The shocking controversy surrounding the Donald Trump Cabinet’s unintentional invitation to The Atlantic’s editor-in-chief to join a text-message group covertly organising a bombing in Yemen has been given a new name: SignalGate, a reference to the fact that the exchange occurred on the free, end-to-end encrypted messaging app Signal.
However, security and privacy experts who have marketed Signal as the best-encrypted texting service available to the public want to be clear that SignalGate is not about Signal, as that moniker has come to represent the most public error of the second Trump administration to date.
The response from the Trump Cabinet’s detractors and even the administration itself has occasionally appeared to blame Signal for the security breach since Jeffrey Goldberg, editor of The Atlantic, disclosed recently that he was inadvertently added to a Signal group chat earlier in March 2025 that was set up to organise US airstrikes against the Houthi rebels in Yemen.
Some analysts have cited the recent accusations of Russian agents phishing Signal. According to reports, Goldberg was invited to the Signal group chat by national security adviser Michael Waltz, who has even implied that Goldberg might have hacked into it.
Even Trump implied that Signal was somehow to blame for the group chat disaster. At the White House, Trump told reporters, “I don’t know that Signal works. To be honest with you, I believe Signal may be flawed.”
Kenn White, a security and cryptography researcher and former Director of the Open Crypto Audit Project who has audited popular encryption products, thinks the true lesson is considerably easier: avoid inviting people you don’t trust into your Signal group chat.
Instead of using unapproved devices that can run publicly available apps like Signal, government officials who handle extremely sensitive or classified material should use encrypted communication tools that operate on limited, often air-gapped devices meant for a top-secret context.
White states unequivocally that Signal is not to blame for this, as he said, “Signal is a tool for communication intended for private discussions. It’s not a technical issue when someone who shouldn’t be in the discourse is brought into it. That is a problem with the operator.”
For a simpler explanation, consider Johns Hopkins University computer science professor and cryptographer Matt Green’s opinion, “Signal is a tool. Bad things are going to happen if you misuse a tool. It is not the hammer’s fault if you strike yourself in the face with it. It is truly up to you to be aware of who you are speaking to.”
“The use of Signal implies that the cabinet-level officials involved in the Houthi bombing plans, including Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth and Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, were having the conversation on internet-connected devices, possibly even personal ones, because Signal would not normally be permitted on the official, heavily restricted machines meant for such conversations. This is the only way SignalGate is a Signal-related scandal. That would be absolutely forbidden in past administrations, at least, especially for classified communications,” White noted.
Using Signal on internet-connected business devices does in fact expose communications to anyone who can attack the iOS, Android, Windows, or Mac computers that may be running the Signal desktop or mobile apps, in addition to anyone who can somehow take advantage of a hackable weakness in Signal.
For this reason, US agencies generally, and the Department of Defence specifically, use government devices that are specially supplied and managed to regulate the features and software that are installed. The fundamental problem was using the wrong tools or software to communicate about extremely high-stakes, covert military operations, regardless of whether the cabinet members had done so via Signal or another consumer platform.
The fact that communication apps like Signal and WhatsApp have “disappearing message” features, the ability to automatically delete messages after a predetermined period, that violate federal record retention laws is one of the most obvious reasons they are unfit for use in classified government work.
According to screenshots of the conversation released by The Atlantic in March, this problem was clearly visible in the principals’ conversation over the upcoming war in Yemen. Originally, the timer was set for a one-week auto-delete, but the Michael Waltz account modified it to four weeks. The contents of the talk might not have been archived in compliance with long-standing government regulations if Goldberg from The Atlantic had not been inadvertently included.
Tulsi Gabbard, the US Director of National Intelligence, testified before Congress that government devices may have Signal preloaded. However, other sources inform WIRED that this is incorrect, noting that it is often challenging and typically prohibited to download consumer apps like Signal onto Defence Department devices.
Defence Secretary Hegseth’s participation in the chat suggests that he either circumvented the normal procedure for requesting such a waiver, used a non-DOD device for the discussion, or acquired an exceedingly unusual dispensation to install Signal on a department device. In February, DOD “political appointees” insisted that Signal be installed on their government computers, according to podcaster and political consultant Fred Wellman.
The assertion that no sensitive material was shared in the Signal communication is at the heart of the Trump administration’s explanation of the actions. Gabbard and others have specifically pointed out that Hegseth is the information’s classification authority. However, according to several sources, this authority does not make a consumer application the ideal venue for this kind of conversation.
There was no official label such as ‘for official use only’ or anything like that in the way this was being conveyed.
Andy Jabbour, a veteran of the US Army and the founder of the domestic security risk-management company Gate 15, said, “But whether it should have been classified or not, whatever it was, it was obviously sensitive operational information that no soldier or officer would be expected to release to the public, but they had added a member of the media into the chat.”
According to Jabbour, military personnel receive yearly security and information awareness training to strengthen operational protocols for managing all tiers of non-public information. Even non-classified material can be incredibly sensitive and is usually tightly preserved, as many sources tell, even if the information in the Yemen attack discussion seems to satisfy the classification requirement.
“Aside from the fact that secret information should never be shared over an unclassified system, I find it absolutely astounding that all of these senior people were on this line and no one even thought to verify security hygiene 101. Who are all the names? Who are they?” Democrat Mark Warner of Virginia, a US senator, stated during a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing in March.
The Atlantic claims that 12 members of the Trump administration, including Vice President JD Vance, Trump adviser Susie Wiles, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, were on the Signal group chat.
Jabbour goes on to say that even when decision-making authorities are present and taking part in a conversation, a proactive, established method is used to establish an information designation or declassify material.
“You can’t just say, ‘That’s actually not spilt milk, because I intended to spill it,'” he says, referring to spilling milk on the floor.
In summary, SignalGate presents numerous privacy, security, and legal concerns. However, one of them is not Signal’s security. Despite this, some have looked for shaky links between Signal vulnerabilities and the Trump Cabinet’s security lapse following The Atlantic’s story.
A Pentagon expert, for instance, echoed a study released recently by Google’s security researchers, who warned Signal earlier this year about a phishing method used by Russian military intelligence to target users of the app in Ukraine.
However, Signal released an upgrade that made it much more difficult to utilise that approach, which deceives users into adding a hacker as a secondary device on their account. The same tactic was also used to target certain accounts on the messaging apps Telegram and WhatsApp.
“People who use popular websites and applications are subject to phishing attacks. We added further security measures and in-app alerts to help prevent people from becoming victims of phishing attacks after discovering that Signal app users were being singled out—and how. This job was finished several months ago,” Signal spokeswoman Jun Harada said.
“In fact, considering Signal app’s reputation and track record among security experts, the Trump administration could have done much worse than to use it for those discussions if they were going to jeopardise secret communications by discussing war plans on unapproved commercial devices and publicly accessible messaging apps,” according to White, the cryptography researcher.
“For communities that are most vulnerable, such as human rights advocates, lawyers, and journalists’ private sources, Signal is the consensus recommendation,” White added.
The real trouble with Signal
Signal, once considered a privacy and security beacon, is now controversial for all the wrong reasons. Despite charges in the signal app, it remains a discreet communication method.
However, earlier charges have placed doubt on the app’s underlying ideals and internal policies.
Whistleblowers and former employees allege a worrisome Signal Foundation reality. Signal has secured communication for journalists, activists, and individuals worldwide, but the new disclosures have shaken user faith and sparked a debate about secret texting.
Reports of Signal Foundation’s internal disagreements and whistleblower accounts revealed the situation. Inners say the organisation’s hierarchical structure discourages dissent, mismanages and lacks transparency. A hostile working culture with bullying, harassment, and discrimination has been accused. Critics say Signal’s leadership has pushed rapid user development over security and privacy, creating weaknesses.
Integrating MobileCoin, a privacy-focused cryptocurrency, inside the app has proved controversial. Critics say the cryptocurrency adds complexity and security dangers, deviating from Signal’s basic objective. Signal’s leadership’s link with MobileCoin has also generated questions about conflicts of interest. Critics have accused the app of censorship and content manipulation, contradicting its promise of free speech and open communication.
According to privacy and security experts, one of the main charges is the MobileCoin dispute. Signal’s core ideals may conflict with the integration’s lack of openness. Organisational whistleblowers have also reported a culture of fear and intimidation. They say security concerns and dissenting voices are ignored. Employees struggle to communicate their concerns due to the lack of a clear grievance procedure.
Addressing app security vulnerabilities is another big issue. Signal app’s encryption technology is strong; however, metadata management and third-party service dependence have been criticised. Some have questioned if the foundation’s rapid growth has caused security issues.
Signal Foundation governance is also under examination. Accountability difficulties arise from its non-profit status and opaque decision-making. Detractors say a tiny clique holds control, making openness and fair governance difficult.
Despite its end-to-end encryption, Signal’s data handling has generated concerns. Critics say the app’s privacy policy is unclear, permitting unnecessary data harvesting. These concerns raise concerns that Signal may not be as privacy-centric as it claims.
These allegations have had major effects. Many Signal users now doubt its privacy pledge. Signal’s reputation has suffered from the dispute, making it tougher to maintain its secure communication leadership. Regulators and lawmakers have noticed, scrutinising the app’s policies and governance. This may lead to tougher messaging apps and tech company rules.
Alternative messaging apps that prioritise privacy and security have benefited from the SignalGate controversy. Users demanding more openness and responsibility may switch platforms. The scandal has also raised questions about non-profits’ role in secure communication technology development. Signal has also lost the trust of activists and journalists, who use its security to remain anonymous. If these people lose trust in Signal, their safety may be in jeopardy.
The scandal highlights the need for increased transparency and responsibility in secure communication technology development. Messaging apps must be more transparent about their governance, financial, and data management procedures.
To make the whistleblowers feel secure when reporting violations, stronger protections are needed. Independent audits and security assessments should be standard to uncover vulnerabilities and verify best practices.
Messaging apps must also have explicit privacy rules that explain data gathering and use. Open-source development allows public code analysis to find security weaknesses, promoting openness. By spreading control over numerous servers, decentralised systems may reduce censorship and surveillance.
Signal must investigate the charges independently, change governance, increase whistleblower protections, and solve MobileCoin and other security issues. Open and honest communication with users will also help restore platform credibility.
The Signal app incident illustrates the difficulties of digital trust. It emphasises awareness and critical thinking while picking communication tools. As technology advances, users must demand transparency, responsibility, and ethics from secure messaging platform developers and maintainers.
Despite organisational issues, Signal remains a top-tier encrypted messaging app, but its security relies heavily on user practices. The platform defends its encryption, stating there are no inherent vulnerabilities, messages remain protected in transit, and only intended recipients can decrypt them.
However, Signal is only as secure as the device itself. If an attacker gains access to an unlocked phone, installs spyware, or tricks a user into linking their account to a malicious device, private messages can be exposed. While Signal’s end-to-end encryption is open-source and highly trusted, it does not protect against phishing scams, spyware like Pegasus, or human error.
To enhance security, users should prioritise safe practices: enable “Always Relay Calls” to hide IP addresses, use personal rather than work devices, avoid untrusted networks, and turn on disappearing messages to minimise exposure.
While Signal provides robust encryption, true security depends on how users handle their devices and conversations.
The lessons of SignalGate
The SignalGate controversy is seen as more than just a messaging app mishap.
At its core, this scandal represents a fundamental breakdown in operational security protocols at the highest levels of government, revealing lapses in judgment that extend well beyond technology.
The Donald Trump administration’s attempt to shift blame onto Signal itself misses the central point security experts have unanimously emphasised: the app performed exactly as designed. The failure was entirely human.
As cryptography researcher Kenn White and Johns Hopkins professor Matt Green both stressed, Signal is merely a tool, one that was misused by those who should have known better.
The administration’s narrative resembles blaming a hammer after hitting your thumb rather than acknowledging poor craftsmanship.
Perhaps more troubling is what the incident reveals about protocol violations within the current administration.
Cabinet-level officials discussing potential military strikes on consumer devices using commercially available apps represents a significant departure from established security practices.
Former administrations maintained strict boundaries between classified communications and consumer technology for precisely these reasons. The disappearing message feature, which would have deleted evidence of these conversations after a predetermined period, raises additional questions about record retention compliance and transparency.
The attempted justification that “no sensitive material was shared” contradicts the obvious reality that planning military operations is inherently sensitive, regardless of formal classification status. As Army veteran Andy Jabbour noted, this was clearly “sensitive operational information that no soldier or officer would be expected to release to the public.” Senator Mark Warner’s astonishment that “no one even thought to verify security hygiene 101” underscores the severity of this procedural breakdown.
What makes SignalGate particularly remarkable is that it occurred within a group that included twelve senior administration officials, including the Vice President, Secretary of State, and Director of National Intelligence.
The lack of questioning regarding the venue indicates either a collective ignorance of basic security protocols or a troubling culture of procedural shortcuts at high levels of government.
The irony is that the Signal app itself remains one of the most secure consumer messaging options available, a tool trusted by journalists, human rights advocates, and vulnerable communities worldwide precisely because of its strong encryption and privacy protections. The administration could hardly have chosen a better consumer app for sensitive discussions, yet the fundamental error was using any consumer app for such purposes.
As this controversy continues to develop, the focus should remain on procedural failures and human error rather than technological shortcomings.
SignalGate serves as a powerful reminder that security is only as strong as its weakest link, and that link is often human judgment. In an era of increasing digital threats and surveillance, even the most powerful encryption cannot protect against the simple mistake of adding the wrong person to a conversation.
For an administration facing scrutiny over its handling of sensitive information, SignalGate represents not just an embarrassing mishap, but a troubling glimpse into operational practices that security experts and government veterans alike find deeply concerning. The ultimate lesson may be that in the case of national security, following established protocols is not bureaucratic red tape, it is essential protection against this kind of preventable breach.