In a series of papers published on Monday (July 6), the Department for Business and Trade (DBT) said its research demonstrated that digitalising processes, financing and documents can reduce cost, time spent and manual errors for companies trading across borders.

“But in practice, adoption remains low, particularly among SMEs, and firms face a range of difficulties, including patchy customs acceptance, platform interoperability and identity infrastructure,” DBT commented, while adding that the findings would help shape the approach of the Labour government, awaiting PM-designate Andy Burnham to take over the proceedings at 10 Downing Street, to build SME capability in trade digitalisation that will make the exchange of goods simpler, faster and more digital.

“The DBT examined several pilot projects, including digital trade corridors between the UK and France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand and Taiwan, commissioning reports from industry partners such as Boex, LogChain and Ipsos,” the department said.

One of the DBT’s papers gave the example of UK-based UniSim, an SME that exports healthcare training technology to mainland Europe, which was able to reduce the number of paper trade documents it produced by 90%, cut administration time per shipment by 50% and reduce overall costs by 2%.

Another research document cited a pilot into trade finance interoperability, which found that Lloyds in the UK and MUFG in Japan were able to save costs and limit risk by carrying out a documentary credit transaction digitally, using Enigio’s trace:original platform.

“The transaction was delivered by the Teesside University Digital Trade Testbed, alongside the International Centre for Digital Trade and Innovation (iC4DTI) and the International Chamber of Commerce UK, which have long advocated for moving away from paper,” the document mentioned.

However, as per the DBT, barriers to wider adoption go beyond technical challenges.

SMEs often lack time, resources and specialist knowledge to support a transition to fully digitalised processes and tend to be unaware of digital trade provisions within existing trade agreements. Though many companies were comfortable with basic digitalisation, such as emailing PDF invoices and uploading data to third-party couriers, the use of more complex documents such as electronic bills of lading remained rare,” the department said.

The study papers also discovered a “misalignment on trade finance”, where the promise of improved access to credit “did not resonate with small businesses”.

As per the DBT, “Trade finance lenders often struggle to offer SMEs a fully digital solution because different technology platforms are not connected. Even if a bank can accept an electronic bill of lading from several different providers, it may face further difficulties if customs authorities in destination countries do not recognise the particular platform being used.”

“Businesses will be more likely to move away from hybrid processes when digital documents become consistently accepted by intermediaries and regulatory authorities across the whole corridor, not just inside one firm or platform,” one of the digital trade corridor pilots found.

The research papers also contained a range of recommendations for the UK government and Burnham to consider.

‘Intermediaries from both logistics and finance noted that for [electronic trade documents] to be adopted widely, the government needed to act as a central actor to connect different systems, such as establishing a centralised digital identity registry and a unified trade portal. A digital identity registry would allow banks to verify small businesses immediately and process electronic documents with confidence,” it said.

The report also advised the DBT to make digital processes mandatory, such as requiring certain customs documents to be provided electronically by default.

“Enforcing a shift towards digitalisation would help overcome a widespread reluctance to change, particularly among SMEs. Voluntary adoption is slow partly due to cultural resistance and a prevailing ‘if it isn’t broken, do not fix it’ mentality. Intermediaries noted that rapid change only occurs when it is required, such as global shipping lines demanding electronic bills of lading. It suggested this,” it added further.

“The DBT should also continue to explore further trade agreements, including digital and free trade agreements, as evidence suggests that, even with low awareness, digital trade provisions are helping to facilitate greater use of digital tools and practices,” another study paper commented.

The post UK eyes course correction after research advocates trade digitalisation appeared first on International Finance.

As per the data, total exports dropped by 20.5% to 4.502 billion dinars from 5.66 billion dinars in the first quarter of 2025. Imports declined as well, falling 12.3% to 2.734 billion dinars from 3.11 billion dinars a year earlier. Due to this, Kuwait’s total trade exchange contracted by 17.6% to 7.236 billion dinars during Q1 2026, down from 8.77 billion dinars in the corresponding quarter of last year.

“The slowdown continued in March, when the monthly trade surplus declined by 29.2% year-on-year to 610.6 million dinars, compared with 862.8 million dinars in March 2025. Exports during the month fell 37.8% to 1.181 billion dinars, while imports dropped 45% to 570.6 million dinars,” noted the Central Statistical Bureau.

Oil and petroleum product exports accounted for the Gulf country’s majority of overseas sales, reaching approximately 1.09 billion dinars in March 2026, down from 1.7 billion dinars in the same month in 2025.

“Non-oil exports totalled 42.5 million dinars, while re-exports reached 44 million dinars,” the Central Statistical Bureau added further.

As per the bureau, Saudi Arabia remained the leading destination for Kuwait’s non-oil exports in March, with the Kingdom importing goods worth 26.5 million dinars. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) came second at 17.1 million dinars, followed by Jordan (at 7.5 million dinars), India (at 7.47 million dinars) and Iraq (at 5.24 million dinars).

“On the import side, China retained its position as Kuwait’s largest trading partner, with imports valued at 105.3 million dinars during March. Saudi Arabia followed with imports worth 95.8 million dinars, ahead of the UAE at 64.1 million dinars and Japan at 31.2 million dinars,” the agency remarked.

Trade with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries also weakened during March 2026. Kuwaiti exports to GCC markets declined by 35.1% to 49.4 million dinars compared with 76.2 million dinars in March 2025. Still, Gulf markets accounted for 4.2% of Kuwait’s total exports, slightly higher than the 4% share recorded a year earlier.

The post Kuwait’s Q1 2026 trade exchange falls to 7.2 billion dinars, says government data appeared first on International Finance.

In an exclusive interview with International Finance, Brett King, founder and CEO of The Futurists Network, Fintech Hall of Fame inductee, and policy advisor to global leaders, including the Obama administration, President Xi’s advisory ecosystem, and GCC governments, shares his perspective on how artificial intelligence is reshaping money, power, and the global financial order.

You have long predicted shifts in financial systems. Are we now entering an era where artificial intelligence becomes the core decision-maker in finance rather than human-led institutions?

Yes, we are witnessing the end of human-led decision-making in banking. We are seeing multiple agentic platforms being deployed right now at scale, including OpenClaw, PayPal, Stripe, Mastercard and others. So, it’s fairly inevitable that we’ll need fit-for-purpose banking. This requires agentic finance and native AI capabilities, which will exclude most banks in their current technical state. By 2035, agentic banking will be mainstream as neo-banking is mainstream today.

When we discuss the future of money, is the real transformation about innovation, or about who controls financial power?

There is no future for money as we think of it today. The more automation that is put in the system, the less value fiat currency provides, as it is not machine-readable, nor can it move without human intervention. We need smart money, which will include stablecoins, CBDCs, tokens (deposit, utility, etc), and eventually, AI marketplaces will further iterate on digital money.

As AI begins to drive lending, underwriting, and investment decisions, who ultimately holds accountability, the institution, the algorithm, or the data ecosystem behind it?

The institution will hold responsibility, but we will need both human and AI oversight functions to ensure these algorithms work. Ultimately, the quality of the data will determine how well these decisions can be automated. This is why data lakes and foundation models are really critical in the medium term.

Do you believe algorithmic trust can realistically replace traditional trust in banks, and what risks come with that shift?

Absolutely. Firstly, trust in banks will convert to trust in algorithms over time, just as it did with credit cards online, and online banking. Today, we see neobanks and wallets with higher trust scores than traditional banks, which is a good indication of the path artificial intelligence will take.

Could AI-led finance democratise access to capital globally, or will it deepen the concentration of power among a few dominant players?

Both. The core problem is not the democratisation of capital as much as it is AI’s potential to replace human capital. Which is why we hear many of the tech ‘broligarchy’ talking about Universal Basic Income. The fact is, wealth distribution is the biggest issue for AI at scale moving forward, not access to capital per se. But, at the same time, there will never be an easier time to start your own business or launch a product in the world.

If artificial intelligence becomes the primary gatekeeper of financial access, how do we address the risk of bias and ensure fairness at scale?

We completely need to rethink financial access in this world, but access to AI won’t be restricted by bias. All you will need is an internet connection and a smartphone. By 2030, 99% of the planet will have that capability (projected). The issues with biases are still present in datasets today, but people are self-selecting platforms that focus on accessibility and speed of access. This is why Revolut is now approaching the milestone of being the largest retail bank (by customers) in Europe, and why Ant Group and NuBank have already taken that status in their markets.

With the rise of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs), are governments enhancing efficiency, or expanding control over how money is used?

CBDCs do not give much greater control over how money is used from the account and fraud structures we have today, although they do allow central banks more direct control over the use of the currency and policy mechanisms connected to CBDCs. The key to understanding is that you can’t run autonomous systems on fiat currency on a traditional core – they are not fit for purpose. You can create translation layers and so forth, but CBDCs can be purpose-built to mirror trade agreements, for example, allowing only for cross-border transfers consistent with said agreements – programmable money that is policy and process enforced. This allows for much greater use of safety rails and mechanisms on autonomous cross-border trade that we don’t have with fiat. Various players, such as the CEO of Circle, have said we’ll likely have to move to rollback models over time, so that current payment rails don’t support either. So, this is all fit-for-purpose money design.

How concerned should we be about the idea of programmable money being used to influence or restrict economic behaviour?

Again, the banks can restrict money from an individual account to entire countries right now, today. So, this is not the systemic risk it would appear to be. Remember, we will need the ability to stop agentic AI-based criminal organisations using AI to scale crime, which we cannot do with today’s rails and account structures. So, we are actually at much greater risk of fraud and crime without programmable money.

Do CBDCs have the potential to genuinely improve financial inclusion, or could they unintentionally weaken the role of commercial banks?

We are already seeing the impact of potential yield from stablecoins being a big destabilising element for traditional deposits, but CBDCs essentially allow anyone with a government ID to have access to basic banking services. So, the answer is, both will happen simultaneously.

Between banks, Big Tech, and governments, which entity do you believe is best positioned to dominate the future financial ecosystem, and why?

The two determinants of success in this world are speed and technical agility. Speed will be defined by your organisation’s culture (how quickly artificial intelligence can be integrated), your tech stack, and how much of it is AI-ready. Banks with on-premise mainframes without access to the cloud or without multi-year digital transformation experience will really suffer through this transition, as they will quickly become less relevant from a systemic perspective. The other issue is market share and those natural shifts. Today, digital banks like NuBank, Revolut, Starling, Chime and others are dominating in their markets because of their ability to acquire customers at scale. AI is going to supercharge that capability, and banks reliant on traditional distribution will simply continue to lose customers pretty rapidly.

For example, HSBC, one of the world’s top 20 banks since the 1980s, has 38 million customers globally. And that has remained stable for the last decade, but Revolut has already hit 70 million in that same timeframe. Next, we will see how AI advisory shifts AuM to digital platforms away from product-based banks.

Are we moving toward a model where banks become invisible infrastructure while technology companies own the customer interface?

Yes, absolutely. Banks are either going to be data stores or data pipes, but they won’t own the personal AI clients at the front end. This is a bigger shift than most people realise. In 10 years, you’ll interact with your AI, and it will execute on your banking and money management, health management, all the administrative elements of your life – you won’t use apps. Interfaces will essentially be liquid/generative, sort of chunks of functionality driven by context and the AI. So, you won’t use banking apps like you do today. Your personal AI agent will interact with the bank agent on your behalf. Only when it needs your input will you get something resembling an interaction with a bank today, but it will be minimal.

Do regulators today have the capability to effectively oversee AI-driven financial systems, or are they already falling behind innovation?

Regulators need to be aware of the technology infrastructure in the future. Humans will simply not be able to supervise an AI-based system of this complexity and the speed of artificial intelligence. Most regulators are falling behind, but likely, regulation will start to coalesce into regulatory zones with common policy/process and infrastructure requirements. You need agentic regulation to run agentic banking, not human-based regulation. Also, policy will need to be a feedback loop process, where the data shows trends, the agent model and guardrails are tweaked, and the code is refined. We won’t be going to the Senate or Parliament to enact policy like we do today – it will all be in code.

Could artificial intelligence and digital currencies accelerate a shift in global financial power away from traditional economic leaders?

Yes, but likely, China will lead the world in terms of the adaptiveness of their economy from an embedded AI/Autonomous finance perspective, just because of the level of investment they are making in infrastructure, including next-generation energy systems and distributed edge compute.

Where is the US falling short today in terms of preparing for this future?

The big oil/gas lobby has restricted renewables deployment in the US, which leaves the US grid under immense strain as automation demands for energy grow. Secondly, the US remains the only G20 country to not have a dedicated fintech charter and widespread real-time payments adoption. Both would be required in the near term.

In an AI-first world, how do you see the very definition of money evolving; will it remain a static store of value, or become a dynamic, programmable asset?

Data will be the new money in many ways. For example, in the mid 2030s, expect longevity to be a big theme for the developed world. Your health data becomes just as valuable as money in that scenario. Thus, the question is how data and money work together in this new system. The reality is that the more automation we put into the world, the less utility money itself will have. It’s highly unlikely that in 60 years we’ll use money at all in most parts of the world.

Could we see a future where AI agents transact, invest, and manage money autonomously on our behalf, and what does that mean for human control over finance?

Absolutely. Control is overrated. Efficiency of capital deployment, maximisation of returns and minimisation of risk are far more critical, and this is where artificial intelligence will excel, and outperform humans consistently and absolutely. Just like you won’t trust a doctor not using AI in a few years’ time, you won’t trust a bank that doesn’t use AI to manage your money in the future.

Are we heading toward a fragmented global financial system driven by competing digital currencies and geopolitical tensions?

We are already in a multipolar geopolitical world. In one of my reports, I have described the impact of the Iran war and general large-scale systems automation. Ian Bremmer, a highly regarded political commentator out of NYC, talks about the technology cold war we are entering into between the US tech giants and distributed Chinese tech. By 2050, the largest economies in the world will be smart economies, managed by AI. Extremely resource efficient, by today’s standards, but much more energy dependent – this is why the US is not likely to win this in the long term.

What’s the biggest unspoken risk in AI-led financial systems that policymakers may be underestimating today?

Ethics. It is hard to code ethical guardrails into AI because we can’t even agree on ethics as humans. Take issues like abortion, transgender kids, vaccines, etc – how do you manage the ethics of those issues in AI when humans themselves can’t find agreement.

What is one prediction about the future of money that most people underestimate today, but will soon become reality?

Artificial intelligence is the end of capitalism as we know it. AI has one central tenet in respect to its design — that is to automate at scale, eliminating human labour wherever possible. The most efficient business is a human-less corporation. Sam Altman talks about the single-person unicorn as a fact yet to be confirmed, but totally possible. The US Fed chairman has already said AI is eliminating hirings for entry-level positions across the S&P 500 today. This put us on a trajectory where AI generates massive technology unemployment fairly quickly globally. If you have large-scale unemployment due to AI, the basic tenets of capitalism no longer work. That’s why we hear proposals for Universal Basic Income and other things as ways to keep consumers consuming in an AI world. We need new, flexible thinking on our economic and policy models that isn’t simply capitalism versus socialism. We need new types of systems thinking to adapt to this.

The post ‘AI is definitely the future of banking, but the challenge is ethics’ appeared first on International Finance.

As the 2026 midterm elections approach, all three of those pledges are far from being fulfilled, and the reason is a collision between two of his own decisions. First is the decision to strike Iran, and the second is taxing imports at the highest rate in more than a century.

The consequences are showing up where voters feel them most directly, at the gas pump, in the grocery aisle, and at car dealerships. Surveys show consumer confidence at record lows. If the pain persists into November, Donald Trump’s Republicans could face a serious reckoning at the ballot box.

A war that reignited inflation

In late February, Donald Trump ordered joint US-Israeli strikes on Iran. Tehran swiftly responded by closing the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow channel in the Persian Gulf through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil supply passes daily. That one decision triggered an enormous energy price shock that economists say has reversed much of the hard-won progress the United States made on inflation during 2024 and 2025.

Brent crude, the global oil benchmark, surged from about $70 per barrel before the conflict to over $110 at its peak after Iran shut the strait. When Tehran briefly signalled a partial reopening, prices fell below $90, only to climb back above $105 as tensions remained high. The US benchmark, WTI crude, approached $96. As a direct result, US inflation accelerated to 3.3% in March 2026, the highest rate in two years, driven largely by fuel.

The OECD now warns that US headline inflation could hit approximately 4.2% in 2026, up from a previous forecast of just 3%.

The IMF’s managing director, Kristalina Georgieva, has described the situation as a “reversal” of what had been a positive trajectory for prices. Simply put, two years of painful interest-rate increases to bring inflation under control have been significantly set back in a matter of weeks.

Gas prices as political poison

Since the Iran strikes began, pump prices across the United States have risen by roughly 50 cents per gallon, with station price boards changing numbers almost daily in some areas. In California, the average has already crossed five dollars per gallon.

Nationally, analysts expect average US gasoline prices to head toward three dollars fifty if oil stays above $100. The national average was already at $4.16 per gallon on April 8, up from $3.25 just a month earlier, according to AAA data.

Polling shows that voters are angry and anxious. A Reuters/Ipsos survey in early March found that 67% of Americans expect gas prices to get worse over the next year as a result of the Iran campaign.

That fear cuts across party lines. Over 44% of Republicans and 85% of Democrats share it. Only 29% of respondents approved of the strikes at all, and 64% said Trump had never clearly explained what the United States was trying to achieve.

A separate Pew Research survey later in March found that 69% of Americans were worried about rising fuel costs from the conflict. Nearly six in ten Republicans told Pew that gas prices were their biggest concern about the war, while close to eight in ten Democrats said the same.

That bipartisan pain matters enormously heading into November. When a President’s own supporters feel the squeeze at the pump every time they fill their tank, the political shelter that wartime solidarity usually offers starts to crack. Inflation, unlike foreign policy abstractions, is something voters experience personally and remember when they vote.

More than petrol

The disruption to the Strait of Hormuz has inflicted damage well beyond fuel prices. Oil is a raw material for plastics, fertilisers and chemicals, so when its price spikes, the cost of hundreds of everyday products rises in turn. Shipping routes have been disrupted, adding delays and costs throughout global supply chains.

Researchers at the Dallas Federal Reserve modelled the inflation impact depending on how long Hormuz stays restricted. If it remains closed for one quarter, it adds roughly 0.35 percentage points to 2026 inflation.

Two quarters of closure add 0.79 percentage points. Three-quarters would add approximately 1.47 percentage points on top of existing pressures. These figures translate directly into higher prices on goods ranging from groceries to building materials, even if the war itself ends.

OECD economists also note that because of the way prices ripple through supply chains, households will still be feeling the effects in rent, transport costs and consumer goods as they head to the polls in November.

The tariff tax

The Iran shock is not arriving in a vacuum. It is hitting on top of a separate cost increase that Donald Trump himself created. Namely, his sweeping tariff programme, which has imposed taxes on imported goods at levels the United States has not seen in over a hundred years.

When Trump’s second term began, the average effective tariff rate, the actual percentage tax paid on imports, stood at roughly 2.5%. By April 2025, it had jumped to an estimated 27%, the highest in more than a century.

Legal challenges and negotiated deals have since brought it down to approximately 11.8% as of early 2026, with CNN tracking the effective rate at around 16.8% by the end of 2026.

Even at those reduced levels, the tax burden on imported goods is vastly higher than anything Americans faced before Trump’s second term. Initially, companies absorbed most of the extra costs rather than passing them on to shoppers.

In 2025, the US government collected roughly $187 billion more in tariff revenue than in 2024, almost a 200% increase, and businesses covered an estimated 80% of those costs internally. But that cushion is being depleted.

JPMorgan analysts and industry consultants warn that the corporate share of these costs could fall to around 20% in 2026 as pre-tariff stockpiles run out and businesses begin repricing. The bill is now migrating to household budgets.

What does it cost a family

Research by the Centre for American Progress, drawing on Harvard Business School analysis, found that between October 2024 and March 2025, prices of everyday nondurable goods such as cleaning products and toilet paper rose approximately 5%.

Furnishings climbed around 8%. Clothing jumped roughly 14%. A Yale Budget Lab estimate puts the ultimate annual cost to the average US household at approximately $1,700 once tariffs are fully passed through.

Food is now entering the pressure zone as well. Tariff effects typically take 12 to 18 months to work through to consumer prices fully, meaning peak pressure will fall between April and October 2026, right in the heart of election season.

Food prices were already up 2.9% year-on-year in January 2026. Yale’s modelling implies an effective annual food cost increase of around $1,500 for a typical household once tariff effects are fully felt. Combined with higher fuel bills, those numbers become punishing for families already stretched thin after years of post-pandemic inflation.

The sharpest tariff increases fall on metals, vehicles, electrical equipment and computers, raising the cost of cars, appliances and new home construction. Consumer goods with thin margins and heavy import dependence, such as coffee and fresh produce, have seen particularly sharp price swings.

For a middle-income family, the combined effect feels less like an America-first economic strategy and more like being squeezed from every direction at once.

Collapsing confidence

The University of Michigan’s Index of Consumer Sentiment, one of the most closely watched measures of how Americans feel about the economy, fell to a record low in April 2026. The US dollar has also weakened to its lowest point in four years.

While a weaker dollar helps American exporters, it also makes imported goods more expensive, piling onto the inflation already generated by tariffs and the energy shock. JPMorgan Chase chief executive Jamie Dimon, writing in his annual shareholder letter on April 6, laid out the compounding risk in stark terms.

“Now, because of the war in Iran, we additionally face the potential for significant ongoing oil and commodity price shocks, along with the reshaping of global supply chains, which may lead to stickier inflation and ultimately higher interest rates than markets currently expect,” said the document.

Donald Trump’s standing on the Iran conflict itself remains fragile. The same Reuters/Ipsos poll showing only 29% approval for the strikes found that roughly two-thirds of respondents felt the administration had never given a clear picture of what military victory was supposed to look like. When people see their purchasing power shrinking without a clear benefit to offset that sacrifice, frustration tends to find expression in protest votes, especially in the tightly contested districts that decide control of Congress.

Running out of road

Donald Trump could still seek a diplomatic de-escalation with Iran, but after framing the military campaign as a defining test of American resolve, any visible retreat risks being labelled as capitulation.

He could roll back tariffs to ease household budgets, but that would contradict a central pillar of his economic philosophy and anger the constituencies that have benefited from protection.

The White House has already quietly delayed planned tariffs on some furniture and Italian pasta in early 2026, a move analysts read as political damage control rather than principled policy. Wall Street has coined the nickname “TO,” standing for “Totally Chicken Out,” for the administration’s pattern of pulling back from tariff threats whenever markets or polls react badly, suggesting investors see trade policy as more performative than strategic.

Piecemeal retreats like these, however, may not be sufficient to change how voters feel about their household bills by November.

The Dallas Fed’s research suggests that even a relatively brief Hormuz disruption will keep inflation elevated through the end of 2026. The 12-to-18-month lag for tariff pass-through means price pressures will be near their peak immediately before Election Day.

Independent analysts estimate that Donald Trump’s combined policies will cost typical households between $1,500 and $1,700 per year. Consumer sentiment is already at a record low. Neither has the conflict toppled Iran’s leadership, nor has it delivered the concessions the White House sought.

However, the combined arithmetic of oil shocks and tariff costs is already eroding Trump’s standing at home, and as November approaches, his most dangerous political adversary may not be a foreign one, but the monthly household budget.

The post Trump’s war, tariffs squeeze American wallets appeared first on International Finance.

The “Agreement on Trade in Essential Supplies” was signed during New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon’s visit to the city-state, where he met his counterpart, Lawrence Wong. The terms of the pact, as per The Straits Times, were finalised during Wong’s visit to New Zealand in October 2025.

Regarding bilateral trade between Singapore and New Zealand, the latter sources about one-third of its fuel needs from the Southeast Asian country’s refineries, including diesel used in freight, farming and food production. In return, New Zealand supplies around 14% of Singapore’s food imports.

According to New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, dairy remains New Zealand’s largest export to Singapore, making up about 31.6% of total exports, alongside fruits and nuts, fats, oils, meat and edible offal.

The “Agreement on Trade in Essential Supplies” also builds on the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” signed in October 2025, which expands cooperation in trade, security, innovation and supply chain resilience.

“Some initiatives under that framework are already underway, including the Singapore–New Zealand Leadership Forum held on 4 May, where officials urged businesses to strengthen regional partnerships,” reported The Straits Times.

“We have long seen the world in similar ways. We believe in openness and cooperation. Over the years, we have built a deep reservoir of trust. And we don’t just speak about principles; we act on them,” Wong said, stating that discussions with Luxon focused on expanding cooperation under the partnership, including defence and emerging technologies.

Both countries will continue mutual access to military training facilities, apart from deepening cooperation in emerging cutting-edge areas like unmanned systems.

Luxon said the deal exemplifies how like-minded countries can strengthen multilateral cooperation in a shifting global order.

“The agreement that we’ve just signed today, as a world first, is actually a good example of how we can model out and remake the case for multilateralism in the way we want to as well,” the New Zealand Prime Minister remarked.

The post New Zealand, Singapore sign trade pact, to focus on flow of essential goods appeared first on International Finance.

The non-oil sector’s contribution to the Kingdom’s total exports rose to 44%, up from the 2024 growth rate of 39%, the highest level on record. According to the latest global data, Saudi Arabia ranked highest among G20 countries in terms of growth rate.

Over recent years, the Gulf majors’ non-oil exports have shown steady growth. The figure stood at SR325 billion in 2021 and reached SR468 billion in 2022. In 2023, the ratio was SR477 billion, followed by SR543 billion and SR624 billion in 2024 and 2025, respectively.

“Non-oil goods exports reached SR225 billion in 2025, compared to SR217 billion in 2024, representing annual growth of 4%. This was primarily supported by non-petrochemical exports, which hit a record SR78 billion, up from SR70 billion in 2024, marking a 12% increase. Their share of total non-oil goods exports rose from 32% in 2024 to 35% in 2025,” reported Saudi Gazette.

“The value of non-petrochemical exports grew notably between 2021 and 2025, rising from SR58 billion to SR78 billion, while their share of total non-oil goods rose from 25% to 35% over the same period. Sector-wise, food and agricultural exports increased from SR15 billion in 2021 to SR24 billion in 2025. Exports of machinery, mechanical equipment, electrical devices, and their parts rose from SR4.3 billion to SR7.5 billion during the same period. Fertiliser exports also increased from 6.9 million tons to 10.8 million tons,” it added.

Maintaining their positive performance, services exports reached SR260 billion in 2025, up from SR235 billion in 2024, reflecting annual growth of 11%, apart from marking the highest annual value on record.

Among the sub-sectors, travel and transport accounted for 77% of total services exports in 2025.

The re-export sector recorded accelerated growth, as compared to SR91 billion in 2024, it reached SR139 billion in 2025, registering an annual increase of 53%, surpassing the SR100 billion mark for the first time and showcased a steady upward trajectory since 2021. The growth was driven by increased re-exports of machinery, equipment (including transport).

The post Saudi Arabia’s non-oil exports hit record USD 166.4 billion in 2025 appeared first on International Finance.

Yemi Kale, Group Chief Economist and Managing Director of Research at Afreximbank, said in the report’s foreword that more than a trade agreement, AfCFTA serves as an economic stabilisation mechanism in a fragmenting world. The official further explained that by expanding intra-African trade and reducing tariff barriers, the continent can decrease its exposure to external shocks (especially geopolitics), while building regional value chains in sectors like agro-processing, pharmaceuticals, and digital services.

Kale, while interacting with Nigerian NewsDirect, emphasised that integration alone is insufficient without adequate trade finance, which he described as a critical transmission channel for real-sector expansion.

He highlighted that African firms, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), remain disproportionately affected by trade finance gaps.

“Bridging these gaps is essential for industrialisation and employment generation, making the strengthening of the continent’s financial architecture a high macroeconomic priority,” he said.

The Afreximbank report sees the overall continental trade growing by 10% in 2026, and despite global geopolitical tensions and trade tariff-related headwinds, African economies have shown significant resilience.

“The continent’s output expanded by 4.2% in 2025, up from 3.4% in 2024, supported by robust domestic demand, strong export performance, service sector growth, and renewed infrastructure investments. However, the economic landscape remains vulnerable due to an overdependence on commodities, which exposes the continent to price volatility,” the report noted.

“Data shows that total trade in 2025 reached USD 1.4 trillion, with intra-African trade accounting for approximately 18% of that figure, bolstered by the ongoing integration efforts under AfCFTA. Africa is well-positioned to enhance its growth prospects through a gradual recovery from recent global shocks. GDP growth is expected to rise marginally to 4.3% in 2026 before expanding to 4.4% in the medium term,” Afreximbank concluded.

The post Trade activities within Africa set to hit USD 230 billion: Afreximbank appeared first on International Finance.

“The DMCC Maritime Centre builds on an established base of more than 150 maritime-related companies operating within the district across shipping, logistics, marine services and trade support. The new centre formalises this activity into a structured, transaction-oriented ecosystem aimed at increasing value capture across maritime trade. It reflects a broader shift in the global shipping industry, where companies are increasingly aligning themselves with jurisdictions that offer a combination of trade flows, access to capital and depth of supporting services,” DMCC said.

Instead of functioning like a regulator or port operator, the centre will serve as a commercial platform bringing together the full architecture surrounding shipping activity, including maritime finance, insurance, legal services, digital documentation, risk management and commercial intelligence.

“In doing so, the Centre is designed to ensure that more of the value generated by global shipping is structured, financed and retained within Dubai. This includes enabling stronger connectivity between shipowners, operators, financiers, insurers, legal advisors and technology providers within a single integrated environment,” DMCC remarked.

“Shipping today is not only about the movement of goods but about how that activity is financed, structured and managed. With the DMCC Maritime Centre, we are building the ecosystem around that reality. We are bringing together the companies, capital and services that sit around maritime trade and creating the conditions for more of that value to be captured here in Dubai,” said Ahmed Bin Sulayem, DMCC’s Executive Chairman and Chief Executive Officer.

“Working in close alignment with DMCC FinX and DMCC Wealth Hub, the Maritime Centre will connect maritime trade with access to capital, financing and risk management, while supporting the structuring and preservation of wealth linked to shipping and trade assets. This is a natural extension of our model, and it reflects the next phase of growth for both DMCC and the wider trade landscape,” the senior official remarked.

The Maritime Centre will operate in close alignment with DMCC’s wider ecosystems, particularly DMCC FinX and DMCC Wealth Hub, creating a more integrated platform around maritime trade. Through FinX, maritime businesses will be able to access capital, financing solutions and risk management tools that will be directly linked to real shipping activities such as vessel finance and freight-related receivables.

The Wealth Hub, on the other hand, will support shipowners, principals and maritime entrepreneurs in structuring and managing capital flow connected to trade and shipping assets. Taking all these divisions together, the centre will create a more complete environment where physical trade, financial structuring and capital preservation will sit within a single, connected ecosystem.

“The formalisation of the Maritime Centre represents the evolution of DMCC’s earlier Dubai Maritime Club, launched in 2016 as a platform for dialogue and industry engagement. The new Centre moves beyond networking to create a fully-fledged economic cluster focused on execution, services and value creation,” the free zone concluded.

The post DMCC launches Maritime Centre to consolidate Dubai’s shipping and trade activities appeared first on International Finance.

According to a monthly bulletin by the Ministry of Economy, Oman’s non-oil GDP rose to RO 28.70 billion, marking a robust increase of 3.1%, compared with petroleum activities, which grew at a slower pace of 1.1% to reach RO 12.02 billion. Sustained activity expansion occurred across sectors like manufacturing, logistics, tourism and services. Inflation, on the other hand, remained contained at an average of 1.69% during January-February 2025/2026, indicating stable price levels that supported household consumption and business planning.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks (total accumulated value of cross-border investments) increased to RO 31.38 billion by the end of Q4 2025, up 8.1%, reflecting continued investor confidence in the Sultanate’s long-term economic outlook. However, FDI inflows declined sharply by 33.7% to RO 2.36 billion, suggesting short-term caution amidst global economic uncertainty and tighter financial conditions due to volatile geopolitics.

Oil market trends, on the other hand, weighed on the broader outlook, with the average crude price falling by 13.1% to USD 63.3 per barrel by the end of February 2026, reflecting softer global demand and increased supply. However, with the Middle East conflict at its peak, which has also resulted in crude oil prices exceeding USD 100 per barrel, the impact on Oman’s economy in the coming days remains to be seen.

Discussing trade metrics, while the overall trade balance recorded a surplus of RO 255.9 million at the end of January 2026, there was a significant contraction of 51.5% compared to the same period in 2025. Imports increased by 10.9% to RO 1.58 billion, driven by higher domestic demand and ongoing project activity, while non-oil exports rose by 15.3% to RO 613 million, underscoring improving export diversification.

The post Oman ends FY 2025 with stable growth, non-oil GDP hits USD 74.6 billion appeared first on International Finance.

IAPH has over 150 of the world’s leading ports as members, widely regarded as a benchmark for governance, safety, and environmental challenges in the maritime sector.

Industry players say the IAPH move is partly designed to reassure terminal lease bidders and ESG-conscious lenders that Santos will universally recognise standards for emission, safety, and transparency, easing financing and permitting for the planned cluster of new terminals.

Through IAPH, Santos Port Authority gains direct entry to tools such as the Environmental Ship Index (ESI) and the World Ports Sustainability Programme (WPSP), which function as global knowledge platforms for green port operations and emissions‑reduction strategies.

The authority says this alignment will help Santos refine its carbon‑reduction roadmap, including investments in alternative fuels, energy‑efficient handling equipment, and cleaner vessel‑incentive schemes.

Santos has around 120 million tons of cargo per year and roughly 30-35% of its total foreign trade. The Santos Port Authority also signals plans for electrified quay cranes and shore power infrastructure for large vessels, which it intends to calibrate using ESI and WPSP benchmarks.

Strategically, the move comes as Santos is expanding its land footprint by more than 50%, from 9.3 km² to 14.5 km², with plans to tender up to 30 new terminals and an export‑processing zone (ZPE) starting in 2027. The Santos Port Authority leadership has framed the IAPH membership as a way to benchmark that growth against leading global ports and attract private‑sector operators with modern, compliant, and ESG‑aligned infrastructure.

Industry analysts interpret Santos’ IAPH accession as a step toward positioning the port as a regional model for sustainable port‑city development, particularly as Latin American trade corridors grow in importance for global exporters and shippers.

Analysts suggest that Santos will become Latin America’s reference port for sustainable expansion at a time when European and North American shippers are increasingly demanding validated ESG performance from gateway terminals.

The post Santos Port Authority joins global port‑governance body IAPH appeared first on International Finance.