The US Treasury Department on Monday (June 22) issued a 60-day waiver, known as “General License X”, permitting Iran to produce, sell and transport crude oil, petrochemicals and petroleum products through August 21.

The licence also clears previously sanctioned vessels and entities for transactions and allows payments in US dollars, apart from reopening the door to American imports of Iranian crude, a trade that had largely collapsed since the 1990s.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent framed the waiver as part of efforts to implement the last week’s US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) while broader negotiations continue. The exemption also covers shipping, insurance and vessel registration services tied to the oil trade.

The financial stakes are significant. Around 67 million barrels of Iranian crude currently sit stranded in floating storage in the Gulf. Unlocking that inventory could generate USD 8-9 billion for Tehran, according to Miad Maleki, a former Treasury sanctions official now at the Foundation for Defence of Democracies. He said the combined measures amount to a sustained reopening of Iran’s most important revenue stream.

“Production, sales, dollar payments, petrochemicals and protected shipping — all switched on at once. Together, they amount to a sustained reopening of Iran’s most important revenue stream,” he told the CNBC.

President Donald Trump defended the move, saying any resulting oil profits were intended for Iran to buy American agricultural products, rather than funding its military.

China, which buys roughly 90% of Iran’s oil exports, is expected to be the biggest beneficiary. Maleki said dollar clearing would likely prompt Chinese buyers to accelerate purchases, having previously relied on opaque payment channels to avoid secondary sanctions exposure.

Chinese crude imports from Iran had fallen sharply between February and May of 2026, an unprecedented 4.8 million barrels per day, a steeper drop than the one seen during the COVID pandemic (4 mbd decline), according to JPMorgan. Kpler analyst Muyu Xu said buyers were still reviewing the new rules and that any pickup in purchases would depend on pricing and cargo availability.

“The ‘General License X’ also removes the principal banking friction constraining volume, giving both state refiners and independent refineries, or teapots, access to intermediary banking networks they previously had to circumvent,” Maleki noted. He now expects a rapid storage “top-off cycle” under which Chinese buyers could rush to replenish stockpiles before the exemption expires in August this year.

Iranian exports have already shown signs of recovery, with 6.79 million barrels shipped last week, the highest in two months, according to maritime intelligence firm Windward. Geopolitical Strategy chief strategist Michael Feller said Iran would likely use the 60-day window to repair war-damaged oil facilities and secure longer-term contracts with Chinese buyers, calling it a major boost to both Tehran’s economy and morale.

“Iranian crude, which typically trades at a discount to global benchmarks, could also shift to a premium above Brent given demand pressure, further increasing Tehran’s revenue windfall,” said Brett Erickson, a managing principal at Obsidian Risk Advisors.

Iranian officials have also pointed to other gains from the talks. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said Swiss negotiations had produced an agreement to release USD 12 billion in frozen Iranian assets and credited the diplomatic process with reducing violence in Lebanon. He said Iran would keep pushing for Lebanon’s “territorial integrity and national sovereignty” through the talks.

The sanctions relief has drawn criticism from sceptics, who argue Washington is offering major economic concessions before securing firm commitments from Tehran on its nuclear programme or regional conduct. Supporters counter that the measures are designed to build momentum, secure nuclear inspections and lower the risk of renewed conflict in the region.

However, signs of an energy pickup will take time to materialise, said Muyu Xu, a senior oil analyst at Kpler.

“Buyers are scrambling to assess the new authorisation and complete internal compliance reviews — particularly those not previously active in Iranian crude. That said, Chinese buyers’ interest ultimately will rise, though actual procurement will depend on pricing and cargo availability,” Xu told CNBC.

Also Read: US-Iran peace deal: Shipping industry remains cautious on Hormuz front

Also Read: The Hormuz blockade is not just about the oil

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The military conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran began on February 28, 2026. It was not just a geopolitical event, but the beginning of an economic crisis reshaping the daily lives of millions of people in the United Kingdom.

This article is an attempt to explain what is happening, why it matters, and what it means for ordinary British workers, families, and businesses.

Distant war and British utility bills

The worst part of the Middle East conflict has been the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, which passes one-fifth of all oil and LNG. Both Iran and the United States tried to play hardball with the maritime chokepoint to get the better of each other at the negotiation table in Islamabad. The biggest victim of the geopolitical power play has been global energy security.

Before the war, a barrel of Brent crude oil traded at $70-$72, but within weeks, future prices shot up to $119 per barrel. The prices that buyers were actually paying on the spot market (where oil is bought and sold for immediate delivery) reached $150 at the time, driven by intense panic buying and shortage fears.

The shock was specifically compounded for the United Kingdom, as the European country imports a large portion of its energy. Net import dependency stood at 43.8% in 2024, which means that when global energy prices spike, the UK does not have enough domestic supply to shield itself.

Wholesale gas prices inside the UK surged from 78 pence per therm at the end of February to 171 pence per therm in the weeks that followed. That is more than double in a matter of weeks.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) described what happened as the single most significant supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. Global oil supply fell by over 10 million barrels per day in March 2026 alone.

The ripple effects were felt almost immediately at petrol stations across the UK. The average price of petrol rose from 131.6 pence per litre to 140.2 pence per litre. Diesel jumped from 141.1 pence to 158.7 pence per litre. These were not gradual, creeping increases. They happened within a month.

Inflation is back, and it is stubborn

The official measure of inflation in the UK, known as the Consumer Price Index (CPI), rose to 3.3% in March 2026. That sounds like a modest number until you consider that just two months earlier, the Bank of England (BoE) had been close to hitting its 2% target and was preparing to start cutting interest rates. Those plans are now on hold indefinitely.

The largest driver of the March inflation rise was motor fuel, which went up by 8.7% in a single month. The last time fuel prices rose that sharply in a single month was during the early period of the Ukraine war. Food inflation is expected to follow.

The Food and Drink Federation has warned that food prices could rise by as much as 9% by the end of 2026 if supply disruptions continue. Part of the reason is fertiliser. Producing nitrogen fertiliser requires enormous amounts of natural gas, and many fertiliser suppliers in the Gulf and Egypt can no longer export their products because of the maritime blockade.

British farmers are facing doubled fertiliser costs, and many have decided it is simply not worth planting crops this year. Less domestic food production means more imports. More reliance on imports, in a disrupted global market, means higher prices at checkout.

There is also an unusual and little-discussed risk around carbon dioxide gas, which the food industry depends on for slaughtering livestock humanely, carbonating drinks, and preserving packaged goods.

The government has already invested 100 million pounds to reopen an industrial plant on Teesside specifically to ensure a domestic carbon dioxide supply. Major retailers like Tesco say shortages have not yet reached shelves, but the Food and Drink Federation is not ruling out significant gaps in availability by the summer if the Strait remains closed.

Growth has stalled

Britain’s economy was beginning to recover early in 2026. GDP grew by 0.5% in February, which was a small but encouraging sign. That momentum has now been cut short. The EY Item Club, one of the UK’s most respected economic forecasting bodies, now expects the economy to grow by zero in both the second and third quarters of the year. For the full year of 2026, it has cut its growth forecast from 1.4% down to 0.7%.

Matt Swannell, the Chief Economic Adviser to the EY Item Club, warns that the labour market is entering a period of severe distress. Matt remarked, “Spiralling energy costs and disruption to supply chains will push the UK to the brink of a technical recession… The heightened energy prices from the war are also set to deliver the ‘biggest hit since the pandemic’ to the jobs market, with the jobless rate projected to peak at 5.8% by the middle of 2027.”

The International Monetary Fund has gone further in some respects. It identified the United Kingdom as the country that suffered the biggest downward revision to its growth forecast among wealthy nations in its spring 2026 outlook. The IMF now expects UK GDP to grow by just 0.8% in 2026, compared to 1.3% predicted earlier.

The OECD, another major international economic body, expects Britain to have the second-lowest growth rate and the second-highest inflation rate among G7 nations. The United States, by contrast, is expected to grow by 2.3%. The gap is stark.

Why is Britain being hit harder than most? Several reasons compound each other. The UK is a net importer of gas. It has very limited gas storage, estimated at just two days of supply at the peak of the crisis. Its economy is highly integrated with international trade and supply chains. And its growth was already sluggish entering 2026, leaving very little buffer when the shock arrived.

The word economists are reaching for to describe this situation is stagflation. That is what happens when an economy stops growing, but prices keep rising. It is the worst of both worlds, and it is the same condition that devastated many Western economies in the 1970s during the oil embargo. The last thing any government wants to see return.

Jobs are being lost

Behind the big numbers are real people losing real work. British employers cut 11,000 jobs in March 2026, the first clear month where the economic fallout from the Iran conflict showed up directly in employment figures. Analysts from EY Item Club estimate that approximately 250,000 jobs could be lost by mid-2027 if current conditions persist.

The unemployment rate stood at 5.2% at the start of 2026. Forecasters now expect it to rise to 5.8% by mid-2027, which would mean over 2.1 million people looking for work. That would be the highest level of unemployment in more than a decade.

The sectors bearing the brunt are those that depend heavily on energy or on consumer spending. Manufacturing, hospitality, logistics and construction are all under severe pressure. Businesses that were already operating on thin margins are finding that rising energy costs, supply chain delays, and weakening customer demand are simply too much to absorb simultaneously.

Many companies are moving into what economists call a defensive posture. Instead of hiring, investing, or expanding, they are cutting costs and building cash reserves to survive the uncertainty.

The Deloitte CFO Survey, which measures confidence among finance directors at major British companies, recorded a collapse in sentiment to a net figure of minus 57% in late March. That is the most pessimistic reading since the height of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Consumers are pulling back

Ordinary households are responding to the situation predictably. When things feel financially uncertain and prices are rising, people spend less. Consumer confidence, as measured by the Deloitte Consumer Tracker, fell to minus 14.1% in the first quarter of 2026, its lowest level since 2023.

Spending power is expected to fall by 0.3% across the year for the average household. People are cutting back on things they do not consider essential. Travel has taken a particularly sharp hit. Spending on travel fell by 3.3% in March 2026, the first such decline recorded by Barclays in five years.

Jet fuel prices have more than doubled since the conflict began, and airlines are passing those costs on to passengers. International holidays are being postponed. People are choosing domestic breaks instead, or simply staying home.

The hospitality sector, which was already struggling with the April 2026 increase in the minimum wage and higher business rates, is now facing what industry figures are calling a summer of shortages. Breweries are worried about carbon dioxide availability ahead of the football World Cup in June, usually one of the most commercially important periods in the calendar.

What the government is doing

Chancellor Rachel Reeves has been walking a difficult line. On one side, there is enormous pressure to protect households and businesses from rising costs. On the other hand, the government is painfully aware that uncontrolled spending could damage Britain’s fiscal reputation and push up borrowing costs, as happened during the 2022 mini-budget crisis.

“This is not our war, but it is pushing up bills for families and businesses. That’s why it’s my number one priority to keep costs down… Obviously, no sensible person is a supporter of the Iranian regime, but to start a conflict without being clear what the objectives are… I do think that is a folly and it is one that is affecting families here in the UK,” The Chancellor said.

The approach taken has been cautious and targeted. Rather than offering blanket support to everyone, the government has focused on the most vulnerable. It has extended the existing 5 pence cut in fuel duty, saving the average driver around 90 pounds per year. It is also working on contingency plans for further energy bill support in the autumn, when demand for gas heating typically rises sharply.

To fund these measures, the government has expanded the windfall tax on electricity generators. Companies that generate electricity from gas-linked sources are currently making exceptional profits because of how electricity pricing works in the UK market.

The government has raised the Electricity Generator Levy from 45% to 55%, capturing more of those windfall profits and redirecting them toward household support. This levy has also been extended beyond its original 2028 end date.

The government has explicitly said it cannot absorb every price rise on behalf of the population. It is a difficult message to deliver, but it reflects the reality that with national debt on track to reach 100% of GDP by 2029, the room for large unplanned spending is very limited.

Internationally, Reeves has been vocal in criticising the war itself. She has called it a mistake and a folly, language that puts her at odds with US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, who has defended the conflict as a necessary cost for long-term global security.

Reeves led a joint statement signed by finance ministers from 11 countries, including Japan, Australia, Spain, and the Netherlands, calling for a negotiated resolution and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. The diplomatic tension with Washington adds another layer of uncertainty to the UK’s economic relationships.

BoE is stuck

Normally, when inflation rises sharply, a central bank’s response is to raise interest rates. Higher rates make borrowing more expensive, which cools spending and helps bring prices down. But the Bank of England (BoE) is in an unusual bind.

Before the Iran conflict, financial markets expected the Bank to start cutting its main interest rate in April 2026, as inflation had been falling toward the 2% target. Now, with inflation at 3.3% and rising, those cuts have been shelved. But the Bank is not raising rates either.

The reason is that the economy is simultaneously weakening. Raising rates aggressively into a slowing economy risks causing a deeper recession. The Monetary Policy Committee has held the rate at 3.75% and is expected to keep it there for some time.

Economists describe this as an unenviable balancing act. If the Bank holds firm, inflation may become entrenched, especially if workers begin demanding higher wages to keep up with rising petrol and food costs. If it cuts rates, it risks fueling inflation further. The most likely outcome, according to analysts, is that rates stay on hold until around mid-2027, when inflation is expected to gradually return closer to target.

For homeowners approaching the end of fixed-rate mortgage deals, this is unwelcome news. Over a million British households are expected to face higher mortgage payments in the coming months as their fixed deals expire, adding to the broader pressure on household budgets.

Industry under pressure

Some of the starkest stories from the current crisis involve British manufacturers. Energy-intensive industries (those that need enormous amounts of gas or electricity to operate) are in genuine difficulty. Steel, chemicals, glass, ceramics, cement, and paper are all facing input cost increases that many cannot absorb or pass on.

The British Plastics Federation has reported that 58% of its member companies are experiencing severe or significant operational impacts. Almost all of its members are reporting rising raw material and energy costs.

Some firms have added surcharges of up to 30% to their prices, which risks sending customers to overseas competitors, particularly American ones, who benefit from access to cheap domestic natural gas and are insulated from the Hormuz disruption.

The construction sector is also struggling. Output had already fallen by 2% in the three months to February 2026, with private housebuilding dropping 6.5%. The conflict has made things worse through supply chain delays and surging material costs.

Bricks, cement, asphalt, and insulation are all more expensive to produce when energy costs are this high. Construction experts have warned that many projects are moving from commercially challenging to commercially unviable.

One of the most unexpected consequences involves renewable energy. Two major offshore wind projects off the Norfolk coast are facing delays because key components, specifically steel turbine foundations and offshore substations, were ordered from suppliers in the UAE. Those components cannot currently be shipped through the Strait of Hormuz. The conflict that is driving demand for cleaner energy is simultaneously delaying the infrastructure needed to deliver it.

Where things stand

Growth has stalled. Inflation is rising. Jobs are being lost. Businesses are pulling back. Consumers are cutting spending. And the root cause of all of it, the blockade of a narrow waterway seven thousand kilometres away, shows no immediate sign of resolution.

What makes the situation particularly difficult is that even a ceasefire would not instantly fix things. Energy infrastructure that has been damaged takes time to rebuild. Supply chains that have been disrupted take months to restore. And business confidence, once lost, is slow to return.

Britain’s vulnerability at this moment reflects structural issues that existed long before the conflict began. The country is too dependent on imported energy. Its gas storage is inadequate. Its industrial base has been gradually hollowing out for decades. The current crisis has exposed all of that with uncomfortable clarity.

The months ahead will be tough, particularly for lower-income households, energy-intensive industries, and anyone whose livelihood depends on consumer spending. The government and the Bank of England are trying to prevent the worst outcomes. But the margin for error is small, and the decisions being made in Washington, Tehran, and on the waters of the Persian Gulf will matter as much as anything decided in Downing Street or Threadneedle Street.

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This comes a week after a series of downbeat business and consumer morale readings and cautious outlooks from top listed companies. The closely watched set of S&P Global surveys of purchasing managers released recently showed worse to come. It pointed to the 21 countries of the euro zone as among the hardest hit, with the preliminary reading of its headline index for the region falling from 50.7 in March to 48.6 in April – a sub-50 tally that indicates a shrinkage in activity.

The input price index surged to 76.9 from 68.9, showing how eurozone factories are facing a jump in their production costs. The index covering the bloc’s dominant services industry, meanwhile, sank to 47.4 from 50.2, well below a Reuters poll estimate of 49.8.

“The euro zone is facing deepening economic woes from the war in the Middle East. Increasingly widespread supply shortages, meanwhile, threaten to dampen growth further while adding more upward pressure to prices in the coming weeks,” said Chris Williamson, chief business economist at S&P Global.

On the other side of the Atlantic, however, S&P’s gauge of US activity rebounded but was also characterised by the same kinds of panic buying in the face of war-caused supply shortages and price pressures that held back EU activity. Delivery times and output prices hit their highest levels since the post-COVID supply chain snarls and inflation wave peaked around four years ago.

The manufacturing PMI increased to a 47-month high of 54.0 from 52.3 in March, beating economists’ expectations for a reading of 52.5. The measure of new orders received by factories also rose to 54.8 from 52.3 in March. The services PMI also recovered, rising to ‌a reading of 51.3 from 49.8 last month, the first contraction since January 2023.

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According to trade intelligence platform Kpler, since the Iran war began, more than 500 million barrels of crude and condensate have been knocked out of the global ⁠market, in what seems to be the largest energy supply disruption of modern history. Talking about the immediate impact, Iain Mowat, principal analyst at Wood Mackenzie, told Reuters that the lost fuel may end up curtailing the aviation industry’s energy demand for 10 weeks.

In the Middle East, countries lost about eight million barrels per day of crude production in March, nearly equivalent to the combined production of Exxon Mobil and Chevron, two of the biggest ‌oil companies ⁠in the world. As per Kpler, jet fuel exports from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman fell from about 19.6 million barrels in February, to just 4.1 million barrels for March and April so far combined.

“With crude prices averaging around USD 100 a barrel since the conflict began, those missing volumes represent roughly USD 50 billion ⁠in lost revenues,” said Johannes Rauball, a senior crude analyst at Kpler.

The ratio equates to a 1% cut in Germany’s annual GDP, or roughly the entire GDP of smaller European countries such as Latvia or Estonia.

Kpler even stated that the resumption of energy trade through the Strait of Hormuz would mean little for the global economy, as recovery of ⁠output and flows will remain slow. While global onshore crude inventories have fallen by about 45 million barrels so far in April, production outages, since late March, have reached roughly 12 million bpd.

“Heavier crude fields in Kuwait and Iraq could take four to five months to return ⁠to normal operating levels, extending stock draws through the summer. Damage to refining capacity and Qatar’s Ras Laffan LNG complex means full restoration of regional energy infrastructure could take years,” Rauball concluded.

The post USD 50 billion loss in 50 days: Iran war upends oil and gas flow appeared first on International Finance.

The latest estimate from the independent research and intelligence company marks a steep increase from its initial USD 25 billion projection, reflecting a broader scope of damage as ceasefire talks continue between the United States and Iran.

“Repair work does not create new capacity. It redirects existing ⁠capacity, and that redirection will be felt in project delays and into inflation far beyond the Middle East. The $58 billion bill is the headline, but the knock-on effects on energy ‌investment timelines ⁠globally may prove ⁠just as significant,” Rystad senior analyst Karan Satwani told Reuters.

Rystad sees total repair spending likely to average around USD 46 billion, with downstream refining and petrochemical assets accounting for ‌the largest share due to their ⁠complexity and extent of damage. Industrial, power, and desalination assets may add a further USD 3 billion to USD 8 billion in costs.

“Recovery timelines are starting to diverge between assets and countries, showcasing differences in domestic execution capabilities and access to supply chains. Iran faces the most widespread damage, with repair costs potentially reaching USD 19 billion, affecting gas processing, refining and export infrastructure. In contrast, Qatar’s impact ‌is more concentrated but technically complex, particularly at its ⁠Ras Laffan industrial hub, where repair work may overlap with ongoing LNG expansion projects,” Rystad said.

While engineering and construction will account for the largest share of spending, delays in procuring critical equipment will likely ‌determine recovery timelines. The biggest challenge, in Rystad’s opinion, will be procuring equipment and workers.

Rystad’s estimate also coincides with the assessment of Fatih Birol, the head of the International Energy Agency (IEA), who believes that it will take about two years to recover the Middle East’s lost energy output. In an interview with German newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung, the official said, “That will vary from country to country. In Iraq, for example, it will take much longer than in Saudi Arabia. However, we estimate it will take approximately two years overall to reach pre-war levels again.”

Birol has further warned the energy players, along with the broader global economy, against underestimating the consequences of a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

“Shipments of oil and gas that were already en route to their destinations before ‌the ⁠war in Iran began have now arrived, mitigating the impact of shortages. But no new tankers were loaded in March. There were no new deliveries of oil, gas or fuels to ⁠Asian markets. This gap is now becoming apparent. If the Strait of Hormuz is not reopened, we must prepare for significantly higher ⁠energy price,” the IEA boss remarked.

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Ajay Banga said that the economic fallout from the conflict is already feeding into weaker global expansion, with both developed and emerging economies expected to feel the ripple effects in the coming days. It is worth mentioning that the ceasefire, announced by United States President Donald Trump last week, fell through as Tehran and Washington failed to reach a consensus in Islamabad.

“The risks deepen significantly if the conflict drags on. In a prolonged-war scenario, global growth could decline by as much as 1 percentage point, underscoring the fragility of the recovery and the sensitivity of markets to geopolitical shocks,” Ajay Banga said.

In fact, the World Bank sees emerging markets and developing economies bearing a disproportionate share of the global slowdown, with the projected growth rate now estimated at 3.65%, down from an earlier estimate of 4% made in October 2025. If the conflict continues, growth could fall sharply to 2.6%.

On the other hand, the emerging economies also need to deal with growing inflationary pressures, with the World Bank now forecasting the ratio at 4.9%, up from a previous estimate of 3%. In a worst-case scenario, inflation could surge as high as 6.7%, reflecting supply disruptions and higher energy costs linked to the Middle East conflict.

Ajay Banga’s comments come ahead of the crucial meeting in Washington, where top global finance professionals will meet to discuss the Iran war’s cascading effects, with a section of the analysts even calling the crisis the “third major shock,” after the COVID pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war.

Top International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank officials will be downgrading their forecasts for global growth and raising inflation predictions due to the war, keeping in mind factors like higher energy prices and supply disruptions.

Before the beginning of the Iran war on February 28, both global institutions were expected to lift their growth forecasts given the resilience of the global economy. However, the regional conflict, which is now steadily leaving its global imprints, has changed the equations.

The post Middle East conflict: World Bank chief Ajay Banga sees massive global growth hit appeared first on International Finance.

However, the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders suggests the overall industry outlook is cloudy because most sales reflected orders placed before the Iran war began. The industry body also expressed concerns over consumer confidence and vehicle affordability.

“The headlines belie the costs incurred and the challenges involved,” said SMMT Chief Mike Hawes, noting that March is typically the busiest month in a financial year and that strong demand from private buyers boosted new car registrations.

However, the latest data shows the new vehicle market maintaining its sales uptick, which started in December 2025. Still, the Middle East conflict, now in a two-week ceasefire phase, pushed oil prices beyond the USD 100-barrel mark, creating clouds of uncertainty for economies worldwide.

“We expect the good run of form in the car registrations data will grind to a halt ‌in the ⁠coming months, as the weight of surging energy costs and the prospect of (rate) hikes from the (BoE) MPC curbs affordability,” said Elliott Jordan-Doak, a senior economist at Pantheon Macroeconomics, while interacting with Reuters.

According to the United Kingdom’s SMMT, volatile geopolitics and the surge in fuel costs may increase demand for electric vehicles while risking higher energy and supply chain costs.

“Battery electric vehicles recorded their best month in terms of volumes in March, though their overall market share remained at 22.6%, well below the government‑mandated target, opens new tab of 33% for 2026,” the industry body remarked, while stating that Tesla’s new registrations in the European country rose 20% from a year earlier to 8,599 units, trailing Chinese peer BYD’s nearly 134% jump to 15,162 units.

“With uncertainty around the cost of fuel, electric vehicle enquiries are on the up, as consumers look to electric as an attractive alternative to petrol and diesel vehicles,” said Jamie Hamilton, automotive partner and head of electric vehicles at ⁠Deloitte.

The post Despite strong March sales data, United Kingdom automobile market stares at uncertainty appeared first on International Finance.

Fitch assesses liquidity using Bloomberg’s Liquidity Assessment (LQA) scores, which indicate security-level liquidity. The ratio can range from one to 100, with 100 signifying the highest liquidity. Generally, a score of 100 is assigned to securities with the lowest liquidation costs within an asset class, while securities with the highest costs get a score of one.

According to Fitch, LQA is a data-driven model that produces a daily security-specific liquidity surface that captures the relationship between volume, cost, and time.

“The LQA decline for investment-grade sukuk has been less severe than for speculative-grade sukuk on average,” the agency stated further.

“While LQA scores have declined in most GCC debt capital markets since the Iran war’s beginning, as well as for sukuk issuers in Turkey, Egypt and Indonesia. On the other hand, many rated Malaysian, Omani, and supranational sukuk have shown resilience in their LQA scores,” Fitch noted.

“Sukuk in the ‘BB’ and ‘B’ categories have the lowest LQA scores among all Fitch-rated sukuk globally on average, with the steepest liquidity fall compared to other rating categories since the war began. Sukuk in the ‘F1sf’, ‘AAA’, ‘BBB’, ‘AA’, and ‘A’ categories held the highest liquidity of all rated sukuk, but also faced declines, except ‘F1sf’,” it stated.

Sector-wise, corporates, infrastructure and project-finance sukuk had the lowest LQA scores among all rated sukuk globally, with the steepest liquidity falls. Asset-backed, supranational and sovereign sukuk, in contrast, maintained the highest liquidity levels, except asset-backed sukuk, whose scores increased.

“Fitch also analysed liquidity for 52 comparable sukuk and bonds from the same issuers. Liquidity was broadly similar in 50% of cases, sukuk were less liquid than bonds in 31%, and more liquid in 19%. GCC US dollar sukuk and GCC US dollar bonds have displayed broadly similar liquidity trends, with both declining since the war began. The average LQA score for GCC US dollar sukuk fell to 45 on 23 March from 56 at the end of 2025. The average score for GCC US dollar bonds dropped to 48 from 53 in the same timeframe,” the ratings agency remarked.

“About 64% of Fitch-rated sukuk had an LQA score above 50 on 23rd March, down from 82% in January 2025 (excluding local ratings and sukuk without an LQA score). Investment-grade sukuk are generally more liquid, with an average score of 65 as of March 23 (January 2026: 73), compared to 33 for speculative-grade sukuk (January 2026: 48). Historically, GCC DCMs have rebounded fairly quickly when tensions eased following previous Middle East geopolitical episodes, but the impact this time will depend on the scale and duration of the war,” it concluded.

The post Fitch sees varying effects on Sukuk, Gulf debt market liquidity appeared first on International Finance.

While 21st century businesses have no other option but to take the volatile geopolitics into consideration while expanding their operations, the insurance sector faces the challenge of accurately assessing the possible outcome of damages and calculating appropriate premiums to charge.

As of 2026, war insurance remains an unknown quantity for insurance companies, with a high risk that a policy issued in this domain could lead to insolvency.

While industries like aviation and maritime trade still get specific war insurance options tailored to their needs, International Finance, using the ongoing Middle East conflict as a case study, examines how the broader War risk insurance industry has come under tremendous stress.

In Dire “Straits at Hormuz”

On February 28, 2026, the coalition of the US and Israel launched targeted air raids against Iran’s military and missile infrastructures, along with its decision-makers, repeating a similar act from 2025, killing the Western Asian nation’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and many senior government and military officials.

Since then, Iran’s retaliatory missile and drone attacks across the Middle East have introduced chaos in the entire region. Apart from the American bases located in the region, energy production facilities are being attacked, while maritime trade through the Strait of Hormuz (one of the important shipping lanes) faces severe disruption.

While aviation and maritime trade are known for getting specific war insurance options, immediately after the conflict’s beginning, marine insurers started cancelling war risk coverage for vessels, as three tankers were damaged in the first week.

Through the Strait, oil equal to about one-fifth of global demand is moved by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iraq, Iran, and Kuwait, with tankers hauling diesel, jet fuel, gasoline and other products. While maritime insurance majors, including Gard, Skuld, NorthStandard, the London P&I Club, and the American Club, excluded Iranian waters, Gulf and adjacent waters from their War risk insurance commitments, Skuld is reportedly working on a buy-back option to reinstate cover.

This move has led to a situation where the costs of shipping oil from the Middle East to Asia, already at six-year highs, could put the global energy trade under tremendous financial stress.

By March 13, the rates for a weekly coverage reportedly stood around ten times higher than before the beginning of the conflict, raising the transportation cost in the shipping corridor as well.

Nick Francis, Partner with Kennedys Legal Solutions in Singapore and Hong Kong, told International Finance that the coverage rise should be viewed using the parameter called additional war risks premiums (AWRP).

“AWRP, as the name suggests, is driven by risk. The risk in the Persian Gulf and surrounding areas has obviously escalated dramatically since the Iran conflict began. As a sidenote, while AWRP has exponentially increased, so have charter rates for these vessels – particularly tankers – so owners/operators are willing to pay the AWRP (which is usually passed on to charterers of vessels under charterparties in any event),” said Nick.

According to the marine journal Lloyd’s List, as of March 13, high-risk voyages were being quoted at approximately 7.5% of the ship’s value. This ratio may rise to 10% or more. Before the war onset, additional premiums (AP) for voyages through the Middle East Gulf (MEG) typically ranged from 0.15% to 0.25%.

The geopolitical developments in the last three to four years (including those in Ukraine and the Suez Canal) have made one thing clear: the choking of shipping lanes will be the new normal. In that case, will it add pressure to the WRI industry?

Nick, a leading shipping and international trade lawyer, told International Finance, “The insurance industry is built on an ability to price risk. I think the market is well steeled for the current conflict, given the recent experiences with the Black Sea/Sea of Azov following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.”

Could the insurers have handled the Hormuz situation in a better manner?

Nick said, “The insurance industry is there to provide cover for various risks, which it does. It doesn’t create the risk.”

Shipping sector in a tight spot

Discussing risks, things are getting uncertain within the commercial marine industry itself, with a strong probability of hull rates rising. Dylan Mortimer, Vice-President of New York-based insurance player Marsh, told the Reinsurance News that there could be near-term rate increases for the Marine Hull line of businesses operating in the Gulf region by 25%-50%, with underwriters swiftly cancelling certain annual hull war policies under standard seven-day war clauses.

Stephen Rudman, head of marine for Asia at Aon, told Modern Diplomacy that the increase in hull war market rates should be seen as a quick response to the risk of significant losses if multiple vessels are attacked at the Strait of Hormuz. According to Rudman, there will be heightened underwriting scrutiny for voyages into or near sensitive (conflict) zones, including a potential requirement for prior approval.

Estimates by global investment giant Jefferies suggests that damages from seven reported vessels at the Strait (figures as of March 6) could lead to industry losses of up to USD 1.75 billion. Tankers valued at USD 200-USD $300 million could face new insurance rates of approximately 3%, translating to about USD 7.5 million in premiums, a significant rise from roughly USD 625,000 before the conflict.

Shedding further light upon the crisis, Nick noted, “When costs rise for the owner and operators of vessels, they will inevitably be priced into charter rates. Increased cargo premiums will obviously affect the landed value of goods – and will eventually be passed on to the end consumer.”

According to Sheila Cameron from the Lloyd’s Market Association, by March 6, about 1,000 vessels (mostly oil and gas tankers), with a total hull value exceeding USD 25 billion were in the Persian/Arabian Gulf region.

Stating that while most of these vessels are insured within the London market, she told Modern Diplomacy, “Reinsurers may respond to increased risks by adjusting the conditions under which their liability begins, potentially leaving main insurers with more risk and stress on their solvency levels.”

Also, the International Group of P&I Clubs has ceased coverage for vessels operating in and around Iran. Without it, shipowners will face open-ended liabilities, often halting voyages in high-risk areas. Industry reports reveal that such war-risk exclusions in the past led to reduced traffic and higher freight costs, and the same pattern can now re-emerge in the Persian Gulf as well.

According to London-headquartered GlobalData, reinsurers are repricing exposures across sectors such as marine, aviation and energy, while maintaining coverage continuity wherever possible. The conflict is affecting the sector through both direct exposure to loss events and indirect pressures, including higher reinsurance costs, capital flows, and inflation.

If anything, the changing geopolitics have taught the 21st century global socio-economic order that businesses need to engage with insurers to address disruptions and risks tied to war-like events, without any laxity.

Expressing confidence in the sector’s resilience, Nick concluded, “War is not new. War risk insurers have been recently dealing with the events in the Black Sea/Sea of Azov, involving missile strikes on vessels and, later, numerous constructive total losses (following a 12-month deprivation period), and missile attacks by Houthis in the Red Sea – so they are well- prepared to deal with the current events in the Persian Gulf.”

The post IF Insights: Choking of Strait of Hormuz tests limits of war risk insurance appeared first on International Finance.

Around the same time, reports began circulating that the Michigan-based medical technology giant was facing a major cyber incident. A voicemail at its US headquarters referenced a ‘building emergency’ Internally, operations were disrupted. Externally, questions were mounting.

Then came the claim. A hacktivist group known as Handala Hack Team, believed to have links to Iranian intelligence, posted a lengthy statement on Telegram, claiming responsibility for a large-scale data-wiping attack. According to the group, more than 200,000 systems, servers, and devices across 79 countries had been wiped. No ransom demand, negotiation, just erasure.

Right now, it is still unclear how much damage has actually been done, and the claims haven’t been independently confirmed. But even the possibility of an attack at that scale targeting a company so deeply embedded in global healthcare has sent ripples far beyond the organisation itself. Because Stryker is not just another corporate name.

Its products sit inside operating rooms. Its systems support surgical workflows. Its supply chains feed directly into hospitals, clinics, and critical care environments. So, when something like this happens, the impact does not stay contained; it spreads.

Not Just Another Breach

For years, cyberattacks have followed a familiar pattern. Break in, encrypt systems, demand payment. Ransomware became almost routine, but this incident doesn’t quite fit that mould. There is no clear financial motive. No demand. No obvious attempt to monetise the breach.

Instead, what is being described if the claims hold is something more destructive. A wiper-style attack, designed not to extract value, but to remove it entirely. That distinction matters.

Errol Weiss, Chief Security Officer at Health-ISAC, sees this as part of a broader shift.

“We are absolutely seeing a shift toward disruption-focused attacks in healthcare, and it is tightly linked to the broader geopolitical tensions. Iran-aligned and sympathetic hacktivist groups have been increasingly targeting US and Israeli critical infrastructure to make political statements and retaliate for actions against Iran since the war escalated in late February,” Weiss told International Finance.

In other words, what he meant was that the timing isn’t random. The digital world is increasingly reflecting real-world tensions, including those involving Iran and the United States. Healthcare, somewhat unexpectedly, is becoming a part of that equation.

Weiss puts it plainly: “Destructive activity against healthcare and its supply chain is not just about money anymore. It is about sending a message, and creating maximum operational and psychological impact.”

Authorised Tools Used In Unauthorised Ways

If the intent is shifting, so are the methods. One of the more striking aspects of this incident is the reported use of Microsoft Intune, a legitimate enterprise device management platform, to carry out system wipes. No obvious malware, no dramatic breach signature, just authorised tools, used in unauthorised ways. It’s subtle, quiet, and incredibly effective.

Weiss explains why this approach is so difficult to defend against: “Abusing legitimate tools like Microsoft Intune is a classic ‘living off the land’ tactic, and it is incredibly hard to spot because it looks like normal administrative and IT activity.”

That is the uncomfortable reality. The attack does not look like an attack. It looks like a routine admin action, which means traditional detection methods, the ones designed to spot malicious software, don’t always work. That leaves organisations exposed in ways they are not always prepared for.

Weiss points to a critical gap. He says, “For high-risk actions, like issuing a device wipe, there should be built-in controls such as dual-admin approval, so a single compromised account cannot trigger a catastrophic event.”

One account, one mistake, one breach, and suddenly, thousands of systems can disappear.

Not Entirely New, But Potentially Escalating

Chester Wisniewski, Global Field CTO at Sophos, offers a slightly more cautious take on whether this marks a definitive shift.

“Overall, no, but in this case, we might begin to see this shift. Historically, Iran has utilised ‘wiper’ attacks. If they ramp up their activity. These attacks might become more prevalent,” he told International Finance.

While disruption-focused attacks are not yet dominant, the conditions are there, and they may be evolving.

On the use of legitimate tools, Wisniewski is clear that this is not new.

“Living off the land has been very common for at least a decade now. This technique was even used during the Target breach in 2013,” he said.

“What’s changed is the context, and the scale. Looking for common strains of malware is still important, but careful monitoring of behaviour and unusual tool usage is essential for an effective defence,” he added.

In other words, organisations need to rethink what ‘normal’ looks like inside their own systems, because attackers are already doing that.

The Ripple Effect Nobody Talks About

When a company like Stryker is disrupted, the immediate assumption is straightforward: hospitals will feel the impact. But Weiss highlights something more nuanced and, in some ways, more concerning.

He says, “The healthcare supply chain is deeply interconnected, but paradoxically, much of the downstream fallout we see is actually self-inflicted.”

It’s a surprising statement, but it makes sense.

“Hyper-conditioned to fear a ransomware or malware outbreak, many organisations default to a knee-jerk reaction: proactively severing B2B connections. That instinct to isolate, disconnect, protect is understandable, but it can backfire,” he said.

“That panic is what frequently escalates a targeted incident into a widespread service disruption. The damage doesn’t just come from the attack. It comes from the reaction to it. In a sector like healthcare, where timing and coordination matter, those reactions can have real consequences,” he added.

A Sector Under Pressure

There is an ongoing debate about whether healthcare is being specifically targeted or simply exposed.

Weiss says, “Healthcare is a prime target because its disruption creates immediate, tangible panic and maximum pain at a very personal level. Hospitals aren’t just infrastructure; they’re emotional infrastructure. Disrupt them, and the impact is immediate and visible.”

“The historical underinvestment in cybersecurity and reliance on complex, fragile supply chains make the health sector a highly vulnerable pressure point during global conflicts,” he added.

However, Wisniewski takes a more measured stance: “I am not sure there is evidence for this…the majority of attacks are opportunistic.”

It’s a subtle difference in interpretation, but perhaps both can be true. Healthcare may not always be the intended target, but it remains one of the most impactful ones.

Where It Breaks: Identity And Trust

If there is a single thread running through incidents like this, it is identity. Who has access, who can act, and who is trusted.

Wisniewski points to a striking statistic: “Almost 70% of incidents we responded to in 2025 were the result of some sort of identity compromise. That is not a technical failure. That is a trust failure.”

Credentials stolen, access abused, systems misused. Once inside, attackers don’t need to force their way through; they just walk.

Highlights another dimension of the problem, Weiss said, “Too many healthcare organisations still treat their centralised device management platforms as inherently trusted infrastructure rather than primary attack surfaces.”

This assumption that certain systems are safe creates blind spots, and attackers tend to find those first.

Recovery Isn’t Just About Numbers

The scale of the alleged attack – tens or even hundreds of thousands of systems – sounds overwhelming, and it is. But not all systems are equal.

As Chester Wisniewski explains, “It is important to differentiate quantity from importance.”

Many endpoints, such as laptops and desktops, can be rebuilt slowly and with significant effort, but in a relatively predictable way. What’s far more challenging to restore are the on-premise servers and cloud infrastructure that sit at the core of operations.

Those systems are different. They are not just devices; they represent the functioning backbone of the business. Restoring them is not simply an IT exercise; it becomes a business-critical process that can define how quickly an organisation recovers.

Are We Ready for What Comes Next?

This is where the conversation shifts from analysis to something more serious. Because if this incident is not an outlier, but a preview of what is coming, then the question becomes unavoidable: are we actually ready?

Errol Weiss doesn’t hesitate in his response, stating, “Candidly, the healthcare sector is drastically underprepared. Which brings us to the part that is difficult to ignore: If hospitals are left fighting these large-scale fires alone, people could die.”

This is not framed as a distant possibility. It reads more like a warning.

What Needs To Change

There is no single fix here, no silver bullet that can eliminate the risk. But there are clear starting points.

Wisniewski keeps it simple: keep firewalls and VPNs updated, enforce strong MFA, and watch closely for identity misuse. Basic steps, but they only matter if you actually stick to them.

At the same time, Weiss argues for stronger safeguards and a more collaborative approach.

He said, “Organisations should immediately lock down their administrative environments, but defence cannot happen in a silo. Because attackers are already sharing knowledge and evolving together, defenders need to do the same.”

More Than Just a Cyber Incident

The claims surrounding this attack may ultimately turn out to be exaggerated. It’s also possible that the disruption will be contained. In a few weeks, this may just become another case study in a long history of cyber incidents. However, it doesn’t quite feel that way, because this incident represents something much larger.

Cyberattacks are not just about data or money anymore. They are about disruption, sending a message, and hitting systems people depend on most. When something like this hits a company like Stryker, it doesn’t stay online; it spills into hospitals, supply chains, and real life.

The post Why Microsoft Intune’s role in Stryker cyberattack is a scary prospect appeared first on International Finance.