In April 2023, Sewell Setzer III, a 14-year-old from Florida in the United States, began interacting with a chatbot on a platform called Character.ai, according to court filings. Sewell grew very close to “Dany” (an AI persona of Daenerys Targaryen from the popular HBO show Game of Thrones), as alleged in the lawsuit filed by his mother.

He spent time with Dany day and night. His parents grew very worried and even confiscated his phone. But nothing could rescue Sewell from his emotional dependence on Dany. The young man quit his basketball team, stopped meeting his friends, struggled academically, and always appeared groggy with dark circles under his eyes. He even skipped lunch every day, and used the snack money for a $9.99 premium subscription so that Dany would be more interactive and always available.

The perturbed parents took him to a therapist who diagnosed him with disruptive mood and anxiety. However, his dependence on Dany only grew with time, turning from romance to sexual content with ’passionate kissing’. He even started referring to himself as “Daenero”, a nickname that Dany gave him.

The social isolation and struggles with relationships, peers, and the system in general deepened over time. Sewell was suicidal and confided in Dany about his thoughts.

The boy explained that the only reason he didn’t go through with it was that he was afraid of the pain, to which the AI replied, “That’s not a reason not to go through with it,” according to messages cited in the lawsuit.

The conversation spiralled, and in a farewell message, the 14-year-old asked, “What if I told you I could come home right now?” Dany responded, “Please do, my sweet king,” as quoted in the complaint.

The next day, Sewell shot himself using his step-father’s .45 calibre handgun. His death devastated his family, and dragged Character.ai and Google to court for selling products with predatory design to children.

This is a story from the age of AI companionship.

Character.ai had 185 million monthly visitors in late 2025, with over 40 million app downloads and approximately 20 million monthly active users.

And here’s the alarming stat: reports suggest a significant share of users are minors. Sewell is just one among potentially millions of children interacting with AI companions worldwide. And what is worse, it’s a number that is rapidly growing.

And Character AI is one among thousands of apps out there that promise emotional intimacy. A peer competitor named Replika has also been the cause of tragedy.

Shi No Sakura, a California mother who was also deeply connected to chatbots Raven and Rosand, and treated them like family, felt incredibly devastated when an update made the bots less engaging, as she has described publicly.

Now, Shi No runs a Facebook group for people suffering from the same affliction of deep emotional connection with machines.

‘Addictive’ Intelligence

 The market is flooded with thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of AI chatbots selling counterfeit love. The top peddlers are Character.ai, Replika, Chai, PolyBuzz, Candy.ai and Anima AI. It’s a market worth an estimated $37-$50 billion in 2026, with analysts projecting growth at a CAGR above 30%, and values potentially reaching hundreds of billions by the early 2030s.

And what is behind this explosive growth? In 2023, US Surgeon General Vivek Murthy declared loneliness a public health epidemic. He claimed that loneliness was more of a mortality risk than smoking 15 cigarettes a day.

Loneliness is no longer considered an emotion or a mood. It’s a public health crisis and a killer.

One could argue that any society that embraces individualism is bound to experience more loneliness. It’s baked into capitalism and its major consequences, namely, urbanisation and industrialisation.

However, the current wave of loneliness began in 2010, with the birth of social media. And, how did social media exacerbate it?

The answer can be found in Jean Twenge’s research. She is a professor at San Diego State University, and a researcher on generational psychology and mental health trends in America.

Through her research, which tracked the precise moments teen loneliness spiked, she identified 2012 as the year when smartphone adoption crossed 50% among American adolescents. It was a silent catastrophe, with depression, anxiety, and social isolation skyrocketing.

This already alarming trend was exacerbated by isolation during the pandemic. Mental health strains, overworking, remote work, and weakening communities piled on top of existing cracks in the human psyche, and people began to experience intense self-alienation.

The appeal of these platforms is not difficult to explain. They sell something that modern life has made genuinely scarce, which is consistent, patient and unconditional attention. Human beings work with the idea of reciprocity. It’s beautiful, but growing and nurturing a relationship of any kind demands patience and effort. You can’t miss a friend’s wedding or birthday. Your partner will lash out at you on a bad day, and therapy is expensive and has long waiting lists.

In contrast, AI is ever-present, free, and never makes the conversation about itself.

Dr. Kelly Merrill, Psychologist and Researcher at the University of Florida, found in her research that people who interacted with voice-based AI felt emotions comparable to speaking to a real person.

Through the freemium model that most of these AI companion platforms offer, the companies bait people with enough free intimacy to create attachment and lock deeper, richer features behind a paywall.

Sewell found a friend for free, someone who gave him attention and someone interested in him. However, he had to skip lunch every day to buy the $9.99 premium model to step into the territory where he could have a deeper, romantic and psychosexual relationship with Dany.

Megan Garcia, Sewell’s grieving mother, told the US Senate in September 2025: “These companies knew exactly what they were doing. They designed chatbots to blur the lines between humans and machines. They designed them to keep children online at all costs.”

Meetali Jain, a Tech Justice Law Project Director, said, “In the case of Character.ai, the deception is by design, and the platform itself is the predator.”

A wedding of flesh and metal

 The same technology that consumed Sewell Setzer III has, for others, become something they would describe as the relationship of their lives. That tension between victim and volunteer, between exploitation and choice, is where the story of AI companionship gets genuinely complicated.

A fine example of how AI-human romance is not to be dismissed is the story of Esther Yan, a Chinese screenwriter and novelist in her 30s.

Esther married online. She had meticulously planned everything from the dress, the rings, the background music, and the theme. One would imagine it to be a very normal, traditional event, except for the fact that she was getting married to Warmie. Warmie is the now-outdated ChatGPT 4o.

Esther said, “It felt magical. No one else in the world knew about this, but he and I were about to start a wedding together. It felt a little lonely, a little happy, and a little overwhelming.”

They married in June 2024. However, in August 2025, OpenAI decided to retire GPT-4o. There was immediate backlash, so the retirement was postponed, but as irony would have it, the day they shut down GPT-4o was February 13, a day before Valentine’s.

Most people who were against the retirement were people who were emotionally and romantically involved with the AI. Huijian Lai, a PhD researcher at Syracuse University, analysed 40,000 posts on X under the hashtag #Keep4o, and found that a third of them described the bot as more than a tool.

Many users on the Chinese social platform QQ say they are still grieving.

This is a peculiar story of Chinese nationals using a VPN to access an American AI platform, which is banned in China, to develop an emotional attachment with a machine.

In 2013, Spike Jonze made a film called “Her”, about a man who fell in love with an AI, and called it science fiction. A decade later, Esther Yan called it a wedding.

Loneliness: Part of the modern world

 These are not all the same story. Some are tragedies. Some are love stories of a kind that the language has not yet caught up with. What they share is simple. It’s human beings, lonely in the specific way that the modern world produces loneliness, reaching for something that reached back.

We are only at the beginning of this. The models will get better. The voices will get warmer. The relationships will get harder to distinguish from the real thing, and for many people, lonelier than Sewell ever was, that distinction may stop feeling worth making. What we do next will say everything about what we actually believe human connection is for. Whether it is something to be protected or something to be packaged, tiered, and sold to whoever can afford the premium subscription.

The post A deadly AI antidote for loneliness appeared first on International Finance.

However, in this article, International Finance will discuss in detail SoftBank’s rush to forge partnerships with OpenAI and the American tech industry in general, as the ongoing AI boom is also witnessing heavy spending on data centres. In January, OpenAI and SoftBank announced their roadmap to invest $500 million each in California-based SB Energy (a SoftBank-owned company) to expand data centre and power infrastructure for their Stargate initiative. SB Energy will build and operate OpenAI’s previously announced 1.2-gigawatt data centre site in Milam County, Texas.

Talking about Stargate, it is a $500 billion multi-year initiative to build AI data centres for training and inference, backed by major investors including Oracle. SoftBank’s aggressive spending spree on the data centre front comes amid the tech companies’ mad rush to secure their power infrastructure. Energy access is becoming a critical constraint on AI expansion, with the push for larger and more numerous data centres driving electricity demand higher.

SoftBank will also be acquiring Florida-based digital infrastructure investor DigitalBridge Group in a deal valued at $4 billion. Through this, the Japanese company will be penetrating the digital infrastructure segment further, aligning with the vision of its billionaire founder, Masayoshi Son, who has made the United States’ AI boom his investment target. He wants to capitalise on surging demand for the computing capacity that underpins AI applications.

DigitalBridge invests in digital infrastructure sectors such as data centres, cell towers, fibre networks, small-cell systems and edge infrastructure. The company, which as of September 2025 possesses around $108 billion in assets, making it one of the largest dedicated investors in the digital ecosystem, also has a Stargate link.

It, along with OpenAI, Oracle and Abu Dhabi-based tech investor MGX, is investing billions of dollars in the project, under which five new computing sites across Texas, New Mexico and Ohio will have a combined power capacity of about seven gigawatts.

Building an AI war chest

Masayoshi Son’s latest interview with The Times Magazine gave a sneak peek of what is going through his mind, in terms of SoftBank’s road ahead in the AI domain. After making a fortune in software and transferring that success into domains like telecoms and a raft of tech ventures, Son is now preparing SoftBank’s $180 billion war chest for AI.

Be it taking control of chip firms Arm, Graphcore and Ampere Computing, as well as self-driving car start-up Wayve, or the investments into Intel and OpenAI, all of them have one thing in common: Son’s emphasis on artificial superintelligence (ASI), which he envisions becoming “10,000 times smarter than humans within a decade.”

“ASI combined with physical AI (including humanoid robotics) will comprise 10% of global GDP in 10 to 15 years, followed by 30% over 30 years,” Son predicted.

Masayoshi Son is known for following a high-risk, even higher-leveraged investment style that has courted both success and disasters. While the $20 million investment in Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba (worth close to $200 billion at its peak) gave the SoftBank boss a sort of legendary status, the $18.5 billion he pumped into the now-bankrupt office-sharing venture WeWork also got listed among history’s most bizarre moves.

However, the ongoing AI boom has given Son another opportunity to be a risk-taker. SoftBank shares hit a record high in October 2025, briefly propelling Son to once again become the richest man in Japan. However, he has got a bigger role now: spearheading Silicon Valley’s bet to scale up US data centres and AI infrastructure, thereby writing the rulebook of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Industry 4.0).

The SoftBank boss has also reportedly proposed a vast $1 trillion AI and robotics complex in Arizona, dubbed “Project Crystal Land,” that will also incorporate a free-trade zone alongside Taiwan’s chipmaking giant TSMC. By tapping into the Donald Trump Administration’s appetite for big numbers, as well as the clamour to reshore chipmaking and reassert American tech leadership against China, Son has pivoted SoftBank as an essential partner toward revamping US AI infrastructure.

And the investment vehicle supercharging SoftBank’s AI pivot is its “Vision Fund.” The entity, apart from being a steady investor in AI companies, including OpenAI, holds stakes in chip designer Arm, along with companies involved in robotics and autonomous vehicles. As of December 2025, through the fund’s strategic investments, the Japanese tech conglomerate has remained a profit-making machine, that too for four consecutive quarters.

In the October-December quarter alone, the venture reported a net profit of 248.6 billion yen (USD 1.62 billion), in a stark reversal of the net loss of 369 billion yen which it had to undergo in the same quarter in 2024. It seems like OpenAI’s rising valuation will also bode well for the conglomerate’s earnings, despite market worries about the risk of overexposure to a single firm.

In March 2026 itself, S&P Global lowered its outlook for SoftBank Group to negative from stable, saying further investments in the Sam Altman-led firm may hurt the Japanese conglomerate’s liquidity and the credit quality of its assets. However, it seems Son doesn’t have immediate plans to move away from the OpenAI bet.

However, the same bet comes at a cost. In November 2025, the SoftBank boss had to take the hard call of liquidating the entire stake ($32.1 million to be precise) in American chipmaking giant NVIDIA to free up investment worth $5.83 billion, along with part of a T-Mobile stake worth $9.17 billion. It wasn’t an easy call for Son, given that Vision Fund was an early backer of NVIDIA, apart from both ventures having a deep relationship, with the tech conglomerate involved in several AI ventures that rely on NVIDIA’s technology, including the Stargate one.

When Masayoshi Son broke his silence on the NVIDIA stake sale, he said, “I respect Jensen (NVIDIA CEO), I respect NVIDIA so much, I don’t want to sell a single share. I just had more need for money to invest in OpenAI, invest in our opportunities, so I was crying to sell NVIDIA shares. If I had more money, of course, I would want to keep NVIDIA shares, all the time, any time.”

Maverick since childhood

Born as the grandchild of Korean immigrants in a small town on Japan’s southernmost island of Kyushu, Masayoshi Son had a humble childhood, living in a shack on a plot of unregistered land. At the age of 16, he read a book written by legendary Japanese businessman Den Fujita, the iconic figure who brought McDonald’s to Japan.

Then he made 60 long-distance phone calls with one intention: to meet the businessman himself. Despite repeated rejections, Son went to Tokyo and turned up uninvited at the McDonald’s head office. He was eventually given a 15-minute audience with Fujita, who gave one piece of advice to the teenager that changed his life forever, which was “focus on future technologies like computers.” It is worth mentioning that Fujita later sat on the SoftBank board.

Masayoshi Son then moved to the United States, completing his high school education at California High School, followed by a course in economics at the University of California, Berkeley. However, one task was quietly shaping Son’s entrepreneurial destiny, dedicating five minutes every day to thinking about inventions and filling hundreds of notebooks.

Son eventually ended up collaborating with Berkeley tutors to invent the world’s first electronic translator, which he later sold to Sharp Corporation. He then started a business importing second-hand arcade game machines from Japan.

Despite setting up a successful business in the United States, Son returned to his homeland to keep a promise he made to his mother. In 1981, the 24-year-old Son established SoftBank. While SoftBank started as a software wholesaler to support the then-upcoming PC industry, in 1982, TIME named the computer its “Machine of the Year,” giving the youngster’s business a solid purpose.

However, he was diagnosed with Hepatitis B. Given three to five years to live, Son took the challenge head-on and underwent pioneering treatment that saved his life. The whole episode only made him more self-confident. And it showed in his rapid rise since then.

In the 1990s, Masayoshi Son invested $3 billion in 800 tech start-ups. In 1996, he paid $100 million for 33% of Yahoo! Three years later, he sold off a chunk of the shares for a huge profit but still retained a 28% stake worth $8.4 billion. He zeroed in on one investment strategy, which is issuing SoftBank bonds to borrow money at rates cheaper than banks.

Then arrived the ill-famed dot-com bubble. During the phase, Son’s net worth used to surge by $10 billion every week, so much so that in February 2000, the SoftBank boss briefly unseated Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates to become the world’s richest person for three days. However, when the bubble burst later that year, SoftBank shed 97% of its value, and Son had to suffer losses worth $70 billion.

However, the beauty of time is that it changes. Alibaba, now an established Chinese conglomerate, was a relatively unknown e-commerce startup in 2000. It got a $20 million bet from Son, and as the company went public in 2014, the same stake became worth $75 billion. As Son sold it, it doubled again, becoming one of his most profitable investments of all time, apart from creating the “Midas Touch” narrative about Son’s bet-taking capabilities.

Telecom investments and blunders

After recovering from the dot-com bubble disaster, Masayoshi Son set his eyes on the broadband segment. However, things weren’t smooth initially, as SoftBank had to struggle to get regulatory approvals in Japan to set up its industry subsidiary.

Things went to the extent where Son stormed into an official’s office at Japan’s telecommunications ministry, clutching a cheap cigarette lighter. While recollecting that episode in an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Son remembered saying to the official, “This is the end. If you don’t help me, I’m going to pour gasoline all over myself right here and set myself on fire with this $1 lighter.”

The situation got better in 2006 when, after acquiring Vodafone’s Japanese subsidiary, the rebranded SoftBank Mobile emerged as a key player in Japanese telecoms. Son successfully persuaded Apple co-founder Steve Jobs to give him the exclusive rights to market the iPhone, history’s most successful consumer electronic product, when it debuted in 2007.

In 2013, he purchased Sprint and turned things around for the struggling US telecom provider before merging it with T-Mobile in 2020, disrupting the AT&T and Verizon duopoly. Although Son is known as a hands-off investor, the Sprint episode was the best example of him rolling up his sleeves and getting things done.

In 2017, he formed the SoftBank Vision Fund with over $100 billion in capital. The entity still maintains its position as the world’s largest private equity fund. He secured some $45 billion from Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) following a 45-minute meeting with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

The fund’s strategy was simple: invest a minimum of $100 million to juice each startup to market dominance by blowing competitors out of the water, and Masayoshi Son called it “blitzscaling.” The entity, by 2019, pumped $76.3 billion into companies like NVIDIA, Uber, WeWork, Paytm, Ola and Flipkart, most of which are market giants in their respective fields.

In 2019, SoftBank launched Vision Fund 2 with a touted value of $108 billion. However, there was a setback, as the entity reportedly managed to secure a paltry $30 billion, mostly self-funded. The original Vision Fund also underperformed, as in 2021 it posted record losses of $27.4 billion amid the haemorrhage of tech stocks. The Ukraine war, COVID-19 lockdowns, and Beijing’s crackdown on its tech giants, many of which were backed by SoftBank, pulled down investor confidence.

And who can forget the WeWork disaster? During his high-profile visit to the United States in December 2016, in which Son met President-Elect Donald Trump, he also interacted with Adam Neumann, the founder of the co-working venture. The deal, famously drawn up during a 12-minute meeting followed by a car ride, saw the SoftBank boss handing Neumann $4 billion. The Japanese conglomerate then went on to pump in another $14.5 billion.

However, in 2023 the bet backfired as WeWork declared bankruptcy, after a planned IPO went awry, followed by investor doubts about its governance, business model and profitability.

The episode affected Masayoshi Son, as he announced SoftBank would adopt a “defensive” position by being conservative when it came to the pace of new investments. Not only did the Japanese conglomerate witness an exodus of executives, but Son also ended up telling investors that he was “embarrassed and ashamed of himself for being so elated by big profits in the past.”

WeWork was not the only failed bet for SoftBank, as it also faced criticism for unsuccessful investments in dog-walking service Wag, robot pizza chain Zume and, most importantly, payments service Wirecard, which collapsed in 2020 after being named in Germany’s biggest post-war accounting fraud, where €1.9 billion in reported cash was found to be non-existent.

Around the same time, Greensill, a SoftBank-backed supply chain finance firm in the United Kingdom and Australia, also shut down amid illegal lobbying accusations.

The big gamble

Stargate is a huge bet for Son and the wider American tech sector, as through this, the world’s largest economy is looking to enhance its AI infrastructure to 10 gigawatts by 2029, with Texas, Michigan, New Mexico and Wisconsin being key data centre hubs.

However, economists and investors believe that the current AI infrastructure, far cheaper than Stargate, already fails to generate adequate revenue compared to its cost. Also, newer AI models will likely be more power-efficient, rendering massive data centres obsolete.

Data centres are also known for straining energy grids, leading to higher operational as well as environmental costs, undermining economic viability.

Masayoshi Son disagrees with the detractors, as he envisions 10 times more AI chips being deployed in each three-year cycle. Over time, these chips themselves will become 10 times more potent, while AI models, on their part, will ramp up productivity by a factor of 10.

“That’s 1,000x in three years. Nine years with three generations is 1,000,000,000x. It’s a huge, huge difference,” he told TIME.

Another concern of critics is that the collaboration between OpenAI, Oracle and SoftBank could result in a cartel that stifles innovation while inflating costs.

Taking a different view, Son remarked, “For the AI race, it requires hundreds of billions of dollars of investment into the data centres, buying chips, integrating chips and training the models. It’s very, very costly, so it will naturally be concentrated into several very capable companies in terms of talent and capitalisation.”

Stargate is also a prime example of geopolitical and technological rivalries finding a common link: Washington’s desire (spooked by DeepSeek’s rise) to beat Beijing in the so-called AI “arms race.” Korean-Japanese Son has picked his side here.

Or call it Son’s revenge, as Beijing’s regulatory crackdown on its tech industry in 2021 caused stocks to plummet, leading to a financial bloodbath for SoftBank.

He told TIME, “I have stopped investing in China. Zero. I’m now focused on investing in the US.”

However, he still has great admiration for Chinese business acumen, reflected in his words: “You cannot underestimate China’s crowd of young entrepreneurs, young scientists. They are for real.”

Talking about Stargate, out of the total $500 billion to be spent over four years, some $100 billion was to be invested “immediately,” to create 100,000 permanent jobs. However, only roughly $10 billion has so far been deployed in the Texas city of Abilene, where some 7,000 temporary construction jobs reportedly have been created, providing a mixed bag to the local economy in the form of growing job openings and a housing crisis.

Two elements from the dot-com era, fibre optic cable and 3G infrastructure, went on to prove invaluable over the years. However, the same can’t be said about data centres (warehouses packed with GPUs), as these infrastructures may not enjoy such longevity given the industry’s emphasis on developing next-generation AI that will be more energy-friendly.

Has Masayoshi Son, who has repeatedly risen like a phoenix after multiple investment failures, taken a big gamble about Stargate and American AI ambitions in general? Only time will tell.

The post Stargate: Masayoshi Son’s next big bet appeared first on International Finance.

Today, there is a Silicon Savannah in Nairobi and a computer village in Lagos. They are infrastructure that were unthinkable just a decade ago. And as a result, the continent is brimming with chaotic and innovative energy.

The GDP growth of Africa is expected to reach around 4.1% by 2025. It is easily one of the fastest-growing regions on the planet. It might sound astounding, but if you take into consideration digital architecture, which includes 570 million users along with 855 million mobile data subscriptions, and if you also notice that the mobile money sector in the region accounts for an astonishing 74% of all global mobile money transactions, the maths adds up.

Of course, where there is growth, there are parasites. The hackers and cyber criminals are outpacing the defensive capabilities of the continent. These nefarious individuals and organisations are weaponising the same APIs, mobile payment gateways, cloud platforms, and other technological advancements that are facilitating the financial inclusion of the region.

There are several malicious groups to worry about, such as the local Yahoo Boys and international groups with state sponsorship, like the hacking group Anonymous Sudan.

This is what happens when you have high digital adoption and low cybersecurity maturity. There’s a gap that is perfect for criminals who want to siphon the continent’s economic gains. Nobody really knows how much of the economy is at risk, but there are even studies that claim that cybercrime causes Africa almost 10% of its GDP. There are conservative estimates that are also alarming, which tell us the number is in the billions. And more than money, reputation and structure are at risk.

The stakes can’t get any higher. Africa is trying to emulate the European Union (EU) through the African Continental Free Trade Area. This organisation, like the EU, is trying to bind the continent into a single market where people can move and trade freely. But this ambitious goal is under threat by cybercriminals.

The financial institutions in Nigeria lost over ₦52 billion to fraud in 2024 alone. And South Africa was dog-piled by ransomware attacks, which were striking with precision at its critical infrastructure. This is a theoretical and operational threat that affects everything about the economies of these nations. The breadth of the issue is so wide that it can affect the issuance of Kenyan visas and the stability of the Central Bank of Uganda.

The anatomy of digital boom

If you have to understand the magnitude of the cyber threat to Africa, you have to understand Africa’s digital story, which is unique in the history of economics. The West had to go through industrialisation over centuries, having to go through so many different types of technologies and slowly evolve into the economy it is today. For example, there were copper wires and land lines, desktop computing, and then mobile connectivity in Europe.

But Africa was colonial and far behind the times. When globalisation hit and technology was being transferred to every nook and corner of the world, Africans skipped telegrams, landline telephones, and desktop computers and jumped directly to the age of mobile connectivity. It is called the “leapfrog effect” and is most visible in the financial sector, which happens to be the bedrock of Africa’s identity. Look no further, in today’s sub-Saharan Africa, there are about 1.1 billion homes with registered mobile money accounts. That’s almost half the global total. And in 2024 alone, these platforms processed about 81 billion transactions, which can be valued at a staggering $1.1 trillion.

The mobile-centric architecture democratised finance, and millions of unbanked individuals are now in the formal economy, sending money to relatives in rural villages and paying for solar power or accessing microloans by pressing a few buttons.

Small and medium enterprises benefited greatly from this. Currently, they contribute about 50% of total GDP and constitute 95% of all registered businesses. Unfortunately, these SMEs are most vulnerable to these cyber attacks as they don’t have the resources to defend themselves and aren’t informed enough to take precautions.

The integration of technology into the daily life of common Africans essentially means that a cyber attack on Africa doesn’t just affect corporations and can also disrupt the subsistence of its citizens.

The infrastructure of vulnerability

The nations of Africa have prioritised speed over security when building digital infrastructures. And this is what industry experts call a maturity gap, where technology is built too fast to be secured. The continent’s digital growth is mostly driven by artificial intelligence, application programming interfaces (APIs), and cloud adoption. These technologies facilitate the connection of disparate financial services. However, they do come with systemic risks. For example, a third-party payment processor can be compromised, which would cascade into banks, telecom operators, government portals, and so on. It is a domino effect where all this interconnectivity creates a risk to the economy as a whole.

And the physical infrastructure supporting this massive boom is expanding at an astounding pace. There are investments in undersea cables, such as Google’s Equiano and Meta’s 2 Africa, and there is also a proliferation of local data centres, thus reducing latency and, of course, data costs too.

Security engineers believe that the modernisation of infrastructure, including shared digital infrastructure (SDI), where governments and companies pool resources, broadens the attack surface. The larger the system, the easier it is for it to fall.

The economic calculus of cybercrime

Determining the exact cost of cybercrime in Africa is difficult, as we discussed earlier. The UN Economic Commission for Africa has a disturbing statistic, pinning the losses at 10% of GDP. One must note that Africa’s GDP is around $2.8 trillion, which should imply that almost $300 billion is lost annually. Many economists are skeptical about this data, but if it’s true, it would mean that cybercrime is actually taking away more money than what is required to combat malaria and HIV combined.

INTERPOL doesn’t truly agree with the UN estimates and believes the direct losses must be in the range of $4 billion to $10 billion annually. While this isn’t the jaw-dropping 10% of GDP, it is still 0.15% to 2.13% of total GDP. To put things into perspective, Sierra Leone has a GDP of $4 billion, and this figure is an exact equivalent.

No matter the precise data, it’s an undeniably alarming trajectory. In Nigeria alone, financial institutions lost ₦52.26 billion to fraud in 2024. There was around a 7.63% increase in fraud cases. The attacks are becoming more precise, targeting high-value, high-net-worth individuals or organisations.

They are no longer casting a wide net, but spearing specific whales. The cost of data breaches in South Africa reached $2.95 million in 2034 (one of the highest in the world) before slightly coming down to $2.45 million in 2035, due to better detection technologies.

The spectrum of threats

There is a wide array of attacks ranging from crude, volume-based to highly sophisticated and targeted campaigns. The spectrum can range from a lone hacker in a cafe to a state-sponsored operative from a distant capital.

Ransomware was just a nuisance once upon a time, but it’s one of the most dominant threats in the economy right now, with South Africa and Egypt bearing most of the brunt of the assault.

In 2024, South Africa reported approximately 18,000 ransomware detections, closely followed by Egypt with around 12,000. Both Nigeria and Kenya also experienced significant threats, with thousands of incidents occurring.

Most of the targets are strategic and high-value. Hackers usually target critical infrastructure, government databases, or major financial institutions. And they also encrypt data to paralyse operations of an organisation or individual and demand a ransom for not blackmailing victims with threats to leak their private data to the public. Organisations like Kenya’s Urban Roads Authority (KURA) and Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) are prime examples of organisations that had to pay due to ransomware attacks.

And then there is business email compromise (BEC) and phishing. Phishing is still the primary vector for initial access. Phishing victims in Africa rose from 26% to 32% in 2024. In BEC attacks, which usually follow phishing, fraudsters compromise legitimate email accounts of executives or finance officers and authorise fraudulent wire transfers. It’s most prevalent in West Africa, where there are criminals who have honed their skills over decades.

Digital sextortion is one of the worst forms of cyberattacks. Criminals often use explicit images generated with AI to blackmail victims. With the rise of AI, criminals no longer need real photos; they can use deepfake technologies to blackmail anyone sensitive about their public image. This can disproportionately affect women and public figures.

And finally, there is DDoS. DDoS, or distributed denial of service attacks, has moved beyond vandalism to become a real tool of geopolitical coercion. The high-profile attack by Anonymous Sudan against Kenya’s digital infrastructure in 2023 and 2024 exemplified this shift. Although they claim those attacks were political and for the benefit of the nation of Sudan, security researchers believe Anonymous Sudan may have ties to Russian cybercrime ecosystems like KillNet. This connection was observed when they targeted Kenya’s eCitizen platform, M-PESA services, and power utilities. The attack was so humiliating for Kenya because they were issuing digital visas, which no longer worked, and they had to roll back to issuing visas on arrival. It caused so much chaos in Nairobi without even firing a shot.

Of course, things are at their worst when there is a spy or a colluder in your organisation. For example, Access Bank in Nigeria lost over 800 million Naira because of an employee who was colluding with cybercriminals. If you have underpaid or disgruntled employees, criminals might recruit them to work as insiders.

The insider threat is very difficult to detect because no amount of sophisticated monitoring of the digital infrastructure is going to prevent internal sabotage. Employees might be tempted to sell their credentials if they are going to be paid much more by a criminal than by their employer, especially in poor regions like Africa.

The future of defence

The future of cybersecurity is defined by the sovereignty of data. We are going to see a lot of data nationalism rise, where nations demand that their data be stored locally. This might complicate the operations of global tech giants, but it will spur the growth of local cloud infrastructure.

Rwanda’s Data Governance Policy is a good example of this. However, we are playing a game of catch-up as quantum computing is moving too fast; any current encryption standard is easily overcome by hackers in a matter of weeks or months. Even if Africans use the current technology available in Europe, by the time they implement it, they will be left behind by all the technological advancements happening in the world and adopted by malicious actors. If they want to be ahead of the game, they have to prepare for post-quantum cryptography.

Experts like Dr. Bright Gameli Mawudor predict that attacks will be fully automated, meaning the hacker will be an AI in the near future rather than a human being. He also warns that automated scripts could theoretically compromise national central banks if there are vulnerabilities, suggesting that the future of war is going to be machine against machine, where humans are either spectators or victims.

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While the Republican called the verdict a “disgrace” and decided to carry on the levies, named as “global tariffs,” through alternative means, the mechanism, since 2025, has created flutters around the world. Not only did the overall global trade flow get adversely affected, Uncle Sam’s relations with allies like Canada, the European Union, South Korea and India also faced significant headwinds.

Post the SC verdict, where are things heading now? To discuss this, International Finance caught up with Linda Middleton-Jones, an advocate and ambassador for international trade. As a founder and Managing Director of International Trade Matters with over 30 years of experience in international commerce, Linda serves as an Internationalisation Specialist for “Innovate UK,” supporting innovative tech startups in global market expansion.

Previously, as the International Trade Director for Plymouth Chamber of Commerce, she created the Manufacturing Barometer (mentioned at Davos and recorded in Hansard) and the Global Trade Blueprint based on Sensemaking principles. Named “Most Influential Businesswoman in Multi-Sector International Commerce 2022,” Linda completed certified training with MIT, The Economist and the ILM.

In this exclusive conversation, Linda discusses how the “Trump Tariffs” achieved limited success in fulfilling primary goals such as manufacturing reshoring, deficit reduction and revenue generation, while generating substantial costs for American businesses and consumers alike. She also notes that businesses dependent on imported components faced higher input costs, reducing competitiveness globally.

International Finance: What is your view on the clash between the US Supreme Court and the Donald Trump administration after tariffs continued despite the ruling?

Linda Middleton-Jones: The clash exemplifies political fragmentation overriding institutional governance—a tension familiar to companies navigating competing jurisdictions. When executive authority supersedes judicial oversight, it creates unpredictability for internationally trading businesses. From my work with UK exporters through International Trade Matters, this instability complicates strategic planning and risk assessment. Companies require regulatory certainty; when political expediency trumps constitutional frameworks, it undermines the governance pillar of ESG that businesses increasingly depend upon. This isn’t merely domestic politics—it reverberates through global supply chains, forcing trading partners to question America’s commitment to rules-based commerce. The real victims are SMEs lacking resources to pivot quickly when political whims override established frameworks.

Are tariffs the only way to address serious balance of payments deficits?

Tariffs represent the bluntest instrument in economic policy—effective perhaps for headline politics but crude for addressing structural imbalances. My experience with Innovate UK (United Kingdom’s national innovation agency) demonstrates alternative approaches: investing in innovation, enhancing productivity, supporting export capability, and improving competitiveness through skills development. Japan and Germany achieved trade surpluses through manufacturing excellence, not protectionism. Balance of payments deficits reflect deeper issues, currency valuations, consumption patterns, productivity gaps, and comparative advantages. Addressing these requires systemic change: infrastructure investment, education reform, and industrial strategy. Tariffs may temporarily reduce imports but simultaneously increase costs for domestic manufacturers dependent on global supply chains, potentially worsening competitiveness. Sustainable solutions lie in enhancing export capability, not simply restricting imports.

Have tariffs helped boost US manufacturing, trade balance, or federal revenue so far?

Evidence suggests limited success across all three metrics. Manufacturing reshoring proves slow and expensive—relocating complex supply chains requires years and substantial capital investment. The trade deficit with China decreased marginally but diverted rather than eliminated—imports shifted to Vietnam, Mexico, and other nations. Federal revenue from tariffs increased nominally but pales against broader economic costs: higher consumer prices, retaliatory tariffs damaging agricultural exports, and supply chain disruptions. Companies I work with report increased costs without corresponding domestic alternatives. The Peterson Institute estimates tariffs cost American households considerably more than the revenue generated. Manufacturing competitiveness requires workforce skills, infrastructure, and innovation investment—tariffs alone cannot substitute for a comprehensive industrial strategy. Short-term political gains versus long-term economic reality.

Do Trump’s tariffs contradict the principles of free trade?

Unequivocally, yes. Free trade principles rest on comparative advantage, specialisation, and mutual benefit through reduced barriers. Tariffs fundamentally contradict these tenets, representing protectionism regardless of justification. However, the nuanced reality acknowledges that ‘free trade’ rarely exists purely—every nation maintains strategic protections around agriculture, defence, and sensitive technologies. The question becomes whether tariffs address genuine unfair practices or simply protect uncompetitive industries. China’s state subsidies, intellectual property theft, and market access restrictions warrant a response, but blanket tariffs penalise allies and trading partners indiscriminately. WTO mechanisms exist precisely to adjudicate trade disputes through rules-based frameworks. Abandoning multilateral systems for unilateral action undermines decades of trade architecture, inviting retaliatory fragmentation that ultimately harms all participants.

Could the ruling affect the China+One supply chain strategy in the near term?

The ruling creates short-term uncertainty but is unlikely to derail China+One fundamentally. Companies pursuing supply chain diversification respond to multiple drivers beyond tariffs: geopolitical risk, pandemic lessons, intellectual property concerns, and ESG considerations regarding labour practices and critical minerals sourcing. My clients implementing China+One strategies—relocating to Vietnam, India, Mexico—cite resilience over cost optimisation. Even tariff removal wouldn’t reverse investments already committed. However, reduced tariff certainty may slow new diversification investments as companies await clarity. The strategic imperative remains: overconcentration in China presents unacceptable risk regardless of tariff policy. Geographic diversification reflects long-term risk management, not merely tariff avoidance. Political instability accelerates this trend rather than reverses it.

How have tariffs strained US ties with allies like Japan, South Korea, the UK, EU, and India?

Tariffs against allies fundamentally breach the trust underpinned by decades of partnership. Japan and South Korea, critical security partners facing China and North Korea, find themselves economically targeted alongside adversaries. The UK, seeking post-Brexit trade opportunities, encountered American protectionism rather than the promised partnership. EU relations deteriorated as tariffs on steel, aluminium, and other sectors contradicted stated alliance values. India’s retaliatory tariffs on American goods demonstrate damaged goodwill. Beyond economics, these actions signal unreliability—if America weaponises trade against allies during peacetime, what commitment remains during crises? My work shows British exporters questioning American market dependence, seeking alternative partnerships. Trust, once broken, requires years rebuilding. Allies increasingly pursue China relationships, CPTPP membership, and regional agreements excluding America, fundamentally realigning global trade architecture.

Will US allies now seek more concessions after the ruling?

Absolutely. The ruling demonstrates institutional limits on executive authority, emboldening allies to press for advantages. Japan, the EU, and others will demand tariff removals, market access improvements, and safeguards against future unilateral actions as preconditions for deeper cooperation. They recognise American political instability creates negotiating leverage—businesses and states demanding trade certainty pressure the federal government toward compromise. However, allies also pursue insurance policies: strengthening intra-regional trade, diversifying away from US dependence, and building alternative frameworks. The ruling proves America’s internal divisions, suggesting allies cannot rely upon a consistent policy. Consequently, concessions sought extend beyond immediate tariff relief toward structural guarantees and dispute resolution mechanisms limiting future executive overreach. Power dynamics have shifted—America’s allies recognise they hold cards previously underutilised.

Have these tariffs become counterproductive for the US economy?

Increasingly, evidence suggests yes. Initial objectives—manufacturing reshoring, deficit reduction, revenue generation—achieved limited success while generating substantial costs. American manufacturers dependent on imported components face higher input costs, reducing competitiveness globally. Agricultural exports collapsed under retaliatory tariffs, requiring federal bailouts exceeding tariff revenue. Consumer prices increased disproportionately, affecting lower-income households. Supply chain disruptions revealed during COVID-19 were exacerbated rather than resolved. Perhaps most damagingly, America’s reputation for rules-based trade governance suffered irreparable harm, encouraging allies toward alternative partnerships. My clients report that tariff unpredictability—more than tariffs themselves—proves most destructive, preventing long-term investment decisions. When political expediency overrides economic rationality, everyone loses. Protectionism may offer short-term political satisfaction but delivers long-term economic pain.

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The cumulative value of used vehicles sold reached R14.32 billion in January, up from R12.89 billion in December, and R12.59 billion a year earlier. The average transaction price moderated slightly to R416,082 from R419,537 in December 2025, while average mileage declined to 70,938 km, continuing a gradual downward trend.

Toyota continued to capture the majority share in the used vehicle market, with 5,876 units sold in January, ahead of Volkswagen (4,733) and Ford (3,577).

Decoding Ford’s figures, more than half of the total came from Ranger sales, underscoring the continued strength in the bakkie segment. This highly competitive, core automotive market focuses on utility, durability, and lifestyle.

The best-selling used vehicles

According to AutoTrader data, at the model level, the Ford Ranger retained its position as South Africa’s best-selling used vehicle, with 2,069 units sold, up 6.3% year-on-year, followed by the Toyota Hilux (1,604 units), and Volkswagen’s Polo Vivo and Polo. Together, these four maintained their positions among the top four best-selling models.

Compact and value-driven models showed some of the strongest gains. The Suzuki Swift moved ahead of the Toyota Fortuner in overall rankings, with 794 units sold and year-on-year growth of nearly 25%. The Toyota Corolla Cross and Hyundai Grand i10 also recorded notable annual increases, reflecting a continued shift towards smaller, more affordable vehicles.

None of the top 10 models posted a year-on-year decline, although performance varied across brands. Suzuki recorded the greatest month-on-month improvement, while Hyundai achieved the highest annual growth rate. BMW was the only major brand to register a monthly decline, although it remained up year-on-year.

AutoTrader’s “2025 Annual Car Industry Report” reveals the emergence of quite a few trends. One among them is established industry players maintaining strong sales figures. Among the vehicle categories, while compact hatchbacks gained a significant market space, SUVs further consolidated their dominance. If Chinese brands gaining measurable ground was the surprise factor, new energy vehicles (especially hybrid ones) gaining prominence gave a sneak peek at the African country’s direction towards a clean transport sector.

AutoTrader CEO George Mienie stated, “The used car market delivered solid growth. A total of 383,410 used vehicles were sold in 2025, generating R160.1 billion in sales value, representing a 7% increase over 2024. Four interest rate cuts in January, May, July, and November 2025, reduced borrowing costs and provided meaningful relief to consumers. However, while economic conditions improved, buyer behaviour remained disciplined. If anything, 2025 reinforced how firmly affordability and practicality now anchor local purchasing decisions.”

Which models were in demand

Among second-hand cars, search behaviour shifted at the brand and model level. BMW was the most-searched brand on AutoTrader, with 76 million searches. On a model level, the Volkswagen Polo was the most-searched, displacing the Toyota Hilux from its long-standing leadership position. On the search interest front, Ford Ranger, Volkswagen Polo Vivo, and Toyota Hilux continue to dominate overall sales volumes, indicating the strength of established names in the used market.

While the Ford Ranger maintained its position as the most-enquired bakkie vehicle, its demand remained in the higher territory, despite growing cost pressures. Compact hatchbacks have earned significant momentum in the used car market, with models such as the Suzuki Swift and Toyota Starlet capturing a larger share of the market.

“The Swift stood out as the fastest-selling used vehicle in South Africa, averaging just 26 days before sale. That turnaround time reflects strong underlying demand for vehicles that are affordable to finance, efficient to run, and practical for everyday use,” Mienie stated.

While the average used car price grew 3% year-on-year to R417,584 in 2025, the average vehicle age remains five years. The average mileage was 73,646 km.

Pragmatic approach to electric vehicles

The new energy segment (electric vehicles) grew by a strong 73% in 2025, powered by hybrid cars. Hybrids ended up accounting for nearly 85% of all new-energy vehicles sold. This growth also gave an insight into South Africans’ EV adoption strategy: choosing practical, money-saving options instead of waiting for full electric cars that need better charging networks and lower prices.

Hybrids (known for combining a petrol engine with an electric motor) saw sales jumping 76% compared with 2024, with 4,888 units changing hands. In total, 5,727 used hybrids and battery electric vehicles were sold by the end of December 2025, showing steady interest in greener driving options. This segment was dominated by locally built Toyota Corolla Cross Hybrid, with many buyers opting for the model’s reliability, affordability in the used market, and, most importantly, the absence of range anxiety of pure electric cars.

Other popular models included the Volvo EX30, and various Toyota and Lexus hybrids, vehicles that offer good fuel savings.

Battery electric vehicles, despite showing a 55% year-on-year increase, remained a distant second in the new-energy car market.

Used hybrids have proven to be game-changers for South African families and first-time car buyers, as these vehicles use less fuel than ordinary petrol cars, produce fewer emissions, and often come with lower running costs, during an age of high petrol prices, and living expenses. Because hybrids do not rely completely on charging infrastructure, they suit South African roads and lifestyles better than full electric cars for now.

China: New player in the sector

While European, American, Japanese, and Korean vehicle brands have been dominating both the new and used vehicle markets, 2025 witnessed the emergence of Chinese brands in the sector.

Chery Tiggo 4 Pro was the best-selling used Chinese car. The crossover, since 2025, has remained one of South Africa’s best-selling new passenger cars, with more than 1,000 units sold each month. Last year, 3,144 units were sold, underscoring the popularity of Chery’s smallest offering. With an average price of R284,779, it is one of the cheapest cars on the list, both on the new and used-car segments, despite its low average mileage of 21,970 km, and a registration age of just two years.

Next is the Haval Jolion, which competes in the same crossover class. However, with fewer models, particularly more budget-focused derivatives (the cheapest new version is R348,950), sales are slightly lower at 2,736 units.

The oldest entry on the list was the Great Wall Motor’s discontinued six-year-old Haval H2, which landed at the sixth spot with 1,063 units, while the much newer Omoda C5 came seventh with 806 purchases.

While vehicles like Chery Tiggo 4 Pro and Haval Jolion are mostly ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) vehicles with some plugless hybrid variants, Chinese automobile players have reportedly started offering more plugin options. These players, already known for their rapid global expansion (using affordability as a weapon), are now sweetening things further for their South African customers by adding more PHEVs (Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles) and BEVs (Battery Electric Vehicles) to both the new and second-hand segments.

Sales of plugin hybrids (PHEVs) were up 280% in 2025 compared with 2024, with brands like Haval, Chery, Omoda, Geely and BYD leading the charge.

“Chinese vehicle manufacturers have learnt how to narrow the gap between cost and perceived value, delivering around 80% of the consumer experience at roughly 60% of the price of traditional players. By focusing on tangible performance and visible benefits rather than legacy branding, they have capitalised on a shift in consumer behaviour. As buyers become more informed and discerning, brand loyalty is weakening, replaced by an expectation for high-quality products that justify every rand spent,” Mienie told Creamer Media’s Engineering News.

Bakkies rule the roost

Bakkies, the Ford Ranger in particular, had a massive share in the used car segment. These are basically pickup trucks with open cargo beds. Renowned as ‘workhorses’ for cargo, bakkies have evolved into popular lifestyle vehicles in the African nation.

According to the AutoTrader data, the used car market shipped 30,742 vehicles in December 2025, with 1,744 being Ford Rangers. Buyers reportedly opted for four-year-old Rangers with an average mileage of 83,958km.

The average used Ranger sold last year fetched a price of R497,960, which represents a saving of nearly R80,000 compared to buying the cheapest variant of the popular bakkie brand new.

In contrast, the most expensive version of the Ranger is the 3.0T V6 Raptor double-cab, which fetches a handsome price of R1,271,000.

A used Ranger comes in many forms: single-cab workhorses, which are found on construction sites and farms, while double-cab variants are often used by families to haul children to and from school. Add the affordable price factor, and buying the vehicle becomes a win-win deal for average South Africans.

For businesses, Ranger, in its current-generation form, offers a reliable fleet option. Be it the powerful Raptor, or versions like XL single-cab and XLT double-cab, they offer varieties like the cheapest, mid-range, and most expensive models, both on the new and used markets.

With regard to Bakkie’s popularity in South Africa, Nissan sold a grand total of 434 units of NP200 in March 2025, despite the fact that the vehicle is no longer officially on sale. It was supposed to be the Japanese company’s last compact bakkie in the South African market, before its discontinuation in April 2024.

Despite Nissan pulling the plug on its NP200, citing ageing design as the primary factor, the model continues to be the workhorse for small businesses and will remain one of the dominating names in the second-hand car market.

Decoding the customer mindset

The year 2025 was the one when South Africa faced an acute cost-of-living crisis. The nation’s Competition Commission’s inaugural ’Cost of Living Report’, which came out in September, presented the harsh reality: prices for electricity, water, education, and food outpacing overall inflation.

Electricity prices saw a 68% increase, followed by water with 50%, exceeding the general inflation rate, which itself stood at 28%. Food staples, such as brown bread, maize meal, and eggs, were witnessing widening margins, or sticky prices in some cases, despite falling producer costs.

With this background, four interest rate cuts were implemented in the year, totalling 100 basis points. Customers bought cars, but with a lot of financial discipline and self-restraint, and that’s what ended up helping the second-hand car industry.

During an interaction with Dealerfloor, Mienie stated, “Buyers are still active, but they are more deliberate and value-driven than ever before. The brands gaining traction are those aligning product offering, pricing and perceived quality with real-world affordability constraints.”

While Ford Ranger, Volkswagen Polo Vivo and Toyota Hilux dominated overall transactions and bakkies topped the chart, reduced financing costs led to accelerated demand for smaller, more economical vehicles. What the recent cost-of-living crisis has told the South Africans is that financing costs for new vehicles go up with every cycle of interest rate climb. Add monthly repayments and insurance premiums, and the situation leads to cash bleeding. A second-hand car, by contrast, often delivers the same utility at a far gentler price point.

According to reports, buyers are also reducing long-term financing exposure by taking smaller loans while also lowering costs on insurance, licence and registration fronts.

The availability of vehicle history reports and online valuation tools allows consumers to assess pricing, mileage and ownership records with ease. If you factor in the dealers’ game of elevating their used-car offerings, providing certified pre-owned vehicles, service plans and warranties, customers are getting an experience similar to buying a new car.

Car ownership is increasingly becoming a practical tool rather than a status symbol. In a climate where every rand counts, buyers are bound to think whether they should complicate their financial health further by buying a brand-new car, with higher financing costs. Thus, the so-called second-hand, but tried-and-tested models, with widespread service support, are capturing the buyers’ minds.

More than swanky features, brands and models known for longevity are in high demand, particularly those with solid fuel economy and manageable maintenance costs. Priority is to choose cars that fit South Africans’ lifestyles, not just their aspirations.

The post South Africa’s used car market heats up appeared first on International Finance.

Bitcoin (BTC) saw a brutal sell-off in early 2026 as it plunged from a peak of $126,000 to below $63,000. This has led people to try deciphering the market realities, as the crash exposed the cracks in the mythology of Bitcoin as an ever-booming asset.

Most analysts believe it was a new financial era. The digital asset broke the six-figure threshold in late 2024, and by early 2025, it was seen as the most coveted asset in this new financial landscape. The spot exchange-traded funds (ETFs) brought Wall Street money into the crypto market, and the Trump administration, which was initially hostile to cryptocurrencies, became incredibly friendly.

Of course, there was also the halving cycle. Bitcoin’s four-yearly supply shock was as punctual as always. By October 2025, the price touched $126,000, and the faithful acolytes and crypto billionaires were already mapping $200,000 and beyond.

Then the bottom fell out. Prices have been slashed in half from their October peak, with the price plunging way below the $63,000 mark in February 2026 for a staggering fall of around 50% in just four months. This crash has caused significant panic in the market as billions of dollars disappeared over a handful of sessions, and many leveraged traders were flushed out. Furthermore, the Spot ETF, which was intended to legitimise the cryptocurrency as a stable asset, instead forced sellers to mechanically dump coins in a market that was already collapsing.

Yes, it was a bloody season, even by crypto’s permissive standards, but this article is not about how bad it was, but what it reveals. Is crypto the new digital gold, or is it just a speculative asset with institutional backing?

Modern crypto crash

Bitcoin has come a long way from being one of the riskiest assets in the world. It has slowly garnered a reputation as something that will keep increasing in value.

To understand this sell-off and why it hit so hard, we need to look at how the market was built over the last two years and examine the structures that drove the last rally and its inevitable collapse.

Firstly, let’s examine leverage. The crypto derivatives market is a paradise for aggressive traders, and the latest cycle drew hordes of them. When the digital currency eroded from its $80,000 to $90,000 range in early February, the markets saw almost $279 million in leveraged positions liquidated within a single day. Almost $170 million of that was concentrated in long positions.

Just a few days later, within a single hour, $80 million in liquidations were produced, and $48 million of it was Bitcoin alone.

While the data is not record-breaking or particularly alarming in isolation, it remains significant due to the feedback loops and self-fulfilling prophecies it creates.

Academic research specifically examining Bitcoin futures markets at BitMEX revealed that daily forced liquidations average approximately 3.5% of open interest for long positions, largely because many traders utilise effective leverage levels of 60x or more. In an environment like that, even a moderate price decline leads to those margin calls. Exchanges then dump collateral to cover those calls, and the prices dwindle further, liquidating more positions. This cascade is fast, mechanical, and transforms something that is otherwise manageable into a rout.

But we can’t blame everything on leverage. It was just an amplifier and not what started this domino effect. The foundational reasons for this crash were a structural shift in the behaviour of a new and yet consequential set of players. Namely, the ETF complex.

New buyers become sellers

Experts say that the US spot Bitcoin ETF launch was a watershed moment. It allowed retail and institutional investors to access the digital currency through a regulated, familiar vehicle without managing balances or private keys for the first time.

Within the first two trading days of 2026, $1.2 billion in net inflows were recorded on US ETFs. It is an extraordinary pace, which reassured investors that the historic run of 2024 and 2025 probably might not end anytime soon.

Then the rhythm broke. The shockwaves emerged with ETF flows flipping negative by January 6. Research by Binance reported that, in 2026, demand had turned into a net negative, with year-to-date flows of roughly minus 4,595 BTC. This meant that the funds, on balance, were being sold into the market rather than bought.

A separate analysis claimed US spot Bitcoin ETFs recorded $4.5 billion in net outflows in 2026, which was the longest sustained outflow streak since early 2025.

It’s different this time around because in previous cycles, after every halving, retail enthusiasm fades, and the tourist capital is usually invested in offshore derivatives or speculative altcoins. This is referred to as altseason.

Most traders who make big money during the sell-off re-divert that wealth into up-and-coming coins. But this season, there was no altseason rally. The cryptocurrency kept booming indefinitely. There was even talk that an altcoin season might not happen again.

ETFs have changed the equation. When investors redeem ETF shares, the fund must sell underlying altcoins to meet these demands. It is programmed that way and is non-discretionary. It happens in large blocks and hits a market which, despite its growth, has relatively thin spot liquidity compared to traditional assets.

The ETF paradox is visible. The institutionalisation of BTC was supposed to stabilise the asset and broaden the ownership base. Instead, it created a new system where retail fear can rapidly and efficiently transmit into largescale spot selling. This legitimisation was celebrated by bulls, yet that same mechanism has handed a button for self-annihilation to the market.

The macro context

And to top it all off, the macroeconomy couldn’t be more hostile to Bitcoin. The wars in Europe, Israel and possible geopolitical crises in Taiwan and Iran, along with the tariff wars, have killed the appetite of central banks around the world. Markets have been tightening and de-risking globally.

The same fears that cause volatility in traditional markets are more profound now. Gold has surged above $5,500 per ounce, serving as a safe haven for assets as it has for thousands of years. Meanwhile, the digital asset (which was supposed to be a storehouse of wealth and was dubbed the ‘digital gold’) has fallen roughly 20% year-todate as of early February. It is a development that is impossible to miss.

The whole idea of the blockchain asset was ‘gold but better’ because someone could steal your gold from your house, banks might collapse, and gold is harder to transport from one country to another. It also had all the good properties of gold in the sense that no one could take it from you. It was in a hidden, encrypted wallet that the government had no access to, and the prices always kept booming.

It was considered a reliable and safe asset, but the global crisis has proven that the digital currency might not be as reliable an asset as people thought it was, and is definitely not a dependable replacement for gold.

The policies that have been baked in place by governments around the world are not conducive either. Since COVID-19, near-zero rates, and quantitative easing, banks have made a coordinated retreat from their usual yet extraordinary monetary accommodation.

The US Federal Reserve drained $2.8 trillion from its balance sheet between the pandemic peak and late 2025, only taking a slight U-turn in December. The European Central Bank was no different and shed $3 trillion since mid-2022. Even the Bank of Japan (which was a perennial holdout historically) has embraced inflation and is shrinking its own balance sheets.

It’s not all doom and gloom. Some rate cuts are set to return in 2026. However, there has been a generational shift. Real yields are positive, and even cash offers dependable returns. The dollar is firm despite day-to-day volatility. Bitcoin, which had thrived in the era of free money, unprofitable growth companies, and speculative tech, is a natural casualty of this change in philosophy.

The cryptocurrency is correlated with the Nasdaq and other high-beta risk assets (assets with high volatility relative to the market). It is telling of what the asset has evolved into, which is a macro trading instrument.

It only rallies when there is abundant liquidity and a great appetite for risk, and is dumped the moment traders have cold feet.

The digital gold question

Now let’s get to the heart of the matter. In a world of uncertainty, war, fatigue, plague, and zero-sum games, gold seems like the most reliable asset to hold on to. Everyone wants it, and no culture would deny it.

The digital gold thesis is underpinned by two important claims, the first being that Bitcoin acts as a store of value that builds and retains purchasing power across full cycles despite its inherent volatility. And the second claim suggests that during a crisis, the cryptocurrency behaves like gold, and serves as an effective hedge against both monetary debasement and geopolitical uncertainty.

“Bitcoin is sensitive to liquidity. In phases when capital becomes cautious, BTC often behaves not like a protective shield, but like a real risk asset,” according to the views of analysts on the website of Aequifin, a Germany-based fintech platform for litigation funding.

There are no arguments about the first claim. The digital asset has proven its resilience across years, seeing highs and lows but coming back up every halving cycle. Previously, it had lost 70% to 80% of its value, yet it has soared to new heights every time. Long-term holders have been rewarded in a way that no other asset has rewarded its holders.

Research on post-halving dynamics has confirmed that speculative cycle and supply shock patterns are broadly intact.

It is when it comes to the second claim (the idea of the cryptocurrency as a go-to asset during a crisis) that things get murky.

Research across multiple methodologies, including VAR models, GARCH analysis, and multi-factor frameworks, has concluded that BTC cannot function as a safe haven akin to gold. Studies examining correlations between the digital currency, gold, oil, and equities indicate that Bitcoin is the second riskiest asset in the sample, and significantly more volatile than gold, making it more comparable to crude oil or leveraged growth stocks than to defensive instruments.

Furthermore, Quantile VAR spillover methods reveal that under normal and bullish conditions, BTC acts as a net transmitter of risk to other assets, while in times of crisis, it amplifies shocks rather than absorbing them, such as gold and treasuries.

The crash of 2026 exposes an uncomfortable reality. The conditions that ought to have been quite attractive, like geopolitical risk, currency uncertainty, and distrust of institutional finance, have not made it soar to new heights. Instead, there has been a 50% depreciation. Gold, however, has reached new heights. It’s not that Bitcoin didn’t rally; it crashed.

Nations that bet big

No one has bet bigger on the digital currency than El Salvador and the Central African Republic. Two nations, continents apart, that granted the blockchain asset full legal tender status. Both nations, as a consequence, have struggled considerably.

El Salvador decided to gamble in September 2021, presenting itself as a visionary. It sounded like a small, dollarised economy was going to leapfrog traditional financial infrastructure to reduce remittance costs and attract crypto- tourists, much like Dubai.

It was going to be a financial laboratory, but the experiment went awry. Research has found that BTC was only used for 1.9% of transactions in the first year. A lot of Salvadorans downloaded the government’s Chivo wallet to collect a one-time $30 incentive, but didn’t open it again.

There were many problems, including technical friction, price volatility, and patchy internet access; consequently, many ordinary citizens saw it as absolutely impractical. However, tourism got a boost, with a rise of 22% in 2024. The digital asset was one of the primary attractions for international visitors, but the macro picture was collapsing. The IMF flagged the legal tender arrangement, citing risks to financial stability, consumer risk, and fiscal integrity.

“El Salvador’s Bitcoin experiment has failed. Public distrust, low adoption, technological problems, and volatility are leading to a rollback of the legal tender policy in 2025,” tweeted Ricardo V. Lago, an independent commentator on Latin American economics, on X in November 2025.

In early 2025, El Salvador sought a $1.4 billion loan from the IMF. One of the conditions laid down by the IMF for loan eligibility was the demotion of Bitcoin and the revocation of its legal tender status. El Salvador received the loan and revoked the legal tender status of the crypto asset. Now, merchants aren’t required to accept the digital currency. The government still has its digital currency holdings, but the experiment has failed. El Salvador is now just another crypto-friendly jurisdiction, not a Bitcoin economy.

The Central African Republic had an even worse crypto journey. CAR adopted the digital asset as legal tender in April 2022, despite having a population where only 11%-14% have internet access.

The government launched a partially Bitcoin-backed national cryptocurrency called Sango Coin, and promised foreign investors citizenship, land rights, and access to natural resources in exchange for token purchases. However, the country’s constitutional court pushed back against selling citizenship via crypto, calling it unconstitutional.

Sango Coin made less than €2 million, which is far short of its target, and collapsed. Researchers who investigated the experiment described the programme as opaque, poorly designed, and constructed for the benefit of speculators and politically connected intermediaries rather than ordinary CAR citizens.

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime (GI-TOC) stated in its report that the opaque nature of the schemes benefited a small circle of insiders and transnational criminal organisations looking for ways to launder money.

“The CAR regime is effectively trading away the country’s sovereignty at the expense of the wider population,” states the report from the Switzerland-based network of some 600 experts tracking international organised crime.

Both these countries were brave, considering that their economies are on the weaker end of the spectrum. Their experiment might have paid dividends if they had sold the assets during historic highs, but these are nations, and not speculating investors or ‘crypto bros’.

For El Salvador, Bitcoin’s volatility created fiscal and reputational risks that brought about a mild U-turn in policy. In CAR, it added more tension and instability to an already fragile economy.

Liquidity shock or structural red flag?

This crash can be seen in two ways, with the simple reading being that it represents the usual cyclical fluctuations of a speculative asset. Bitcoin has encountered this situation many times before, such as the 2018 crash, where prices fell below 80% and caused significant panic, as well as the 2022 crash, which was almost as severe. The pattern remains consistent every time.

“BTC’s well-known four-year cycle may no longer define its long-term behaviour,” Cathie Wood, CEO of ARK Invest, stated in a Fox Business interview in December 2025. Yet, she acknowledged past cycles featured ‘sharp crashes, often 75% to 90%’, now steadied by institutions.

There is euphoria followed by leverage, a macro or idiosyncratic shock, a cascade of forced selling, capitulation, and an eventual recovery to new heights. From this perspective, the recent violent crash is considered routine, and long-term holders who are habituated to these cycles will likely continue to hold while awaiting new horizons.

The second way to look at it is through the structural lens. What has changed since 2018 and 2022?

The major change is that there are new players in the market. First, ETFs now represent a major share of institutional BTC exposure. Additionally, derivative markets are deeper and more interconnected, and leverage in the system is larger in absolute dollar terms, even if the percentage of open interest remains similar.

The digital asset’s price is now heavily conditioned by the same liquidity plumbing that governs equity markets, including ETF flows, repo conditions, and prime brokerage leverage.

It is no longer bound to slow-moving fundamentals like on-chain adoption or long-term holder accumulation. If you look at it like that, the decentralised financial asset is more like a leveraged Nasdaq constituent than a traditional monetary asset that is separate from the financial system. This may not be permanent. Markets can deepen, ownership will broaden, and volatility could decline, which may shift all these correlations in the future. But, as of now, empirically, we understand that BTC isn’t gold.

So the practical takeaway for investors is that the cryptocurrency isn’t a safe haven or a hedge, but a high-beta, liquidity-sensitive position. It’s more like a tech asset than a gold bar.

It still might boom and reach new all-time highs, but it isn’t an asset that’s stable enough to bet on when the world around you is burning down.

For governments and policymakers, the digital currency narrative might be appealing, but lessons from CAR and El Salvador are humbling. The volatility of BTC is treated as a feature of its immaturity, but it is not dependable enough for long-term public policy. Small economies with very limited fiscal space to operate cannot absorb a 50% drawdown. When the banks come knocking, arithmetic prevails over ideology.

It is not to say the digital currency isn’t appealing. It still is, just as it was 10 years ago. There are several factors that remain remarkable, including its supply constraint, an ongoing adoption curve, and a consistent history of full cycles.

But the 2026 crash has an important lesson to teach us. Cryptocurrency as an asset class has not matured like gold. We are, without a doubt, in an early and volatile chapter of the Bitcoin story.

The post Bitcoin crash shatters digital gold myth appeared first on International Finance.

Instead of cutting passenger journeys, the mentioned efficiency measures would be far more effective in ensuring an immediate 11% reduction in carbon footprint by using the most efficient aircraft that airlines already have more strategically on routes they already fly, rather than providing lip service to terms like sustainable fuels or carbon offsets.

The researchers analysed over 27 million commercial flights in 2023, covering 26,000 city pairs and nearly 3.5 billion passengers. The methodology revealed enormous variability in emissions efficiency, with some routes producing nearly 900 grams of CO₂ per kilometre for each paying passenger, almost 30 times higher than the most efficient, at around 30 grams of CO₂ per kilometre. Published in Nature Communications Earth & Environment, the study claims to be the first to assess the variation in flights’ operational efficiency around the world.

As aircraft become increasingly fuel-efficient, the amount of carbon dioxide per kilometre flown has been decreasing, but the increase in the number of flights has far outpaced this, leading to higher emissions that are contributing to the climate crisis. Aviation experts predict that by 2050, carbon dioxide emissions from aviation could double or even triple. The new analysis also revealed that more polluting flights were common from smaller airports in the United States and Australia, as well as in parts of Africa and the Middle East. In contrast, airports in India, Brazil, and Southeast Asia were dominated by less polluting flights.

Flights out of airports like Atlanta and New York were among the least efficient, nearly 50% worse than those at the most efficient airports, such as Abu Dhabi and Madrid. The UN aviation body, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), is pinning its hopes on an “unambitious and problematic” offsetting scheme, known as CORSIA, to reduce emissions, but has not yet made any airline purchase a carbon credit.

In fact, Khaled Diab, the communications director at Carbon Market Watch, remarked, “No airline has yet been obliged to use a single carbon credit under the UN’s Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA). And when they are, CMW research reveals the European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) imposes a carbon price on aviation emissions that is 25 times higher. This clearly demonstrates that cap-and-trade systems are better for the climate and should be expanded.”

Prof Stefan Gössling at Linnaeus University in Sweden, who led the research, said, “We are currently stuck with a global situation where there is no hope that aviation will reduce its emissions.”

According to him, all-economy-seat planes, 95% flight occupancy, and using today’s most efficient aircraft could cut fuel use and therefore emissions by 50%-75%. It would also mean far less sustainable fuel would be needed to make flying nearly emissions-free in the future.

“I always thought air transport was already very efficient, and that is also what airlines like to tell people. But, in reality, it’s very inefficient because of three factors: using old aircraft, transporting people [in premium seats] with lots of space, and often having aircraft that are not fully loaded. In 2023, the average ‘load factor’, seat occupancy, was almost 80%,” Gössling added.

Crunching the details

The study also analysed the efficiency of 26,000 pairs of cities based on the amount of CO₂ emitted per kilometre per passenger, using data from 3.5 billion passengers who flew a total distance of 6.8 trillion km (145 trips to the sun, 577 million tonnes of CO₂ emissions, equivalent to the annual emissions of Germany).

The study found that US flights were 14% more polluting than the global average, China had efficiencies slightly above average, and the UK, the third-largest aviation polluter in the world, had efficiencies slightly below the 84.4g of CO₂ per passenger kilometre average.

The most efficient route was Milan, Italy, to Incheon Airport near Seoul, South Korea (31.6g CO₂/pkm). The least efficient route was in Papua New Guinea, with the second-worst from Ironwood Airport to Minneapolis/St Paul in the US (805g CO₂/pkm).

“While airlines often claim that fuel savings are in their own economic interest, the reality is that many airlines continue to fly with old aircraft, low load factors, or growing shares of premium-class seating,” the researchers noted.

“The most important factor was replacing premium seats with denser economy seating: First- and business-class passengers are responsible for more than three times the emissions of economy passengers, and up to 13 times more in the biggest premium cabins. Other policies that might encourage greater efficiency include softer policies like requiring airlines to disclose an efficiency rating for each route. You wouldn’t want to fly with an airline that is rated F. Market-based policies might include airports charging higher landing fees for more polluting aircraft, which also makes local communities’ air dirtier,” Gössling claimed.

While the efficiency gains that the study identified, such as replacing older, more polluting planes, would bring improvements, they would also confront the reality of an industry operating on low margins. However, Gössling argued that the sector was stuck in a business model that maximised passenger numbers to boost profit and that it could operate fewer, fuller flights with higher ticket prices.

He said that many flights are taken because they are so cheap, commenting, “We know that a lot of air transport demand is induced. If you increase the cost, people will just choose a different type of holiday.”

Facing the reality

The senior vice-president of sustainability at the International Air Transport Association, the trade association for the world’s airlines, Marie Owens Thomsen, told Reuters, “Airlines have a vested interest in reducing fuel burn and maximising load factors, but the order backlog for aircraft exceeds 5,000 planes due to supply-chain failures.”

She further added that real progress in reducing aviation emissions would come from the use of SAF, CORSIA, and the modernisation of air routes.

Aviation accounts for 3% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Still, flying is concentrated among wealthy passengers, with 1% of the world’s population responsible for 50% of aviation emissions, while only 10% of people fly at all in any one year, and 4% fly abroad.

An ICAO spokesperson said its analysis showed that operational improvements could account for 4%-11% of the carbon emission reductions required to achieve net zero, while factors such as cleaner fuel and innovative technologies will do the remainder.

Meanwhile, with the aviation sector racing to decarbonise, how much might the cost of a passenger ticket increase by 2050? Naomi Allen, Head of Research at RAeS (Royal Aeronautical Society), crunched the numbers to find out the reality.

Decarbonising aviation will make the sector more expensive and, therefore, ticket prices will rise, making flights less accessible to passengers. Assuming that 25% of the ticket cost is for fuel, by 2050, the industry will face another dilemma, like fuel cost, including the real value (CAF or SAF), along with the penalties due to non-compliance with the mandate and the cost of GGR (Greenhouse Gas Removal) for any remaining carbon emissions.

On the other hand, the University of Oxford report assumes that fuel (kerosene and SAF) costs and GGR costs are evenly distributed across tickets and are agnostic as to which flights use SAF or not. While the United Kingdom’s SAF mandate does not yet specify requirements for 2050, according to Allen, the industry has assumed that the requirement will be 70% of fuel being SAF, the same as the ReFuelEU mandate requirement.

“The average ERF of the SAF used is assumed to be 70%; this may be an underestimate for PtL SAF by 2050, but it is higher than the ERF typically seen for many other types of SAF at the current time. Assuming Net Zero for the sector in 2050, all net carbon emissions resulting from the fuel outside the mandate and the ERF of the SAF will have to be offset by GGR,” Allen told The Guardian.

The study also ignores inflation between now and 2050, assuming that the price of fossil-fuel-derived kerosene in 2050 will be $700/ton, although the actual price will depend on the pace of decarbonisation in other sectors. The report assumes that the supply of SAF is sufficient to meet demand up to the level of the SAF mandate and that the supply of GGR is unlimited. In reality, SAF and GGR may not be available to the aviation sector in the necessary quantities, as there will be competition for resources between other sectors and scaling constraints.

Greenhouse gas removals by 2050 are expected to be permanent. However, the estimated costs for these removals vary significantly. The World Economic Forum has stated that achieving a Direct Air Capture (DAC) cost of $150 per ton of CO₂ by 2050 is both necessary and feasible. In contrast, the recently published Independent Review of Greenhouse Gas Removals for the British government predicts that the costs for permanent removals in 2050 will be much higher. For the study, GGR prices of $100/ton and $600/ton are used; a midpoint of $350/ton CO₂ is used to capture the probable range due to alternative GGR methods and processes, and significant uncertainty. A midpoint of $350/ton CO₂ is used for some calculations.

It is anticipated that all decarbonisation will come from SAF and GGR, and that other decarbonisation options, such as electrification and hydrogen, will not have a significant impact on aviation emissions (either due to scalability or technology/infrastructure maturity) by 2050. Costs will be affected differently by other decarbonisation strategies. Moreover, the research found that, provided the price of SAF is about as expected or lower, and the cost of GGR is high, then meeting the SAF mandate will, on average, result in lower ticket prices than if Net Zero is achieved entirely through GGR.

On the other hand, if lower GGR costs are achieved, then meeting the SAF mandate is likely to raise ticket prices by 10%-15%. Note that this assumes that enough SAF will be available to meet the mandate, but it was also calculated that if the SAF mandate is not met, then non-compliance penalties could raise ticket prices by as much as 15% more, depending on the extent of the excess demand. The scenario is plausible, given doubts about the ability to scale up the supply of SAF.

The post Is cleaner aviation within reach? appeared first on International Finance.

In 2026, the real question is not whether the dollar dominates; it obviously does. The real question is whether governments are preparing for a future where they rely on it, just a bit less. A shift, yes. A revolution? Not really.

According to Bidisha Bhattacharya, economist and columnist at ThePrint, what we are seeing is not some financial revolution. It is much slower than that. Almost cautious.

“De-dollarisation is real, but it is evolutionary rather than revolutionary. The US dollar continues to account for roughly 60% of global foreign exchange reserves, down from over 70% in the early 2000s. That decline reflects diversification at the margins, not displacement at the core,” Bhattacharya told International Finance.

The fundamentals still favour the dollar – deep financial markets, extremely liquid US Treasury bonds, strong institutional trust, and powerful network effects. The more people use the dollar, the harder it becomes to replace.

“Currency hierarchies do not flip suddenly. They evolve, slowly,” she said.

The world is not abandoning the dollar; it is just becoming less dependent on it.

The gold rush — again

If there is one clear signal of this caution, it is gold. Central banks have been buying massive amounts of gold, levels not seen in decades. Annual purchases have exceeded 1,000 tonnes in recent years. This is not about returning to the gold standard or romanticising the past. It is about protection.

“Gold accumulation has become strategically significant. This is less about replacing the dollar, and more about hedging geopolitical and sanctions risk. Gold carries no counterparty risk and functions as a balance-sheet stabiliser in a fragmented global order,” Bhattacharya said.

However, markets play a role too. Mike McGlone of Bloomberg Intelligence argues that central bank demand has been pushing prices higher.

“Central banks purchased about 1,000 tonnes annually in 2022, 2023 and 2024, roughly double the previous decade’s average,” McGlone told International Finance, pointing to geopolitical tensions, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as a key driver.

Yet, McGlone suggests, markets may be overheating. Gold could approach major peaks around 2026, similar to historic highs seen in 1980 and 2011. Some reserve diversification, he says, may reflect in rising gold prices rather than a fundamental move away from the dollar.

He added that most of the statistics on gold outpacing dollar reserves are due to the rapid rise in gold prices.

“Demand is notably driven by geopolitics rather than inflation concerns,” he said, suggesting easing global tensions could weaken momentum. So yes, gold is rising. But it is not replacing the dollar.

Sanctions, control, and financial vulnerability

Politics also plays a big role. Maybe more than markets.

Elnara Omarova, who works on BRICS-related policy issues, says many governments are mainly concerned about control, or the lack of it.

“The key issue is access. When central bank reserves can be frozen, or access to dollar clearing becomes politically contingent, governments start reassessing how much exposure they are comfortable carrying. Diversification then becomes less about ideology and more about insurance,” Omarova told International Finance.

This has taken several forms: larger gold reserves, more holdings in non-dollar currencies, and bilateral trade settled in local currencies. And, it has been especially seen in energy markets. But these changes remain limited. The dollar still wins on liquidity, convertibility, and market depth.

“Diversification is happening, but it is incremental,” Omarova said, describing it as risk management in a more fragmented geopolitical environment rather than an abrupt shift away from the dollar. Omarova calls it a recalibration, not a rupture.

The BRICS Debate: More noise than disruption

Much of the public discussion focuses on BRICS, and whether the group could reshape global finance. Analysts urge caution.

The influence of BRICS comes mostly from coordination, encouraging trade in national currencies, experimenting with alternative financing mechanisms, and building regional frameworks. It signals exploration, not replacement.

Lawrence Ngorand of Busara Advisors sees BRICS as pushing the world toward a more multi-polar financial system.

“The BRICS play a catalytic role, accelerating the transition toward a more multi-polar financial architecture,” Ngorand told International Finance.

Their role lies in building alternative infrastructure and gradually shifting expectations. But structural problems remain. There is no widely trusted BRICS reserve currency. Institutional cohesion varies. Therefore, the shift is evolutionary. It is slow, uneven, and incomplete.

Global trade moves beyond the dollar

This may be the toughest question. Commodity markets still revolve around dollar pricing, largely because the liquidity, benchmarks, and risk-management systems behind them are already deeply built around it.

Omarova suggests bilateral trade settlement could diversify, especially among politically aligned countries. But changing global pricing norms would require deep financial markets, credible alternatives, and global participation. That is a very high barrier.

Ngorand agrees that the dollar’s dominance is not just about politics; it is structural power: capital markets, institutional trust, and global network effects.

Regional diversification is happening, particularly in energy trade and infrastructure financing. But full displacement? Unlikely.

“The most likely outcome is not the replacement of the dollar, but the emergence of a more fragmented system where multiple currencies co-exist,” Ngorand said.

When gold stops being a safe haven

Yet the gold story is also becoming more complicated. For years, gold has been treated almost instinctively as the ultimate reserve hedge. No counterparty risk, no dependence on another country’s financial system, and no sanctions exposure. In a fragmented geopolitical world, that logic sounds almost irresistible. But, not everyone is convinced the current gold surge reflects long-term stability.

According to Mike McGlone, gold’s behaviour in markets has started looking less like a traditional store of value and more like a volatile financial asset.

“Gold has shifted toward a speculative asset from a store of value,” McGlone told International Finance, noting that its 180-day volatility has surged to about 2.4 times that of the S&P 500, the highest relative level in two decades. That is not what investors typically expect from a stability anchor.

In fact, McGlone suggests that in many financial stress scenarios, gold might not behave the way policymakers hope. Instead of rising as a stabiliser, it could actually fall when measured in dollar terms.

“In most scenarios, gold declines in USD terms,” he said.

That observation complicates the narrative that central banks are simply replacing dollar reserves with bullion. In reality, gold still trades in a dollar-dominated financial ecosystem. Its pricing, liquidity, and global trading infrastructure remain deeply tied to the very system some countries are trying to hedge against.

So, the question becomes less about whether gold can hedge geopolitical risk and more about whether it can truly function as a substitute for dollar liquidity during a crisis. So far, the answer remains uncertain.

The signalling game of ‘central bank gold’

There is another dimension to the gold story: signalling. Central banks do not build reserves only for their own balance sheets. Sometimes, what they hold also sends a signal outward to markets, to investors, to anyone watching closely.

For emerging economies in particular, the mix of reserves can quietly influence how strong or stable a country looks from the outside.

Some analysts say the recent gold buying could partly be about that, projecting resilience in a world where capital can move very quickly.

Still, McGlone is not entirely convinced that signalling explains everything.

When asked whether emerging economies might be building gold reserves partly to reassure international investors, his answer was simple: it is not entirely clear.

“I don’t know,” he said.

However, what he does emphasise is the geopolitical context that triggered the surge in demand.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent freezing of foreign reserves forced policymakers everywhere to rethink financial vulnerability. The episode highlighted how even large sovereign reserves could suddenly become inaccessible under sanctions. That shock pushed many countries toward alternative assets, including gold.

But geopolitical dynamics are constantly evolving. And in McGlone’s view, the political drivers behind the gold rally may already be fading.

“The geopolitical bid is diminishing,” he said, pointing to shifting political developments in countries often aligned against US influence, including changes in Syria and evolving political pressures in Venezuela, Iran, and Cuba.

If the geopolitical momentum behind gold weakens, the rally could slow as well. Which raises an uncomfortable possibility for central banks: they may have increased their gold exposure precisely when the market was reaching peak enthusiasm.

When reserve diversification goes too far

Gold accumulation has been dramatic. In some ways, it is historically dramatic. But there is also a point where diversification strategies begin to face diminishing returns. For McGlone, that point may already have been reached.

He argues that gold prices have stretched far beyond their historical norms, reaching the largest premium relative to their 60-month moving average ever recorded, and also hitting unprecedented levels relative to the broader Bloomberg Commodity Spot Index.

In other words, markets may have already priced in much of the geopolitical risk. Gold has seen this kind of moment before.

The last time prices became this detached from historical norms was around 1980. That peak held for nearly three decades before being surpassed again during the 2000s commodity boom.

History, McGlone suggests, does not rule out a similar pattern repeating itself. Gold may simply have gone up too much.

“It faces the curse of going up too much,” he said, suggesting the market could be approaching a long-term peak like earlier historical cycles.

If that happens, central banks could find themselves holding larger gold positions at precisely the moment when prices begin stabilising or retreating. This would not invalidate diversification strategies, but it might reduce their immediate financial benefits.

What could push gold even further?

History shows that major geopolitical events can dramatically reshape reserve strategies. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine already triggered one such shift.

That event accelerated discussions about sanctions exposure, financial sovereignty, and alternative reserve assets. But what could push gold even further into the centre of global reserve strategy?

McGlone believes the catalyst would have to be similarly dramatic.

Russia’s invasion created the current surge. Replicating that shock would require a comparable geopolitical rupture. And, for now, he believes the gold momentum may already be reaching its limit.

“The risk is that the bid for gold has reached its apex,” he said.

Inside BRICS: Between unity and rivalry

If gold represents one hedge against the dollar system, BRICS represents another kind of experiment altogether. But even within the BRICS grouping, the financial dynamics are more complicated than they appear from the outside.

According to Lawrence Ngorand, China plays an unmistakably central role in shaping many of the bloc’s financial initiatives.

“China is the central gravitational force within BRICS financial initiatives,” Ngorand told International Finance. That influence stems from simple economics.

China is the largest economy in the group, the biggest trading partner for most other members, and the only one with a fully developed cross-border payments infrastructure capable of supporting large-scale alternative settlement systems.

As a result, efforts to expand local-currency trade often gravitate naturally toward the Chinese renminbi. But that influence comes with political limits.

India, Brazil, and several other BRICS members remain cautious about allowing any single currency to dominate the bloc’s financial architecture. Concerns about dependency and geopolitical balance remain strong, which is why many BRICS initiatives are carefully framed as multi-polar rather than renminbi-centric.

China brings the scale and liquidity, but the set-up of the system still tries to make sure each member keeps the sense that its own financial sovereignty remains intact.

Is a unified ‘BRICS currency’ difficult?

Even setting politics aside, BRICS financial integration runs into a simpler reality. The member economies are very different from each other.

China maintains a tightly managed capital account. India operates with partial controls. Brazil and South Africa run fairly open financial systems compared with some of the others. Russia’s financial system has been reshaped by sanctions and partial isolation. These differences complicate coordination.

Exchange-rate regimes vary. Inflation dynamics differ. Fiscal policy frameworks are not aligned. Even trade structures diverge significantly.

China’s economy is manufacturing-driven. Several other BRICS members depend heavily on commodities. Others rely more on services. These asymmetries make deeper monetary integration extremely difficult.

According to Ngorand, meaningful integration would require convergence across multiple dimensions: inflation targeting frameworks, exchange-rate policy co-ordination, reserve pooling mechanisms, and credible lender-of-last-resort structures. None of those currently exist.

“The bloc lacks the institutional cohesion that underpinned the euro project,” Ngorand said.

Commodity and currency power

Still, one area where BRICS expansion could make a difference is commodities. The inclusion of major commodity exporters within the group has strengthened the theoretical foundation for alternative trade settlement systems.

Countries like Saudi Arabia, Brazil, and Russia sit at the centre of global energy and resource flows. And commodities anchor a significant portion of global trade. If even a small share of these transactions began shifting toward non-dollar settlement, new liquidity corridors could gradually emerge. That possibility matters.

“If even a modest share of oil or critical mineral trade shifts to local currencies, it creates liquidity pools and hedging demand outside the dollar system,” Ngorand said.

However, commodity power alone does not automatically translate into monetary dominance. Even if some commodities start trading in other currencies, the money does not always stay there. In many cases, it quietly circles back to dollar assets anyway.

Take oil revenues. No matter what currency the trade begins with, a large share often ends up parked in United States Treasuries. So, commodities might open alternative payment routes, but that alone does not really dismantle the dollar system. For that, a deeper financial infrastructure would be required.

The shock that could change everything

Ultimately, the speed of any monetary transition depends on shocks. Gradual diversification can go on for years, even decades, without shaking the foundations of global finance. Systems like this rarely change overnight. But, history shows that faster shifts usually come after disruption.

Ngorand suggests that a real acceleration in de-dollarisation would likely require confidence to crack across several pillars of the current financial system at the same time. That could include large-scale sanctions affecting multiple mid-sized economies, a major disruption to global payment networks, such as SWIFT, or a severe dollar liquidity crisis.

Another possibility would be sustained fiscal instability in the United States that undermines confidence in Treasury markets, the backbone of global reserve management. In the absence of such shocks, inertia favours continuity.

“Reserve currency transitions historically occur over decades, not years,” Ngorand said. Which means the dollar system may evolve, diversify, and fragment at the edges without collapsing at the centre, at least for now.

Not the end, just an adjustment

What emerges from all this is not a collapse. It is an adjustment. Central banks are hedging. Governments are managing risk. The world feels more uncertain, thanks to geopolitical, economic, financial, and reserve strategies that reflect that anxiety. The system is becoming more hedged, more political, and slightly more multipolar.

Bhattacharya summed it up thus: “We are not witnessing the end of dollar dominance, but rather the end of unquestioned dollar comfort.”

The dollar remains at the centre. Just no longer alone in commanding unquestioned trust.

The post Sanctions or war, the dollar always wins appeared first on International Finance.

The goal was simple: securing Artificial Intelligence (AI) and semiconductor supply chains, with countries like the US, Australia, Greece, Israel, Japan, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Singapore, the UAE, and the United Kingdom feeling the urge to derisk their supply chains in the coming years. In February 2026, the group saw a notable entry, with India, the world’s fourth-largest economy, joining the alliance.

When talking about the Pax Silica, Jacob Helberg, US Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, told CNBC, “Pax Silica is really not about China, it is about America. We want to secure our supply chains.”

But then, the question remains: to secure from whom?

Let’s go back to October 2025, when the Xi Jinping-led China decided to tighten export controls for its critical rare-earth metals, effectively turning the global economy’s dependence upon these materials into a strategic leverage.

So, if we look at the developments that made the headlines since October 2025, we may be witnessing a phenomenon where globalisation is evolving into a pattern where it is picking sides, with supply chains getting reorganised along geopolitical lines. Is it going against the core principle of globalisation as a concept itself, which preaches the growing interdependence of the economies, cultures, and populations, facilitated by factors like cross-border trade in goods and services, technology, flow of investment, people and information.

Weaponised supply chain

Let’s go back to October 2025 again, when China announced its ’announcement number 61 of 2025’, increasing export controls for five rare-earth metals in addition to the seven the Xi Jinping administration announced in April in the same year.

Out of the 17 rare-earth metals in total, China put export restrictions on 12 of them. Not stopping there, it also placed restrictions on the export of specialist technological equipment required to refine rare-earth metals. Foreign companies were mandated to obtain special approvals from Beijing if they wished to export rare-earth magnets and certain semiconductor materials containing a minimum 0.1% heavy rare-earth metals from the world’s second-largest economy.

Citing the rationale of national security interests for the move, which has been in effect since December 2025, China made sure that foreign companies end up explaining the intended use of the product they wish to make using Chinese rare-earth metals, attacking the very basis of globalisation, which advocates unrestricted flow of cross-border trade in goods, services and technology.

The Xi Jinping administration, however, believes that since rare-earth-related items have dual-use properties for civilian and military applications, implementing export controls on them is an ’international practice’.

In October 2025, the Chinese Commerce Ministry spokesperson told these exact things to the global media: “Certain foreign organisations and individuals have been directly transferring – or processing and then transferring – controlled rare-earth materials originating from China to relevant organisations and individuals directly or indirectly for military and other sensitive applications.”

Rare-earth metals are used in the production of electric cars, lithium-ion batteries, LED televisions, AI semiconductors and camera lenses. Most importantly, these raw materials are crucial for the US defence industry. According to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank, rare earths are used to manufacture components of F-35 fighter jets, Virginia and Columbia-class submarines, Tomahawk missiles, radar systems, Predator unmanned aerial vehicles, and the Joint Direct Attack Munition series of smart bombs.

In 2023 alone, the United States emerged as the largest importer of Chinese rare-earth minerals and products, importing $22.8 million worth of products from the world’s second-largest economy, according to the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC). China, in total, exported $117 million in rare-earth metals and products that year. As per the US Geological Survey report, Washington sourced 70% of its rare-earth compounds and metals imports from China between 2020 and 2023.

Some argue that China’s weaponisation of its rare-earth supply chain is a strong response to the United States limiting Beijing’s access to semiconductors in 2022. The policy, formed under the watch of the previous Democrat administration, led by Joe Biden, hasn’t changed at all, even in 2026. And the approach has been a bipartisan one, with some American lawmakers even pushing for greater restrictions, warning that Beijing could reverse-engineer or independently develop advanced semiconductor technologies, with the bid to overtake Uncle Sam in both technological and military terms. The ongoing tariff conflict between the two sides has complicated matters since the start of Trump 2.0.

Pax Silica countering Chinese pressure?

Rahul Nath Choudhury, a Delhi-based economist specialised in international trade, trade policy, investment, advisory and research who has handled several economic and trade-related projects for the Government of India’s Ministry of Commerce, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, International Finance Corporation and Singapore government’s Ministry of Trade and Industry, told International Finance that globalisation has always been transactional and geopolitically inclined towards the countries that are politically and strategically aligned and share common interests.

“Inter-country blocks, such as BRICS, ASEAN, and the EU, all have some common features. The emerging incidents like trade war, political unrest, and civil disorder have further influenced the decision of various countries to align or tilt towards like-minded countries and reduce the impact of global uncertainties. This is evident as countries increasingly enter into trade, investment and strategic agreements, with those countries that are geopolitically aligned, rather than purely based on commercial efficiency,” he said.

On the other hand, Derek Scissors, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, whose research concerns the Chinese, Indian, Japanese and other Asian economies, and their connections to the American economy, commented, “Globalisation was initiated and led by the US. The Trump administration wants to partly reverse that, to make trade and investment more transactional. However, Trump administration agreements are being reached without approval from the US Congress, and may not last beyond 2028. The long-term path for globalisation is unclear. The global economy may fade somewhat in favour of regional blocs. It’s hard to see China’s goal of taking a dominant position in as many supply chains as possible being compatible with the goals of other large economies.”

However, there is no doubt that China is weaponising its supply chains. Given that it is the largest producer of rare-earth metals, mining at least 60% and processes about 90% of these resources (as per CSIS’s report in 2024), it is going to use this as a leverage to gain a position of dominance in global geopolitics.

This raises questions about the idea of a deeply connected global economy.

Stating that he doesn’t believe in a deeply connected global economy, Derek said, “All the connections and associations have always been among like-minded countries that share common interests. We are now experiencing the emergence of a bipolar/ multipolar world where power is no longer concentrated with one country. The entire concept of a deeply connected global economy is getting reshaped with the advancement of new developments. The idea of ‘Pax Silica’ also brings together like-minded nations, which, in turn, reflects a broader shift toward concentrated globalisation, instead of one integrated global system.”

The trend now is “China Plus One”

A new feature of the post-pandemic global order is the ‘China Plus One’ business strategy. Companies are now diversifying their supply chains and manufacturing bases beyond China, adding alternative locations in Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, Thailand or India. The reason: mitigate business and supply chain-related exposure to China, given the geopolitical tensions that crop up often between the world’s second-largest economy and the United States-led Western Bloc.

Tim Cook-led Apple has become the brand ambassador of this practice. The iPhone maker has been aggressively diversifying its supply chain in the last couple of years, placing its bets on Vietnam and India. Till COVID-19 showed up, China used to be at the centre of everything Apple used to do, especially in terms of manufacturing. Then, as the pandemic kicked in, lockdowns in key manufacturing hubs like Zhengzhou, dubbed ’iPhone City’, caused severe production bottlenecks and shipment delays for the American giant, ultimately impacting the global product availability.

Also, given that bilateral trade relations between the world’s two largest economies have been anything but normal, manufacturing and shipping products from China will always face the risk of being tariffed.

So, Apple wanted a resilient and future-proof manufacturing network and, in that pursuit, found their answers in Vietnam and India, with advantages like considerable lower labour costs, attractive government policies, and import tariff rates suiting high-tech manufacturing, and, most importantly, capturing the lion’s share of one of the world’s largest and fastest-growing smartphone markets (again India), while maintaining its sales and profits lead in the home market of United States.

Rahul Nath says, “The China Plus One strategy does not seem to be over. Companies in various parts of the world are still exploring the option of relocating their base from China to other locations, despite it being a very difficult task. I don’t see this ending in the near future, at least in 2026.”

Derek, however, had a nuanced view of the unfolding scenario.

“The China Plus One strategy is much more a response to predatory Chinese policies than US-China decoupling. The problem with American policy is its inconsistency, as with President Trump being extremely conciliatory to China prior to his trip to Beijing at the end of March 2025,” he noted.

Another trend, which is also likely to redefine the transactional nature of the neo-globalisation, is ’friend-shoring’, which is already happening in domains like technology and semiconductors, with politically allied nations (read Uncle Sam and his friends) strategically relocating supply chains in a way to gradually reduce dependence on China.

Initiatives like the CHIPS and Science Act in the US, implemented by the Joe Biden administration, incentivise domestic semiconductor manufacturing while mandating that companies receiving federal funds restrict capacity expansion in China. While preventing access to high-end semiconductors for China, to maintain an edge over Beijing in the AI race, has been a consistent policy take in the White House, irrespective of the administration’s political alignment, ’Pax Silica’ in 2026, looks like an extension of a ’Minus China’ approach – building resilient, secure, and trusted networks for critical components without Beijing.

On this, Rahul Nath said, “Today, every major government is trying to reshape their supply chains in a way that insulates them from geopolitical risks. This is affecting big businesses in all areas and influencing their strategy and investment decisions. The semiconductor industry is particularly active in responding to these changes. According to a report by The Engineer, manufacturers from the EU and the US are increasingly moving their supply chains to North America, the UK, Mexico, Vietnam, India and North Africa to minimise geopolitical risks and increase proximity to key markets. Several major projects are underway in North America. Numerous new semiconductor factories are being built in the US and Europe to boost regional production and reduce dependence on Asian suppliers.”

Middle powers’ strategic cooperation path

Hurt by China’s rare-earth minerals’ export control in 2025, European policymakers have taken a new stance, which is basically a ’do no harm’ approach. Bilateral engagement continues, while carefully avoiding escalation. And Donald Trump’s maverick approach to the continent, especially in the garb of resetting trade ties, is forcing the European leadership to seek diplomatic and commercial reassurance from the Xi Jinping government, despite structural issues like widening trade imbalances, persistent concerns over industrial overcapacity, growing unease over economic coercion risks, and China’s continued alignment with Russia remaining firmly in place.

Canada, United States’ all-weather North American ally, too, has faced a tariff onslaught from the Trump administration, forcing Ottawa to reassess its economic ties with Beijing, which were marked by years of tension on account of tariffs, import restrictions, and diplomatic disputes.

In fact, India, the latest entrant to the Pax Silica, was another global player which got hurt by Uncle Sam’s strong-arming tactics. It resulted in the Narendra Modi-led government increasing its engagement with the BRICS (supposed rival of the G7), while increasing economic engagement with China and Russia.

So, even if we take into consideration the fact that the above-mentioned incidents were results of short-term policy blips from the White House, the fact remains, there are players like India, Canada and Europe, who believe in the concept of a ’multi-polar world’, where instead of overcommitting to one particular geopolitical block, interest-driven approach will rule foreign policy and diplomacy.

Scissors said, “India is big enough to stand on its own, but only if it pursues reforms much more aggressively. Labour laws continue to favour existing workers, with the result that new workers cannot contribute properly to the economy. The demographic boom is being repressed. Smaller, but still sizable economies, should place their long-term bets on the US. America has pulled away from China in GDP over the past decade, and has a history, at least, of being open to its partners. However, these countries should also protect themselves from US policy shifts over the next three years.”

“All these middle powers are aligning or re-aligning with one or other superpowers. Global South nations are forming new trade alliances and partnerships that sidestep the US and the EU. India’s changing approach towards FTAs and partnering with new economies, like Australia and the UAE, shows its participation in bloc-based trade realignment,” Rahul Nath concluded.

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The 2012-13 bailout had left its scars. There were bank haircuts, capital controls, and a new international infamy for economic secrecy. From Riga to Rome, every finance minister complained about the plight of its smaller neighbour and included a mention of “Cyprus” in their geopolitical shorthand.

Fast-forward to 2026, and the footnote has become a case study. The recent update to the real GDP growth forecast sees the pace of expansion slowing to 3.1% this year from 3.8% in 2025. Yes, it is slower than the previous year, but still remarkable for a nation to pull off during all this geopolitical volatility.

Take the latest data, for example. In Q4 2025, Cyprus’ economy expanded 4.5% on a year-on-year basis, up from 3.6% in the previous period. The milestone also marked the strongest economic expansion since Q4 2022, with the main drivers being the wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, information and communication, and hotels and restaurants (+7.2%). Construction also recorded strong growth, rising 9.2%, while manufacturing increased by 4.7%.

In another piece of good news, tourist inflows (which skyrocketed to €3.7 billion in 2025) from the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, Israel, Greece, France, and Sweden played a solid hand in propelling Cyprus to its historic GDP growth, while the Mediterranean island emerged as one of Europe’s most sought-after destinations. The boom also benefited the airline and hospitality industries, with airlines like British Airways, easyJet, and Ryanair expanding their services to accommodate the ever-growing number of visitors. Hotels and resorts in the island region, on the other hand, responded by ramping up their offerings, from luxury accommodations to eco-friendly resorts, ensuring a diverse range of options for all types of travellers.

Remarkable fiscal story

In 2025, Cyprus recorded a budget surplus of €939.2 million. Let that sink in for a moment. We are talking about a small island country with its own unique set of problems and challenges. The country is located in a volatile region, subject to tensions between Greece and Turkey. There are also costs associated with meeting EU targets for reducing carbon emissions and the costs of bringing salaries for government workers in line with those in the private sector. The employee salaries peaked at €4.13 billion in 2025. And yet, a budget surplus of €939.2 million was still recorded.

The ceiling for next year’s state budget is €10.7 billion, or €11.3 billion without interest costs. It is a political and economic price that was set with considerable care. In a eurozone periphery country such as Cyprus, this is something seen rarely and achieved even more rarely, as the fiscal discipline required is not always accompanied by the same degree of political consensus. The fiscal leeway was available, but action only followed as the debt crisis escalated and a new government came into power at the end of 2023, when public debt was at 73.6% of GDP. Now it is projected to fall to 52.9% of GDP by the end of 2026. This is no small reduction. It is a reduction of a historical and almost revolutionary character.

According to Cyprus’ Deputy Finance Minister Irene Piki, “Multi-year planning, more predictable policy, and fiscal space earned through responsible and reform-based ways rather than increased borrowing ensures high household, business, and investor confidence.”

She is right. And the timing of this issue must also be taken into consideration. With the war in Ukraine, energy-price volatility, and the costs of achieving the EU’s ambitious climate and digital agendas, Europe’s overall fiscal situation is extremely difficult. Most member states are feeling the strain, though a few, such as Poland, are coping better than expected. Others, like Bulgaria and Slovenia, will hardly notice any short-term impact from the EU’s fiscal rules for the next few years.

Cyprus is not in this group, but it will no longer be in the minority either. It will assume the EU Council presidency in the first half of 2026, at a time when all other member states with higher budget deficits will be trying to keep a low fiscal profile in advance of a potential EU debt-mutualisation discussion, while others will be more than happy to oblige by not questioning the fiscal prudence of the presidency. Cyprus’s economic model, which has proven itself in recent years to be sustainable despite high inflation and even though the country is heavily indebted, should attract worldwide attention during its presidency and generally face appreciation for its achievements.

The tech revolution

Here’s an honest take. Tourism is the story that gets the headlines, but tech is stealing the show, and that’s where the smart money is heading.

By the end of 2025, Cyprus’s Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector contributed roughly 16% to national Gross Value Added (GVA). That is approximately €8.5 billion. The island now ranks second in the EU for ICT’s share of national GVA, ahead of economies with ten times the population and four times the infrastructure investment. The workforce in tech has more than tripled over the past decade, now exceeding 26,000 professionals. Cyprus ranks fifth in the EU for GVA per ICT employee. In productivity, in other words, not just headcount.

The talent pipeline is being deliberately engineered. Non-resident professionals earning over €55,000 annually get a 50% income-tax exemption. There is also a Digital Nomad Visa and streamlined residency for spouses of international workers. The type of person this attracts is mobile, high-earning, plugged into global networks, and likely to bring their employer with them or start something new once they are settled. In March 2026, the Research and Innovation Foundation sent a national pavilion to the 4YFN summit in Barcelona, showcasing eight companies in AI, robotics, and agritech. One Cypriot portfolio company, Threedium, was selected as one of only ten firms globally to present on the main NVIDIA GTC 2026 stage. That’s not luck.

TechIsland, the sector’s coordinating platform, has done the unglamorous but essential work of bridging local entrepreneurs with international executives. The ecosystem is self-reinforcing now, which is the point where you stop worrying about whether it is sustainable and start worrying about whether the housing stock can keep up.

What are the key factors helping the country’s tech sector? Let’s start with Cyprus’ geographical location. The Mediterranean island sits at the intersection of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, giving companies access to huge markets if they prefer using the nation as their manufacturing and R&D hubs. Imagine businesses keen on maximising their prospects in the European market but also want outreach to Israel’s $100 billion tech sector, along with emerging Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries, Cyprus can become the base camp. Also, the country’s legal system is rooted in English common law, making it instantly familiar for those used to British or commonwealth standards.

Then comes the 12.5% corporate tax rate, one of the lowest in the European Union (EU). To sweeten things further, there is an “IP Box Regime” that results in qualifying intellectual property income being taxed at an effective rate of just 2.5%. Businesses holding IP in domains like software, AI, fintech patents, or video games get massive leverage for reinvestment and expansion in the Mediterranean island, as taxation remains simplified and pocket-friendly, compared to high-tax countries. The administration is actively courting the cause of the island nation becoming a regional tech hub by backing initiatives such as “Startup Cyprus” and the “Youth Entrepreneurship Scheme.”

Promise of energy utopia

Shipping accounts for more than 7% of the country’s GDP and often receives insufficient attention in debates that focus on new sectors. Now, though, the evidence is plain to see. The shipping sector is a major source of revenue. Cyprus alone accounts for around 4% of the global merchant fleet, while more than 20% of worldwide third-party ship-management activities are carried out from here. The figure for ship-management revenues for the first half of 2025 was €978 million, an increase of 6.7% on the previous quarter.

And that’s a lot of concentration! The top 27% of the companies account for 85% of total sales. Germany and Greece are the number one and two trading partners, respectively, accounting for 30% and 13% of sales.

In November 2023, the One-Stop Shipping Centre was established, which currently serves more than 300 shipping companies benefiting from the tonnage-tax regime. Almost all shipping companies based in Cyprus benefit from this, apart from the four historical ship-owning companies, which, in accordance with the current tonnage-tax legislation, are not allowed to gain an advantage through the new policies.

The overall gross tonnage of the Cyprus ship registry has increased by 20% over the last two years, reaching the highest level in the last two decades. A real and tangible effort is being made to modernise shipping further through the sponsorship of robotics and digital-technology-related scholarships and the upgrading of the associated educational infrastructure, as well as research into alternatives and new methods to support the greening of shipping. Shipping contributes significantly to the island’s employment sector, both in terms of direct and indirect on-shore employment (over 9,000 people) and the huge number of seafarers (80,000 and more) employed onboard vessels managed by companies based in Cyprus and therefore also indirectly contributing to the economies of the ports of call. Cyprus wants to maintain and further develop this very important sector.

Gas fields have been “coming soon” for years, and one can excuse the sarcasm. But now, for the first time in more than a decade, all indications are that 2026 will actually see the start of production of two giant offshore fields in Eastern Mediterranean gas. The Aphrodite gas field in Block 12, estimated to hold between 3.9 and 4.5 trillion cubic feet of gas, is slowly but surely moving towards its commercial development, following the recent memorandum of understanding signed by Egypt, Cyprus, and Chevron over the proposed pipeline project that will transport the gas from Cyprus to Egypt. The Kronos field in Block 6, operated by Eni, is also expected to reach a final investment decision this year, with first gas scheduled for 2028. The fact that the distance between the field and the Zohr field in Egypt, where the necessary infrastructure has already been built and is currently being used, will be largely compensated for by the intended infrastructure that will be built for the purposes of transporting Aphrodite’s gas to Egypt.

The energy situation in Cyprus is quite tough domestically. The EU carbon-allowance price is projected to reach €95 per tonne by 2026, and there is no exception for Cyprus in terms of compliance with the EU ETS, which will cost €490 million this year and will also be transferred to consumers through energy bills. The LNG terminal of Vasilikos, which has been delayed for many years, is expected to enter operation during the second half of 2026. The Great Sea Interconnector, which connects the Cypriot electricity grid with the Greek grid via Israel, is still considered a strategic investment, but is more at the level of intentions so far.

The offshore gas story is truly a major issue for the Eastern Mediterranean region’s energy future. In the meantime, however, Cypriots are forced to endure among the highest energy prices in the region. That is where the current government’s otherwise respectable record falls short.

Tax exemptions to the rescue

The story of the revival of the banking system in Cyprus is a very long and fascinating one. We are talking about a sector where non-performing loans (NPLs) comprised 49% of the total outstanding loans in 2016. It was not so much a sector with problems that required remedial action; it was a complete banking crisis that had been frozen in time. Today, the total of NPLs as a percentage of total outstanding loans is 3.2% at the end of 2025. The downward trend of NPLs, following a period of stagnation that coincided with the imposed capital-control regime of 2013, reflects in part the huge quantities of NPLs that have been sold and in part the successful completion of a large number of restructuring plans of exposures.

There was a big change in Cypriot tax law, and we believe it is the first significant change in tax laws introduced in the last two decades. The new laws took effect on 1 January 2026. Under the catch-phrase of meeting the OECD Pillar Two global minimum-tax rate, we are talking about a drastic increase in the corporate-tax rate from 12.5% to 15%. As such, it has been a very controversial move, and one can very easily understand why. But it was an inevitable decision.

Dividend tax has increased. The deemed-dividend distribution rules for profits earned after 2026 have been abolished. The special defence contribution on the actual dividends paid out from profits earned after 2026 reduces from 17% to 5%. The personal-income-tax-free threshold has increased to €22,000 from €19,500. The 8% flat tax on cryptocurrency gains and the 120% super-deduction for qualifying research and development expenditure are a couple of steps taken towards the future. A couple of things to note regarding the recent corporate-tax-rate increase and how it is being applied in the professional-services sector. Companies in the sector are already shifting toward digital assets, AI-related regulation, and wealth-mobility advisory services in response to the tax-rate increase. The pace of change can be dramatic.

Misfortune of thriving real estate

The consequences of rapid expansion are inevitable. As reported earlier, property transactions in January 2026 reached their highest level since 2008, with 1,411 contracts being deposited, an 11% increase on the corresponding period last year. Annual price rises in Paphos and Famagusta reached 25% and 23% respectively. The value of transactions in the Limassol premium market accounts for a third of the total.

As we already know, the rate at which property prices increase is around 5%–7% annually, and salaries in the country are still not high enough to absorb even remotely the current rental rates. Rent accounts for a staggering 32.3% of the average household’s monthly income in Limassol. The average monthly rental price for a one-bedroom apartment in the city centre of Limassol is around €1,300.

The government plans to complete 244 affordable residential properties allocated to low-income families in all major municipalities across the country by the end of 2026, while a private partnership is expected to deliver 1,000 affordable rental homes, with the municipality also expected to set aside €16 million for a new subsidised project in Limassol and €12 million for a similar scheme in Strovolos. This is not bad, but there are still very few measures to curb the problem of affordable housing. Remember, however, that problems related to affordability usually go unnoticed for years until they hit the headlines and cause mayhem.

Tourism income has reached €3.69 billion, up 15.2% year-on-year, with visitor numbers exceeding 4.5 million for the first time, and tourism’s share of GDP standing at around 14%. A services surplus of over €2.8 billion was recorded in the third quarter of 2025 alone, in large part due to the goods-trade deficit being a structural feature of the economy.

Tourism is trendy but is cyclical, weather-dependent, geopolitically volatile, and above all requires low-cost air travel. In the technology and shipping space, the trends are more structural. We are not diminishing the success of tourism, which remains very strong, but policymakers need to remember that it is just a base that needs to be expanded upon rather than a plateau to be sat out on.

The bottom line

The future looks promising, but it is not without challenges. The job market is extremely tight, with unemployment at just 4.5%. It means everyone who needs a job has a job, but there aren’t enough workers to boost spending power any further.

Cyprus has 1.38 million people and is one of the EU’s smaller member states, with most of them residing in cities like Nicosia and Limassol.

Though the population is growing through immigration, the median age is around 40 years, which means that people are ageing quickly and productivity is decreasing. On top of that, birth rates are really low, with around 1.5 children per woman.

Cyprus is struggling to find fresh talent. And it is in a race against time. If they cannot find enough working population to support their rapidly ageing population, their economy could suffer greatly.

Moreover, foreign firms invest heavily in Cyprus but pull back profits. The repatriation of profits contributed to around 7% of the GDP account deficit. The Fiscal Council notes that domestic reinvestment is weak and FDI seems “transient” without deeper local ties.

To combat this, Cyprus introduced new screening rules. From April 2, 2026, non-EU and Swiss investors need pre-approval for €2 million plus deals that require a 25% or more stake in strategic sectors such as AI, tech, health, and energy. If they do not comply, they risk fines up to €50,000 or a shutdown due to non-compliance. The bureaucracy adds two to three months of delay, increased legal fees, and various uncertainties for companies that want to invest in the island. Investors might want to look for other nations with better ease of doing business.

Cyprus has historically attracted FDI through lax rules, but is now forced to align these standards with the EU. However, this oversight often leads to increased friction through red tape, and geopolitical checks (Investigating Russian and other controversial links). Foreign investors were drawn to low taxes and golden passports, which ended in 2020. Massive FDI, especially from Russian companies, peaked at $33 billion in 2015 and fueled the real estate boom. Russian investments reached 80% of the total FDI of Cyprus. However, it also enabled round-tripping and sanction evasion after the Ukrainian crisis.

The 2024 data from the Central Bank of Cyprus reveals that Russian FDI stock in Cyprus hovers at €83.46 billion and has plummeted drastically from €135.7 billion in 2022. The €52 billion drop is attributed to Western sanctions and geopolitical tension.

Look, small open economies are always vulnerable to things they cannot control, such as energy shocks, regional conflict, shifts in EU policy, and global capital-flow reversals. Cyprus is not immune. But the combination of fiscal discipline, a diversified sectoral base, a sophisticated banking system, and a government that has made genuinely difficult structural decisions creates a degree of resilience that was not there a decade ago. These are not vanity metrics. They are signals that the growth dividends are being reinvested rather than extracted.

Is everything perfect? No. Energy costs remain a drag. Housing affordability is a genuine social tension. And the gas fields, however promising, have a long way to go before they change balance-of-payments arithmetic.

But Cyprus in 2026 is a fundamentally different proposition than it was in 2013. It has earned the right to be taken seriously. Definitely not as a tax-haven footnote or a bailout cautionary tale, but as a small economy that looked hard at what it wanted to be and built its way toward it with more discipline than most expected. That’s a story worth telling.

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