The company also noted that despite the ongoing Middle East conflict, ADNOC L&S’ global operations have remained normal, as the business remains financially strong and fully operational across all divisions.

“ADNOC L&S continues to closely monitor the current operating environment and is working in coordination with relevant authorities and stakeholders to ensure the safety of its people and the continuity of its operations,” the company remarked in a media note.

Breaking down the key financial details, dividends for the first nine months of 2025 totalled USD 243.75 million (AED 859.3 million), with the third-quarter dividend already paid in December 2025. Subject to required approvals, the dividend will increase by 5% annually from 2026 to 2030, before being paid out quarterly.

“ADNOC L&S delivered record 2025 results, with EBITDA up 32% and net profit up 14% year-on-year, reflecting the ongoing transformation of the business into a global market leader, underpinned by a diversified, resilient business model and disciplined capital deployment. As of December 31, 2025, the Company’s share price has increased by 195% since the IPO, strengthening investor trust in ADNOC L&S’ long-term strategy. Performance was driven by favourable market demand, strong operational execution, and continued expansion across core and growth segments. The integration of Navig8, an international shipping pool operator and commercial management company, was a milestone that strengthened and transformed the company’s capabilities across its logistics value chain,” the venture commented.

Dr. Sultan Al Jaber, Chairman of ADNOC L&S, said, “For shareholders, performance translated into tangible returns. Financial discipline remains central to our strategy, and this strength enables us to pursue value‑accretive growth while maintaining attractive and predictable shareholder returns. ADNOC Logistics & Services has built a global platform underpinned by a resilient business model anchored by long‑term contracts. Looking ahead, our diversified logistics capabilities and disciplined capital framework position the Company to deliver through cycles while supporting ADNOC’s expanding global ambitions.”

“ADNOC L&S continued to deliver its growth strategy built around service excellence and a safe and smart operational execution. Driven by organic growth and our acquisition of an 80% stake in Navig8, our robust balance sheet, prudent leverage policy and strong operating cash flows anchor our resilience. Our Value Efficiency Initiative, introduced in early 2025, delivered $119 million (AED 437 million) over the year, surpassing its original target by 19%. Our ongoing technology and AI-driven innovation, beyond increasing process efficiency across the business, is also delivering tangible service enhancements, creating additional value for ADNOC L&S and our customers,” said Captain Abdulkareem Al Masabi, CEO of ADNOC L&S.

Talking about the January 2025 acquisition of Navig8, an international shipping pool operator and commercial management company, which cost ADNOC L&S USD 999 million (AED 3.7 billion), the move resulted in the immediate integration of Navig8’s 32-vessel fleet, along with the adoption of the company’s advanced commercial and digital capabilities within ADNOC’s fold, significantly expanding its global footprint to 19 cities. The acquisition added commercial scale, strengthened ADNOC L&S’ revenue profile, and improved access to global energy and commodities flows.

“Navig8 provides the Company with a broader international platform for its next phase of growth. In 2025, ADNOC L&S also strengthened its fleet with the first two of a total order of nine Very Large Ethane Carriers (VLECs) and an additional four LNG carriers to generate long-term contracted revenue. On March 23, 2025, the company took delivery of the fifth of six new-build liquefied natural gas carriers from the Jiangnan Shipyard in China,” the venture remarked.

ADNOC L&S also secured long-term strategic partnerships, including a 50-year agreement with TA’ZIZ to develop the UAE’s first dedicated chemicals export port, projected to generate revenue flow of over USD 1.3 billion (AED 4.8 billion) in its first 27 years. A 15-year strategic agreement with Borouge further strengthens ADNOC L&S’ contracted revenue base in the domain of petrochemicals exports, with an estimated value of USD 531 million (AED 1.95 billion).

“With the continuous digitalisation of an increasing number of core business processes, ADNOC L&S has been leveraging AI, big data, and advanced digital platforms to drive service excellence, operational performance, and safety. Its AI-enabled Smart Port Solution reduced vessel turnaround time by up to 90% and cut service sourcing from three hours to 45 seconds, while enhancements to the Integrated Logistics Management System and Integrated Logistics Services Platform increased cargo capacity by up to 40% and improved vessel utilisation,” the business concluded.

The post ADNOC L&S shareholders approve dividend payout appeared first on International Finance.

In 2024, Meta Platforms reported revenue of $164.50 billion. As of September 30, 2025, the social media giant’s revenue was approximately $189.46 billion. It’s a titan of industry that shareholders love, and that loves its shareholders. But the excessive love of shareholders is the root of all corporate sin.

Despite its skyrocketing revenue and incredible technological prowess, Meta doesn’t think it should regulate its market or protect its customers from fraud and harm. The digital advertising ecosystem, once heralded as a democratisation of commercial reach, has metastasised into a complex marketplace where the distinctions between legitimate commerce and predatory fraud are increasingly obscured by algorithmic opacity.

Internal projections for the fiscal year 2024 indicate that advertisements promoting scams, illegal goods, and prohibited content generated approximately $16 billion, representing roughly 10% of the company’s total annual revenue. This revenue is safeguarded by a penalty bid pricing mechanism that monetises high-risk advertisers rather than removing them, a policy framework that sets enforcement thresholds at a staggering 95% certainty level and a corporate governance structure that explicitly caps revenue losses from safety enforcement at a fraction of the profits generated by the fraud.

So, what does this mean? Meta will even let bad actors sell horse dung or magic remedies if they are willing to pay a premium for their risky endeavour. While the company has long faced scrutiny regarding data privacy and political influence, investigations surfacing in late 2024 and throughout 2025 have illuminated a far more tangible structural crisis: the institutionalisation of revenue derived from fraudulent advertising.

What’s really happening?

In November 2025, a Reuters investigation, corroborated by a cache of internal documents spanning 2021 to 2025, revealed a stark internal projection. Meta anticipated $16 billion in revenue for 2024, specifically from ads for scams and banned goods. To contextualise this figure, $16 billion exceeds the annual revenue of major global entities such as Spotify or eBay (Fortune 500 companies). It is a sum that materially impacts the company’s earnings per share and, consequently, its stock valuation.

This revenue stream is categorised internally under various euphemisms, including “violating revenue” or segments associated with higher legal risk. The existence of such specific forecasting line items indicates that this revenue is not accidental. Financial modelling that explicitly accounts for illicit revenue suggests a fiduciary dependency; removing this revenue stream would require a voluntary correction of the company’s top line by nearly 10%, a move that would likely trigger a shareholder revolt in an environment where growth in legitimate user acquisition has plateaued.

To put things into context, Meta shows 15 billion scam ads a day. A lesser entity would be penalised and shut down in most countries, but the mighty titan of the digital industry has thus far been immune to its amoral position on the safety of its consumers. Upper management at Meta does not care if an online casino, a pump-and-dump investment scheme, fake websites, or purveyors of illegal drugs flood their platform with misleading ads, as long as their pockets are full.

After the Reuters investigation and some high-profile cases against it globally, most notably the Calise vs Meta lawsuit and the Brazil AGU lawsuit, the company is trying its best at crisis management.

Calise vs Meta is a class-action lawsuit in the Ninth Circuit pursuing claims of unjust enrichment, arguing that Meta actively solicited and profited from third-party fraud and thus should disgorge the revenue. The Brazilian Attorney General’s Office has also filed suit to recover revenue from 1,770 specific fraudulent ads that used government symbols to scam citizens, demanding that the funds be deposited into a rights defence fund. Something similar is happening in the United Kingdom as well. Regulators in the European country found that Meta platforms were involved in 54% of all authorised push payment scams (where users are tricked into sending money).

The Instagram parent company says only 10% of its revenue came from scams in 2024 and aims to cut it to 7.3% in 2025 and 5.8% by 2027. The claim seems absurd. They have the tools to stop it now, but choose to roll it out slowly to protect their profits and please shareholders.

Of the $16 billion ad revenue they received from bad actors, $7 billion was from higher-risk parties (possibly extremely dubious or problematic). It is ironic because Meta’s own system files it as such. The most critical insight from the internal disclosures is the calculated decision to tolerate this revenue stream based on a comparison with potential regulatory penalties.

The documents suggest a stark cost-benefit analysis. While the revenue from scam ads is estimated at nearly $7 billion annually, the company’s internal risk models projected that regulatory fines for these violations would likely cap at around $1 billion. Instead of punishing or deplatforming, they merely charge a higher fee from these individuals and organisations.

It’s important to keep in mind that Meta is partly responsible for one-third of all successful scams in the US today. Worldwide, the total cost of ad fraud was estimated at $81 billion in 2022 and was expected to surpass $100 billion in 2023, showing that current measures aren’t keeping up with increasingly sophisticated scams.

Furthermore, internal memos revealed the existence of revenue guardrails for safety teams. In one specific instance, a fraud prevention initiative was restricted to actions that would not reduce total ad revenue by more than 0.15% (approximately $135 million).

This explicit capping of safety measures based on revenue impact demonstrates that the risk premium is a protected income stream, insulated from the full force of the company’s own trust and safety capabilities.

Who is profiting and how?

The digital advertising ecosystem, once heralded as a precision instrument for commercial democratisation, has metamorphosed into a complex adversarial theatre where the economic interests of platforms and the operational methodologies of fraudsters have become dangerously aligned. These systems prioritise engagement metrics such as Click-Through Rate and Estimated Action Rate (EAR) over content veracity, creating a fertile substrate where fraudulent actors do not merely survive but thrive.

At the core of the ad delivery engine lies the auction formula, a mathematical arbiter that decides which advertisement is shown to a user at any given millisecond. You don’t win the bid with money on platforms like Google, Facebook, or Instagram; you win it with a combination of ad quality and EAR.

When a fraudster runs a campaign promising “Guaranteed 500% Returns in 24 Hours” or “Miracle Weight Loss Without Dieting,” users interact with these ads at high rates. The algorithm, blind to the veracity of the claim and optimising strictly for the probability of action, registers this high interaction as a signal of quality and relevance. Consequently, the auction mechanism rewards the fraudster with a higher EAR, which inversely lowers their Cost Per Mille or Cost Per Click.

In effect, the platform’s efficiency algorithms subsidise the distribution of scam content, allowing fraudsters to reach vast audiences at a fraction of the cost paid by legitimate brands.

The digital ad fraud ecosystem has matured into a sophisticated business-to-business economy. While the end-point scammers running fake crypto exchanges or counterfeit e-commerce stores bear the operational risk, a vast shadow supply chain of service providers extracts guaranteed profits at every stage of the fraudulent lifecycle. These entities operate with the efficiency of legitimate SaaS (Software-as-a-Service) companies, often earning monthly recurring revenue (MRR) regardless of whether the scammer’s campaign succeeds or fails.

The primary beneficiaries are vendors of evasion technology. Cloaking services, which filter traffic to hide malicious landing pages from platform moderators, have evolved into subscription-based platforms. Services like “TrafficArmor” and “Cloaking House” operate openly, charging tiered monthly fees ranging from $30 to $600, or utilising pay-per-click models where scammers pay premium rates (e.g., $129 for 32,500 clicks) to ensure their ads survive automated review. These companies profit by effectively selling invisibility, creating a technological tollbooth that every high-end fraudster must pay to access the audience.

Supporting this is the Bulletproof Hosting industry. Unlike legitimate hosts that comply with takedown requests, providers like Strox or SpeedHost247 charge premiums (e.g., $85/month or $3/day) to host malicious landing pages on servers explicitly designed to ignore abuse reports and law enforcement inquiries. By commoditising resilience, they ensure that even when a scam is detected, the infrastructure remains operational long enough to be profitable.

Fraud requires a constant supply of fresh identities to bypass platform bans. This has enriched Dark Web marketplaces and account brokers, who act as wholesalers of digital reputation. The most lucrative commodities are Verified Business Managers who hack or farm Facebook/Meta ad accounts with high spending limits and histories of legitimate activity. A verified BM can fetch $120 to $250, while aged accounts (which look less suspicious to algorithms) sell for $45–$50.

This sector also profits from the Stolen Credit model. Brokers sell stolen credit card details for as little as $10–$40, which fraudsters then link to compromised agency accounts. This arbitrage allows scammers to run thousands of dollars in ads using other people’s money, while the identity brokers secure risk-free profit from the initial data sale.

Perhaps the most significant evolution is the shift to Scam-as-a-Service (ScaaS). Technical syndicates now build and lease entire fraud kits (pre-coded phishing sites, crypto drainer scripts, and back-end management panels) to lower-level criminals.

“Instead of charging a flat fee, these developers often take a commission. For instance, the Inferno Drainer malware operated on a 20% commission model, syphoning off a fifth of all stolen funds from its affiliates, generating over $87 million in illicit profit before ceasing operations. This franchise model allows technical groups to scale their revenue infinitely without ever directly engaging with a victim,” said Reuters journalist Jeff Horwitz, who has been covering the alleged ad-related irregularities involving Meta.

Finally, the demand for human engagement signals has created a labour economy in Southeast Asia (e.g., Vietnam, Myanmar) and parts of Eastern Europe. “Click Farms” or “Fraud Farms” employ low-wage workers to manually interact with ads, solve CAPTCHAs, and warm up accounts.

“These operations charge roughly $1 per 1,000 clicks/likes, creating a volume-based revenue stream that exploits global wage disparities to defeat advanced behavioural biometrics. By providing the human touch that algorithms crave, these farms monetise the very mechanism designed to stop them,” Horwitz said.

And it doesn’t stop there. The data collected at these farms is often resold. If you’ve been the victim of a cybercrime, there’s a 34% chance it will happen again if you’re an individual, and an 84% chance if you’re a business. Once scammed, you can end up on what’s called a ‘suckers list,’ marking you as an easy target. These lists are valuable, and people are willing to pay a lot to get them.

How is the world reacting to it?

The world is reacting to the industrialisation of ad fraud with a shift from “user beware” to platform liability. In 2024 and 2025, governments and industries moved to dismantle the economic impunity of platforms, forcing them to bear the costs of the fraud they facilitate.

The most significant development is the regulatory move to force reimbursement. For example, the UK Payment Systems Regulator implemented in 2024 a mandatory reimbursement requirement for Authorised Push Payment (APP) fraud. Crucially, the liability is now split 50:50 between the sending bank and the receiving payment service provider.

While this primarily targets banks, it has created immense pressure from the financial sector on tech platforms. Banks, now on the hook for millions in refunds, are aggressively lobbying for a “polluter pays” model, arguing that since 60–80% of scams originate on Meta’s platforms, the tech giants should contribute to the reimbursement pot.

Effective December 2024, Singapore’s framework assigns specific duties to financial institutions and telcos to mitigate phishing scams. If banks fail to send real-time transaction alerts or impose cooling-off periods, they are liable for losses. This creates a regulatory precedent where infrastructure providers are held financially accountable for gatekeeping failures. Governments are moving beyond voluntary codes of conduct to enforceable legislation with massive financial penalties.

The “UK Online Safety Act,” fully enforceable in 2025, requires platforms to proactively prevent fraudulent advertising. Non-compliance can result in fines of up to £18 million or 10% of global annual turnover (potentially billions for Meta).

In Europe, something similar is happening with the “Digital Services Act.” The European Commission has opened investigations into “Very Large Online Platforms” regarding their risk mitigation for fraudulent ads. The DSA empowers the European Union to fine companies up to 6% of their global turnover if they fail to manage systemic risks, including the spread of financial scams.

In Australia, the “Scams Prevention Framework,” which was passed in early 2025, introduces mandatory codes for banks, telcos, and digital platforms. It includes fines of up to AUD 50 million for non-compliance, specifically targeting the failure to detect and remove scam content.

There is also other litigation from celebrities. For example, Andrew Forrest vs Meta is an ongoing case where Australian billionaire Andrew Forrest pursued Meta in both Australian and US courts over the proliferation of crypto scams using his likeness. While the Australian criminal case was dropped due to evidential hurdles, the US civil lawsuit survived a motion to dismiss in 2024.

This case is pivotal as it challenges Section 230 immunity often claimed by platforms, arguing that Meta’s ad tools contributed to the content creation, thereby stripping them of neutral publisher status.

Even the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission sued Meta for aiding and abetting false conduct by publishing scam ads featuring public figures, arguing that Meta’s algorithms actively targeted these scams to susceptible users.

Meta has, under immense pressure, reversed its 2021 decision to abandon facial recognition. In late 2024, the company began testing facial recognition technology to combat “celeb-bait” scams. The system compares faces in suspected ads against the profile pictures of public figures.

If a match is found and the ad is a scam, it is blocked. This marks a significant concession, as it acknowledges that privacy concerns regarding biometrics are outweighed by the need to stop the financial bleeding caused by industrial-scale fraud.

Major players like Meta, Coinbase, and Match Group have formed coalitions to share intelligence on pig-butchering operations, aiming to sever the communication lines between the scam compounds and their victims.

Engagement fuels fraud risks

This is the aftermath of prioritising engagement over verification. You end up with an ecosystem where scams and fraud flourish, and customers get hurt. At the heart of this crisis lies the EAR algorithm, a mechanism that inadvertently subsidises deception by rewarding the hyper-engaging nature of scams with lower distribution costs. This economic alignment between the platform’s profit motives and the fraudster’s operational goals has created a “Market for Lemons,” where predatory content effectively crowds out legitimate commerce.

The “Retargeting Loop” further exacerbates this by trapping vulnerable populations in algorithmic echo chambers, commoditising their susceptibility, and reselling it through the secondary market of recovery scams.

Technologically, the ecosystem has evolved into an asymmetric arms race, where enforcement is consistently outpaced by evasion. The transition from simple static landing pages to Generation 4 cloaking technologies, which are capable of analysing device telemetry, battery status, and gyroscopic movements in milliseconds, demonstrates that fraud is no longer the domain of opportunistic amateurs. It has industrialised into a sophisticated Fraud-as-a-Service economy. This shadow supply chain, composed of bulletproof hosting providers, identity brokers on the dark web, and commercial cloaking services, operates with the efficiency of the legitimate software sector.

By lowering the technical barrier to entry, these enablers have democratised access to high-end evasion tools, allowing even low-skilled actors to launch enterprise-grade attacks against global platforms.

The failure of self-regulation is now evident in the global legislative pivot toward platform liability. For over a decade, the industry operated under a “user beware” paradigm, but the sheer scale of financial loss has forced a regulatory correction. Initiatives like the United Kingdom’s mandatory reimbursement requirement and Singapore’s “Shared Responsibility Framework” signal the end of platform immunity.

By shifting the financial burden of fraud from the victim to the infrastructure providers, regulators are attempting to realign economic incentives. Only when the cost of hosting a scam exceeds the revenue generated from its ads will platforms invest the necessary resources to close the technological loopholes they currently tolerate.

Ultimately, the future of the digital advertising economy hinges on a fundamental shift from plausible deniability to mandatory verification. The era of anonymous algorithmic bidding must yield to a “Know Your Business” standard, where access to the ad auction is predicated on verified identity rather than mere creditworthiness.

As Generative AI threatens to flood the web with infinite synthetic content, the only viable defence is a strict chain of custody for digital identity. If structural reform doesn’t ensue soon, corporate social media platforms will slowly transform into a black market without oversight.

The world is reacting, but laws are struggling to keep up with fast-moving algorithms. For now, as a reader and consumer, be careful, any ad you see on Instagram or Facebook could be a scam, backed by Meta Platforms, the world’s biggest advertiser.

The post Meta lets scammers pay to play appeared first on International Finance.

In practice, this means clear rules and strong oversight to ensure companies are run ethically and in the best interests of their stakeholders. In recent years, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has made corporate governance a top priority by updating laws, aligning with international standards, and reshaping how boards of directors operate.

International Finance explores the principles of corporate governance, how boards’ roles have evolved from ceremonial to strategic, and what makes boards effective today.

It also highlights the UAE’s progress, focusing on a real example from the Commercial Bank of Dubai in raising governance standards.

What is corporate governance?

At its simplest, corporate governance is about how a company is controlled and directed for the benefit of its owners (shareholders) and other stakeholders. It sets out the relationships among shareholders, boards of directors, and management, defining their roles and responsibilities. A well-governed company has systems to balance the interests of everyone involved, from investors and managers to employees, customers, and the community.

With the right structures in place, good corporate governance facilitates an atmosphere of trust and openness inside and outside the company. For example, companies that adhere to governance best practices routinely publish honest and thorough reports on their financial health and operations, which builds transparency and credibility.

Such transparency makes it easier for investors to trust the company, knowing they will receive timely, accurate information. As the OECD (a global policy standard-setter) notes, governance promotes “trust, transparency, and accountability, which promotes long-term patient capital”—in other words, it attracts investors who are willing to commit to the long term.

Strong governance also enhances accountability: clear rules mean that executives and directors can be held responsible for their decisions and performance. When companies are governed well, shareholders have ways to hold management to account, and management, in turn, is accountable to the board. All of this reduces the risk of mismanagement or corruption and leads to more sustainable success.

Crucially, governance is linked to long-term business sustainability. Companies that operate transparently and accountably tend to make decisions that favour long-term growth over short-term gambles. By setting checks and balances like independent board oversight and strong audit controls, corporate governance helps ensure a company can weather challenges and continue thriving for years to come.

In the UAE, regulators explicitly state that governance aims to achieve transparency, protect shareholders, combat improper conduct, and ensure companies meet their goals and long-term strategy.

As one corporate advisory firm summarised, strong governance enhances investor confidence by demonstrating transparency and attracting investment. It also leads to better risk management and decision-making, ultimately improving a company’s reputation and stability.

The evolution of board roles

As recently as the 1990s, serving on a board was often seen as an “honorary” position, a form of recognition, and many closely held businesses didn’t bother having a formal board at all. Boards would convene infrequently to rubber-stamp decisions or provide polite oversight, but seldom to actively shape strategy. They were, as one account puts it, “largely ceremonial” in those days.

A series of corporate scandals and crises in the late 20th and early 21st centuries changed this. Major failures, from the Cadbury corporate governance scandals in the United Kingdom in the early 1990s to the infamous Enron collapse in 2001 and the 2008 global financial crisis, exposed that inactive or complacent boards were often a weak link in corporate oversight.

Each crisis prompted reforms and sharpened expectations for boards. Laws like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) and codes of best practice worldwide put the onus on boards to truly monitor management, ensure financial integrity, and manage risk. As a result, the public and regulators began to expect directors to be watchdogs and strategic guides rather than figureheads.

Fast forward to today, and the role of boards has expanded dramatically. A modern board is “asked to be all things to all people.” Not only must it provide direction and approve major decisions, but it must also guarantee compliance with laws and regulations, diligently monitor risks, and even act as a champion of corporate social responsibility.

In other words, boards have shifted from being symbols of stability to active stewards of the company’s future. One analysis describes the board of directors now as the “fulcrum for change”—sandwiched between shareholders’ expectations and society’s demands. They are expected to ensure the company not only profits but also behaves responsibly towards employees, the environment, and the community.

This evolution is also evident in the UAE’s corporate landscape. Traditionally, some boards in the region were dominated by founding families or prominent figures, and their oversight could be considered light-touch. But the pressures of globalisation and a maturing economy have driven change.

As Wajahat Gul Memon, a corporate governance lead at the Commercial Bank of Dubai, explained, “Boards are no longer merely fulfilling regulatory requirements. They are driving long-term value creation and ensuring that the organisation remains resilient in the face of changing market conditions.”

UAE’s corporate governance advancements

In the past decade, and especially in recent years, the UAE has made a concerted push to elevate corporate governance standards across its business sector. This effort has involved enacting new regulations, updating existing codes, and ensuring local practices keep pace with international norms. These changes are not happening in isolation, as they are part of the UAE’s broader strategy to promote a world-class business environment that attracts investment and sustains growth.

One cornerstone of the UAE’s governance reform was the Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA)’s Corporate Governance Guide for public joint-stock companies, which was approved in 2020 (via Decision No. 3/Chairman of 2020) and later amended in 2021 and 2024. The SCA, which regulates stock markets in the UAE, introduced these rules to strengthen oversight of listed companies.

Some of the key reforms include requiring that at least one-third of board members be independent directors, with clear criteria to define independence and avoid conflicts of interest. Notably, a special exemption that once allowed certain government-affiliated representatives to be deemed “independent” was eliminated to ensure true independence on boards.

Then there is mandating board diversity by insisting that each board have at least one female director. This moved diversity from a nice-to-have to a legal must-have, catalysing the sharp rise in women’s participation in boardrooms.

The reform also emphasises director competence and engagement, for instance by stipulating that board members must have relevant experience/qualifications and limiting the number of directorships one person can hold to ensure they have time to fulfil their duties.

“Audit Committees,” “Nomination & Remuneration Committees,” and “Risk Management Committees” are compulsory for listed firms, each with defined roles to enhance financial oversight, fair appointments, and risk governance.

Additionally, companies must implement robust internal control and risk management systems, with boards required to regularly assess their effectiveness. Recent amendments even specify that risk frameworks should align with globally recognised best practices like the COSO framework for internal controls.

Companies now also have to provide more detailed public reports—not just financial statements but also governance reports and even sustainability (ESG) reports. For example, an Integrated Report combining financial, governance, and other disclosures must be published within three months of the year-end. These measures ensure shareholders and the market get a fuller picture of each company’s performance and governance practices.

Protecting shareholder rights, especially minority investors, is also a big concern. The reforms bolstered mechanisms for calling shareholder meetings, voting on major transactions, and disallowing last-minute agenda additions that could disadvantage minority shareholders. The overall aim is to make sure all shareholders are treated fairly and have a voice.

They are also introducing board evaluations and improved governance processes. UAE-listed companies must perform annual evaluations of their board’s performance, with an independent external evaluation at least once every three years. There are also new guidelines for board secretaries (who support governance administration) to ensure they are qualified and operate with a degree of protection from undue interference. All these steps underscore a theme that the UAE is aligning its corporate governance framework with international best practices.

In fact, the SCA explicitly stated that these changes are part of “ongoing efforts to align the UAE’s corporate governance standards with international best practices, thereby facilitating a more robust and transparent business environment.”

The 2024 amendments to the governance code, in particular, were described as a “critical shift towards strengthening governance in line with global standards,” covering independence criteria, related-party definitions, and board composition. Likewise, officials from the SCA have noted that adopting global best practices in governance is key to the UAE’s vision for an inclusive, sustainable economy.

The impact on the investment climate has been significant and positive. Stronger corporate governance has made UAE markets more attractive to local and foreign investors. When investors see rules that ensure transparency, accountability, and minority protection, they are more willing to invest their capital, knowing their interests will be safeguarded.

A country report on the UAE’s financial markets observed that regulatory reforms, including improved corporate governance and disclosure rules, are part of the “broader efforts to enhance the attractiveness of UAE capital markets for investors and businesses.”

In practical terms, this means higher demand for UAE stock offerings and greater participation by institutional investors who typically insist on good governance. Indeed, the UAE has recently witnessed a boom in public listings (IPOs) and an inflow of global investment, supported by confidence in the market’s regulatory integrity.

Companies with good governance are generally less risky and more stable, which lowers the cost of capital. As one corporate advisor explained, compliance with the new code isn’t just about avoiding penalties as it “goes beyond just meeting compliance requirements” by yielding benefits like higher investor trust, stronger risk management, better decision-making, and enhanced brand value. All of these factors encourage a healthier investment climate. We can see this manifest in the UAE with rising investor interest and trust in UAE companies.

The post Why corporate governance matters to investors appeared first on International Finance.

A major cost target was also dropped by Deutsche Bank, but they still announced plans to repurchase 750 million euros (USD 780.90 million) worth of shares. Christian Sewing, the CEO, set several ambitious profit and cost targets for the once-troubled bank, and the results set the stage for a pivotal year. A few analysts have expressed doubt that Deutsche will accomplish all of its objectives.

“We have always said that 2025 will be decisive for us. At the end of this year, we will be judged by whether we have been successful with our transformation and growth strategy,” Sewing wrote in a memo to employees.

According to the CEO, the bank has started to consider modifying its plan for 2026 and beyond. Some businesses may close, and specifics will be revealed later in 2025.

Deutsche Bank has changed its target for this year’s cost-to-income ratio from less than 62% to less than 65% to make investments. When questioned about whether he would consider staying for another term, Sewing, who has been the bank’s leader since 2018, said he was still focused on this year’s goals.

The fourth-quarter net profit attributable to shareholders was 106 million euros, down from 1.2 billion euros a year earlier and below analyst expectations of roughly 380 million euros. Profit for the full year missed forecasts of almost 3 billion euros, dropping from 4.21 billion in 2023 to 2.70 billion.

However, revenue from buying and selling fixed-income securities and currencies rose 26%, beating analysts’ estimates for a 17% increase. Income in Deutsche Bank’s unit advising on deals and stock and bond sales rose 71% as investments in the business paid off.

Pretax profit fell short of estimates amid a 14% jump in costs, with Deutsche Bank also raising its guidance for expenses as a share of income in 2025. Sewing wants to balance cost controls with investments in growth as he eyes fulfilling the pledge to return more than 8 billion euro to shareholders over the medium term. Under his watch, the German lender has now refocused its strengths in fixed-income trading and corporate banking, while building up the advisory business to boost fee income.

Deutsche Bank is also planning 2.1 billion euro in capital distributions in 2025, including 1.3 billion euro in dividends for 2024 and 750 million euro in share buybacks for which it has already received regulatory approval.

Deutsche Bank’s trading unit’s performance has been driven partly by a recovery of the venture’s US rates business, the trading in government bonds and derivatives, as well as a strong financing business, which supplies credit to multinational companies.

Revenue declined in the corporate and private banks, where falling interest rates and a weak economy weighed on income. Provisions for souring loans, at 420 million euro in the quarter, were roughly in line with estimates. The lender now expects such provisions to moderate in 2025, after it had to raise its guidance twice in 2024 in a sign that Germany’s economic troubles were spilling over into its loan book.

The post Deutsche Bank may exit some businesses, CEO says after profit miss appeared first on International Finance.

The announcement, made by the industry watchdog Ofwat, comes at a time when the Keir Starmer government needs to decide whether taxpayers should renationalise Britain’s biggest water supplier after it avoided a state rescue under the previous Conservative administration.

In a simultaneous development, Ofwat published a five-year financing plan for all English and Welsh water firms born out of the privatisation of the industry in 1989. The regulator has now proposed that customers would face an average increase of 21% or £19 ($25) per year until 2030. In recent times, the sector has also come under fierce criticism over failures to plug leaks and raw sewage discharges on beaches and in rivers.

A sector in crisis

In the sweltering summer of 1995, Yorkshire Water’s managing director, Trevor Newton, gained notoriety for motivating consumers to use less of the company’s product by saying, “I personally have not had a bath or shower for three months.”

Newton invited the media to watch him wash with a flannel and bowl following a round of jokes about “the filthy rich,” because megabucks paid water company executives was also a big story back then. He had been visiting his parents and in-laws’ houses for soaks, it was later discovered, occasionally leaving Yorkshire.

The episode infuriated the public due to the discrepancy between investor rewards and the quality of service being offered by a privatised utility. Bradford was in danger of going bankrupt, despite Yorkshire having just distributed a £50 million dividend to shareholders.

The company had to rely on tanker transportation through the Dales to move water since the new grid was running behind schedule. The story also highlighted the water infrastructure’s poor condition, which was cited as the primary justification for privatisation. Because of pollution in its rivers and on its beaches, the UK was once referred to as the “dirty man of Europe.”

The industry’s expenditure on replacing its sewage treatment plants and pipes had decreased between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, and the UK was now required to adhere to new pollution regulations set by the European Community.

The same infrastructure needs to be upgraded significantly more than thirty years later, and the costs will increase dramatically. The ten water and wastewater companies in England and Wales have paid out £78 billion in dividends since 1989, but they have also accrued £60 billion in debt. The industry has come to be associated with poor management, corporate greed, and pollution.

The trade-off between price hikes, investment and the environment will test the country’s new Labour government. Water companies have routinely released sewage into rivers and seas, which has made Britain’s waters increasingly dirty, putting the regulator, Ofwat, under intense pressure to act.

Thames had asked for a 44% increase in bills over the period, excluding inflation, while other providers sought varying amounts, from Southern Water’s 73% hike to Severn Trent’s 36% rise and United Utilities’ 25% rise.

The companies say the bill hikes are needed to upgrade ageing pipe networks and help accommodate a growing British population, and say more frequent droughts and storms have helped cause sewage spills. However, critics argue that the companies have under-invested for decades while taking billions of pounds in dividends for shareholders and paying large bonuses to executives.

While the government might want the Ofwat to take a tough line on the water companies, it also needs investors onside as Starmer seeks tens of billions of pounds of private investment to upgrade infrastructure and revive Britain’s economic growth.

In 2019, Ofwat agreed to a plan for average water bills to fall by 12% before inflation over the five years. Since then, inflation and interest rates have jumped, making price rises in the next period inevitable to allow investors to make returns.

A number of major international funds have already sold out of Thames bonds in recent months, after its parent company Kemble Water defaulted in April 2024 amid a standoff with shareholders over providing more equity.

Sold on the cheap

In 1989, the UK government cancelled all of the previous water authorities’ long-term debt and gave money as a “green dowry” to the newly formed companies to facilitate privatisation. Even after selling the businesses for a total of £7.6 billion, these exercises meant that the net proceeds to the Treasury were almost zero.

However, investors in the stock market listings saw their typical fast profit: within a month, shares of the ten companies increased by an average of 20%. Half of the small investors were persuaded to buy, and after a year they took their profits and sold their shares. However, additional funding did materialise. In the four years following the sellout, investment almost doubled to £6 billion annually from £3 billion. Supporters of privatisation might counter that underperformers might be forced to improve by the discipline of a stock market listing combined with a scolding from an impartial regulator.

Following the chaos in Yorkshire in 1995, Ofwat dispatched investigators, which resulted in a management shake-up. By the end of the tenth year, the company’s performance was the best in its class. Byatt also suggested that Yorkshire give customers a return of £40 million in the form of price reductions, and “it concurred after some discussion.”

Nevertheless, it was clear that the businesses had been acquired for far too little money. It was assumed at the time of sale that the companies would require quick access to funds to finance the increase in investment, so during the first five years, the average customer bill increased by a third. First, it was believed that debt levels could only account for up to 35% of the assets’ value, or the leverage ratio, also known as gearing. However, monopoly companies with captive clientele were able to obtain much larger loans from the bond market.

As odd as it may seem today, the regulator also wanted to see an increase in financial gearing. This was justified by the idea that customers would receive lower bills as a result of reduced funding costs. The initial five-year price review by Ofwat in 1994 prevented the anticipated increases in bills during privatisation, while the second one, conducted in 1999, resulted in an average 12% reduction in bills.

The companies were happy to play the debt game. A few people became enamoured with diversification during the boom years of the 1990s, thanks to cheap capital and rising share prices. Water networks in Chile and Indonesia were awarded to Thames. Welsh Water lost a lot of money by acquiring hotels and country clubs. A building company was acquired by Anglian Water in 2000.

Takeover games

In 1995, the government cancelled its golden shares in ten companies. France’s Lyonnaise des Eaux acquired Northumbrian Water and Highland Power acquired Southern Water. Wessex Water was purchased by US company Enron before its spectacular 2001 collapse.

Although water companies were prohibited from purchasing one another, some embraced the vogue of “multi utilities” and acquired local electricity providers, which were eventually privatised in 1990. Welsh Water rebranded as Hyder after taking over South Wales Electricity, and North West Water acquired its local supplier to become United Utilities.

A windfall tax imposed by the incoming Labour government in 1997 on the privatised utilities, including water, did not slow down any of this activity. For instance, Thames was sold for £922 million at privatisation, but in July 1997, the stock market valued it at £2.09 billion; similarly, Severn Trent’s value increased from £849 million to £3 billion.

The privatised water sector had undergone radical transformation by the end of the first ten years. The mixed effects of water privatisation were discussed in 1999 in this newspaper. One could argue that an excessive portion of the additional earnings had been “dissipated in unwarranted mega-increases in boardroom pay, excess dividends, and ill-advised diversifications.”

On the other hand, “We now have much-improved drinking water because a lot of money was invested in improving the infrastructure.”

Negotiations continued unabated. In 2000, the German utility RWE acquired Thames for £4.3 billion in cash and took on £2.5 billion in debt. The 240p per share that all ten water companies were sold for in 1989 was five times higher than the takeover price of £12.15 per share. UK utilities continued to attract foreign capital, which was viewed as a good thing in the spirit of the times. New Labour had no intention of tampering with the model.

Panic stations

A significant turning point was what came next. Following a string of horrific train disasters that claimed many lives in the early 2000s, Railtrack was placed into receivership and transformed into Network Rail. The majority of the nation’s nuclear plants are owned by British Energy, which required a bailout.

Both incidents sparked political panic, with the City trying to fuel worries that foreign investment would dry up if owners thought government action had short-changed them (the baseless accusation at Railtrack). Meanwhile, the water industry continued to vehemently protest that it had insufficient incentives to invest due to the alleged harshness of Ofwat’s 1999 price review.

Two decisions were made as a result, which in retrospect accelerated financial risk-taking. The water companies’ operating licences were originally set to expire in 2014, but were extended by Ofwat in 2002. They were replaced with 25-year rolling licenses.

“Companies and their investors will be able to plan more securely with the longer notice period,” stated Philip Fletcher, the late head of Ofwat, while interacting with the Guardian.

That was the plan, but the change also shielded underachievers from the possibility of being replaced in the medium run.

Then, in 2004, bills increased by 20% in what was widely perceived as a giveaway to the companies during the next five-year price review. Investors found water to be even more alluring.

After that, takeover activity accelerated dramatically. Investment banks, infrastructure funds, and pension funds were the new purchasers, not other utilities. The year 2006 saw Macquarie’s disastrous £8 billion purchase of Thames from RWE. The acquisition of Anglian’s parent company by a consortium of Australian and Canadian pension funds also occurred. After a battle with US investment bank Goldman Sachs, Southern Water was acquired by a group that included JP Morgan Asset Management in 2007. A group led by Citigroup and HSBC acquired Yorkshire Water’s owner, Kelda Group.

This is the time frame that former regulators have identified as when the game changed.

“Private equity infrastructure capital showed the hard face of capitalism, involving leveraged buyouts and short-term policies, namely high borrowing and high dividends,” Byatt wrote in his book “A Regulator’s Sign Off: Changing the Taps in Britain.”

This earned it widespread criticism for its lack of transparency and financial engineering.

Soon after leaving the regulator, Jonathan Cox, who had held leadership positions at Yorkshire and Anglian before serving as chair of Ofwat from 2012 to 2022, testified before a House of Lords committee that “investment banks started to realise in the 2000s that there was an opportunity to acquire the water company assets and to put significantly more leverage on to those capital structures. At that time, I wasn’t at Ofwat. That strategy has never appealed to me, and I think it’s terrible that it took place.”

He contended that investment banks produced “the predisposition of thinking of water companies as financial assets” and skewed incentives.

Financial engineering on steroids

Thames launched a “whole business securitisation” in 2007, shortly after Macquarie acquired it. The fundraising effort was dubbed “banal” despite its aggressive nature. An eight-layered corporate structure, including a subsidiary in the Cayman Islands, was used to package a once sombre business that dealt in pipes and sewage treatment works. This structure allowed debt to be piled on top of debt, much like the layers in a wedding cake.

Leverage ratios of 50% or 60% suddenly rose to 80% at certain companies that were taken off the stock market. In 2018, Thames explained how its complex corporate structure allowed it to borrow more money with the ratings agencies’ approval: “An investment grade credit rating allows for a higher level of leverage.”

Macquarie has justified its Thames business securitisation strategy by stating that it was “very common” at the time.

Martin Bradley, the head of infrastructure at the company, told Infrastructure Investor in 2023 that “it was a UK water utility product that was invented, advised, and constructed by UK banks.”

He cited annual gross returns of 12–13%, which he claimed were consistent with regulatory guidance during the 2005–09 periods, as justification for investors in Macquarie funds that profited from a staggered sale of Thames in 2017.

Additionally, the Australian bank has defended its overall management of Thames, stating that the business “undertook a record level of investment despite the returns allowed by Ofwat being reduced.”

But the industry’s mid-2000s debt binge still has an impact today. In 2021, Southern Water, which had implemented a complete business securitisation in 2003, needed to be saved from what appears to be a miniaturised version of the financial crisis currently engulfing Thames.

Macquarie, which controversially provided £1 billion in fresh equity to recapitalise the company, was the buyer at Southern. Ofwat realised the risks associated with excessive borrowing only much later. Only in 2023, did the company get the authority to halt dividend payments if doing so would jeopardise its stability.

Debt has also been used for its original purpose of accelerating investment, complementing the portion funded by bills. For example, is it a coincidence that the two companies that have been fined the most over the years, Thames and Southern, also have the most aggressive financing structures? The total investment made after privatisation is £190 billion. However, it is indisputable that excessive use of financial leverage is done to maximise profits for shareholders.

“For most companies, debt has been a prudent low-cost source of finance with low interest rates fixed for the long-term. However, some companies borrowed too much, most obviously Thames Water. The risk for this – and for correcting this – belongs to the company and its shareholders,” current Ofwat chief executive, David Black, addressed the point in 2023 when Thames’ financial crisis became acute.

The post Labour government’s water sector challenge appeared first on International Finance.

Before the present transaction was made, Sun Land Investasi owned a 37.54 percent stake and Suriadi owned a 31.22 percent stake in the small lender. Since then, their shares have come down to 19.76 percent and 25 percent respectively. On the other hand, PT Sun Antarnusa Investment and the public still have 14.94 percent and 16.30 percent stakes respectively.

Other media reports state that at the end of 2020, Bisnis bank’s core capital had reached 1 trillion. According to rules, Indonesia’s banks have to increase their core capital to Rp 3 trillion by 2022, according to the regulation issued by the country’s Financial Services Authority (OJK).

Founded in 2016, Kredivo provides Indonesian customers with instant credit financing, which includes buy now pay later option, e-commerce and online purchases, and personal loans. It is in direct competition with Sequoia-backed digital credit lender Akulaku and other online marketplaces and payment startups such as Tokopedia, Traveloka, and OVO, all of which have their own buy now pay later options.

FinAccel is backed by prominent investors such as Mirae Asset-Naver Asia Growth Fund, Square Peg Capital, Singtel Innov8, and Indonesian telco Telkomsel. After its latest funding, the company’s valuation reached almost $500 million. It is also the latest tech company to have bought shares in smaller Indonesian financial institutions, which they later on, plan to turn into digital banks.

The post FinAccel acquires 24% stake in Indonesia’s Bisnis Internasional appeared first on International Finance.

ShareAction is a UK-based registered charity aimed at responsible investment. Barclays has been Europe’s biggest lender for fossil fuel projects since the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. According to ShareAction, Barclays had financed fossil fuel companies and carbon-intensive projects worth more than $85 billion. 

A total of 11 institutional investors managing assets over $170.6 billion have collaborated with 100 individual shareholders for the climate change resolution, media reports said. The resolution will be voted at Barclays’ annual investor meeting in May 2020. 

With that, the lender becomes Europe’s biggest and the world’s sixth largest funder of fossil fuels, according to . BankTrack report last year. The resolution led by ShareAction plans to tackle climate change and change the banks’ lending practices in favour of fossil fuel projects. 

Amundi spokesperson told the media that, “According to its voting policy for 2020, Amundi reiterates its priority on the question of the energy transition and the decarbonisation of the economy. And as such, we are favourable to any resolutions from shareholders that ask issuers to be more transparent around environmental and social factors. Therefore, the resolution of ShareAction is perfectly in line with our policy.

The asset manager holds a minor stake of 0.02 percent in Barclays. Today, companies are under strain to help reduce carbon emissions.

The post Barclays challenged by ShareAction to end fossil fuel investment appeared first on International Finance.

What’s fascinating is many of the mistakes we made back in 2008 are the same mistakes that many tech start-ups make time and time again. I know this because over the past decade we have represented hundreds of tech businesses – from start-ups to big businesses – and I find that time and time again the same issues crop up.

So, what are they?

1. Not having a strong shareholders agreement – or discussing, formulating and documenting the business plan with co-founders

I intended to found my business with three others, however, I soon realised that our goals and objectives were sadly not aligned; our work ethics were very different and our long-term motivations out of sync. Luckily, I had drafted a very good partnership agreement so managed to break free from what would have been a disastrous relationship. Luckily this enabled me to continue with A City Law Firm with just me at the helm, but not all businesses I have encountered can say the same.

Not only do you have to be careful to choose the right partners, but you need to clearly document your goals in a shareholder’s agreements. This means that as founders you can build upon the platform you have created together, but if it goes wrong you have a means to address the problem not just having to wind up the company. The key is choosing the right partners, talking candidly and asking the tough questions at the beginning.

2. Having poor contracts or no contracts – hitting your cash flow

You need to understand your marketplace, your competitors and what you need financially to be able to grow.

Cash is king. Be realistic with budgets and prices and ensure your contracts protect you – not only with clients but with employees, suppliers and contractors. It is fundamental that you closely monitor payment timescales with clients, especially if you are working on large projects. Corporate clients may expect 60 – 90-day payment terms but your sub-contractors will not.

It’s also important you pay yourself a reasonable salary, especially when you are seeking investment, otherwise, if the founder is distracted, the business is not going to progress. Any investor will want to see this factored into any business plans and financial models.

3. Not having good staff contracts or options to incentivise them

A large part of any company’s budget will be put towards recruitment, training and retention of its employees. Despite this, there is a real risk that those key people could walk out of the door leaving you without the requisite skill pool you need, but worse yet, there is a real possibility that they may also take all of their knowledge of your business and pass it to a competitor.

Many businesses focus on many things but staff retention and protection against staff competition is often neglected. This is especially key in the tech world as the opportunities for work are so great.

From a legal standpoint, it is important to:

• Have tight employment, contractor, consultancy and sub-contractor contracts in order to protect your IP and confidentiality. It is also important to have restrictive covenants to avoid staff taking your know-how in terms of clients, IP or staff to a competitor or setting up on their own.

• Consider EMI options as they can give staff the feeling of being part of the fabric of the business and as you succeed so do they in terms of profit sharing without actual cost in the short term to you. This also can attract more specialist experts to the team where cash is not readily available ;

Overall though the key is to find ways to incentivise and look after your team. If you can communicate your vision to the team so that they are working side by side with you, this inspires loyalty and dedication as you are all working from the same plan with the same goal.

4. Intellectual Property & the mistake of that ‘handshake deal’

IP ownership can only be granted or transferred (“assigned”) in writing. As such, if your freelance coder or developer has no contract with your business then they could actually own the IP that they have helped design, not you.

If there is a dispute, then they could hold this to ransom causing a costly dispute or loss of your code or design. You need to ensure you have checked these contracts carefully and that you actually have one carefully drafted in your favour. Many tech companies work with friends and often make arrangements based on goodwill, but when a dispute arises without a contract you are at the mercy of the designer.

If you are bringing your designing or coding in-house, then it is especially key to convince an investor you have secured long-term staff and that the IP ownership will effectively transfer to you.

Many businesses fail to check that their proposed company name or branding is free to trademark. This should be carefully checked before a large budget (or large budget relative to the size of your business) is set aside for branding and marketing as otherwise, you may find yourself having to start all over again.

5. Rushing to Investment and giving up equity in the company

I managed to self-finance my business throughout without taking in partners or investors. I did consider these at points along the way and even had offers of mergers and partners coming into the business but having carried out checks into these entities, I often found hidden skeletons and things I was too anxious to continue to explore.

If you are seeking investment, which is often a necessity for tech companies scaling up, it is vital that you carry out your due diligence on what’s available, what the risks are and who the investor actually is.

– Do they understand your sector?

– Have they got the resources to add more money at a later date if that’s what you need?

– Can you approach them if things go wrong?

– Do they have competing interests in the marketplace?

– What is your exit plan for them?

– Have you also explored grants available for tech, innovation offerings, R & D credits and other means of funding?

Many people are often dazzled by the cheque and sign a contract… but that’s just the start of the journey.

It is important that you consider whether you want to get involved unless you are certain you have aligned goals, exit plan and can handle a crisis together.

6. Not being investor ready

When start-ups do find the right investor, a common pitfall is they are not investor ready because they haven’t got their house in order.

For example, they have not allocated and issued shares correctly. Their articles do not reflect the workings of the company. If an investor picks this up, it can make tech founders look careless and could scare off the investor.

More broadly other things that put investors off include inaccurate statements that have been put in writing… such as:

-“This is unique to the market, no one else is doing this”. This is often a bold statement that just isn’t upheld or accurate;

– “I don’t need a salary for 1-2 years; I can use 100% investment on the business”; wrong! No one will invest in someone who can’t eat and pay their bills!

– “My business is valued at £10 million because it’s going to be worth that in two years when we build our technology”. Can you support that with figures and market research? Be realistic and able to evidence all assertions.

7. Not understanding how markets are regulated

Many businesses, especially those in disruptive markets, need to be regulated or are covered by additional regulations or laws.

Many fintech or ICO companies need to be regulated and choose to risk investment or token raises prior to taking proper advice or considering the proper process exposing you to an FCA investigation.

This is not an issue which only affects those in financial markets but includes among many others those in advertising, legal services/legal tech, recruitment, packaged holidays etc. Knowing your marketplace, sector and taking advice is essential prior to any public offering.

8. Not taking experienced advice and creating an ecosystem

Tech developers are necessarily geared to be financial directors or HR managers yet running a business these roles become fundamental. Not getting good advisors on board early enough is a common mistake. A good lawyer, accountant and tax advisor saves you money and pain at a later stage, especially if they can secure you EIS or another favourable structuring. A good FD helps secure investment and cash flow by managing the budgets and financial forecasts, they also add the commercial know-how into your passionate pitch deck. Downloading templates; googling advice I appreciate happens because of the costs involved, but if you want your business to succeed you need tailored, personal advice and support. I know this is something I have benefited from greatly as I brought in consultants to help me and train me in my areas of weakness. Admitting these gaps in my knowledge and bringing experts in has helped me scale up.

9. Not having skin in the game & asking too little

If you are seeking investment for your tech business you need to start with securing some capital yourself or through your contacts. This shows investors you have faith in your offering, which then means they are more likely to match. This is something I hear frequently from equity investors, so try friends and family first. Another common mistake is asking for too little which cannot be sustained and then you have to go back to the platform or investor for money which could result in them losing faith in your financial model. You need to forecast and present realistic figures so you don’t ask for too much or too little.

10. Don’t let the cat out of the bag

If you don’t have a signed NDA and if you discuss a potential or pending patent you could lose the rights. Discuss the details of your tech, design or offering in as much detail as you can to secure an investor or client, but where possible secure an NDA to protect your confidential trade secrets or ideas or Patents. They may be hard to enforce, often a concern of many so they don’t bother, but it’s a deterrent; it protects you Patents and it’s a good starting point for an injunction if someone tries to reproduce your tech.

The post Ten Mistakes Made By Startups appeared first on International Finance.

“Combining the 21CF businesses with Disney and establishing new ‘Fox’ will unlock significant value for our shareholders,” said Rupert Murdoch, Executive Chairman, 21st Century Fox. “We are grateful to our shareholders for approving this transaction. I want to thank all of our executives and colleagues for their enormous contributions in building 21st Century Fox over the past decades. With their help, we expect the enlarged Disney and new ‘Fox’ companies will be pre-eminent in the entertainment and media industries.”

“We’re incredibly pleased that shareholders of both companies have granted approval for us to move forward, and are confident in our ability to create significant long-term value through this acquisition of Fox’s premier assets,” said Robert A. Iger, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, The Walt Disney Company.  “We remain grateful to Rupert Murdoch and to the rest of the 21st Century Fox board for entrusting us with the future of these extraordinary businesses, and look forward to welcoming 21st Century Fox’s stellar talent to Disney and ultimately integrating our businesses to provide consumers around the world with more appealing content and entertainment options.”

The overall mix of consideration paid to 21st Century Fox stockholders will be approximately 50% cash and 50% stock. The stock consideration is subject to a collar, which will ensure that 21st Century Fox stockholders will receive consideration equal to $38 in value if the average Disney stock price at closing is between $93.53 and $114.32. Disney expects to pay a total of about $35.7 billion in cash and issue approximately 343 million New Disney shares to 21st Century Fox stockholders. As a result, current 21st Century Fox stockholders will own a 17-20% stake in New Disney on a pro forma basis.

Last month, the U.S. Department of Justice entered into a consent decree with Disney and 21st Century Fox that allows the transaction to proceed, while requiring the sale of the Fox Sports Regional Networks.

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Dividends on B Shares will be paid, by default, in pounds sterling at the rate of 35.18p per B Share. Holders of B Shares, who have validly submitted euro currency elections by May 25, 2018 will be entitled to a dividend of €0.4011 per B Share.

This dividend will be payable on June 18, 2018 to those members whose names were on the Register of Members on May 11, 2018.

Taxation – cash dividend

Cash dividends on A Shares will be subject to the deduction of Dutch dividend withholding tax at the rate of 15%, which may be reduced in certain circumstances. Non-Dutch resident shareholders, depending on their particular circumstances, may be entitled to a full or partial refund of Dutch dividend withholding tax.

Furthermore, in April 2016, there were changes to the UK taxation of dividends. The dividend tax credit was abolished, and a tax free dividend allowance introduced, this was £5,000 for the 2016/17 and 2017/18 tax years and reduced to £2,000 for the 2018/19 tax year. Dividend income in excess of the allowance is taxable at the following rates: 7.5% within the basic rate band; 32.5% within the higher rate band; and 38.1% on dividend income taxable at the additional rate.

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