At 96, Buffett becomes chairman emeritus, while his son Howard Buffett takes over the chairmanship of the conglomerate he has led for more than five decades.

The change, announced on Friday, September 18, marks another decisive stage in one of the most closely watched succession plans in global business. Buffett will remain on Berkshire’s board, but the formal transfer of the chairmanship signals the end of his direct leadership of the company.

Greg Abel succeeded Buffett as chief executive officer at the start of 2026 and will continue to run Berkshire’s operations. Howard Buffett, a board member since 1993, will assume the chairman’s role, with responsibility centred on preserving the culture and values established by his father.

The announcement completes a transition that Buffett had been preparing investors for over several years. In May 2025, he told Berkshire shareholders that Abel would succeed him as CEO. The chairman’s departure now separates the company’s operational leadership from the stewardship of its distinctive corporate culture.

For Berkshire investors, however, the significance extends well beyond a change of title. Buffett’s career has helped shape modern value investing, demonstrated the power of long-term ownership and created a conglomerate whose operations span insurance, railways, energy, manufacturing and consumer brands.

His departure therefore raises a question that has followed Berkshire for years: how does a company built around one investor’s judgement continue to prosper when that investor is no longer in charge?

From Omaha to Wall Street
Buffett’s story began in Omaha, Nebraska, where he was born on August 30, 1930. His father, Howard Buffett, was a businessman and US congressman. The young Warren developed an interest in numbers and business early, buying his first stock at the age of 11.

That early interest developed into a lifelong pursuit of investing. Buffett attended the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School before graduating from the University of Nebraska. He later studied at Columbia Business School, where he was taught by Benjamin Graham, the economist and investor widely regarded as the father of value investing.

Graham’s influence became fundamental to Buffett’s approach. The central idea emphasised that shares signify ownership in businesses, not just pieces of paper for trading. Investors should seek a margin of safety by buying assets for less than their underlying worth.

Buffett adopted that discipline and eventually developed it into a broader philosophy: buy excellent businesses at sensible prices, hold them for long periods and allow their earnings and cash flows to compound.

In 1956, he established Buffett Partnership Ltd, an investment partnership that attracted capital from family, friends and other investors. The partnership delivered strong returns and established Buffett’s reputation as a disciplined investor.

Yet the business that would define his career was not initially an obvious success story.

The textile mill that became a conglomerate
In 1965, Buffett took control of Berkshire Hathaway, a New England textile company whose origins stretched back to the 19th century. The company had struggled as the US textile industry faced growing competition and changing economics.

Buffett initially bought shares because he believed the company’s assets and share price offered an opportunity. But the investment did not develop as he had expected. The textile business continued to face difficulties, and Buffett eventually moved away from the manufacturing operations.

Instead of allowing Berkshire to remain a declining industrial company, he began using it as a holding company for investments and acquisitions.

This shift became the foundation of Berkshire’s modern identity.

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Buffett’s approach was to acquire businesses with durable competitive advantages, capable management and reliable cash generation. Rather than constantly buying and selling shares, he preferred to own businesses outright and allow their earnings to accumulate within the group.

One of the most important developments came through insurance.

Insurance: The financial engine
Berkshire’s insurance operations became a critical source of capital for Buffett’s investment strategy. The group owns insurance businesses, including GEICO and General Re, while its reinsurance operations have played a significant role in its financial performance.

Before paying claims, insurance companies collect premiums. The money held during that period is known as the insurance float. When underwriting is profitable, the insurer can invest that float while retaining the benefits of the investment’s returns.

Buffett recognised the importance of this model and used Berkshire’s insurance businesses to generate capital that could be deployed elsewhere.

The strategy helped Berkshire move beyond the economics of a traditional holding company. Its insurance operations provided a recurring source of funds, while the group’s investment portfolio and wholly owned businesses created additional earnings.

The result was a structure that could acquire companies, invest in securities and retain earnings without depending primarily on issuing new shares or borrowing heavily.

Berkshire’s insurance operations remain central to understanding its business model. Underwriting results, investment income, interest rates, claims, and the broader insurance cycle all influence the company’s financial performance.

For investors, this makes Berkshire different from a conventional industrial conglomerate. Its insurance businesses provide both earnings and financial flexibility, although they also expose the group to catastrophe losses and other insurance risks.

Charlie Munger played a crucial role in the evolution of value investing.

Buffett’s success cannot be understood without Charlie Munger, his long-time business partner and vice-chairman of Berkshire Hathaway.

Munger, who died in November 2023 at the age of 99, helped Buffett evolve beyond the strictest interpretation of Benjamin Graham’s investment philosophy.

Graham emphasised buying businesses at a substantial discount to their intrinsic value. Munger encouraged Buffett to focus more on the quality of a business, even when the purchase price was not exceptionally cheap.

That distinction became important. Berkshire increasingly acquired companies with strong brands, pricing power and attractive long-term economics.

One of the most celebrated examples was the group’s investment in Coca-Cola. Berkshire began building its position in 1988, and the beverage company became a major long-term holding.

The investment reflected Buffett’s preference for businesses with powerful brands, repeat demand and the ability to generate cash over many years.

Munger’s influence also reinforced Berkshire’s culture of rationality, patience and independent thinking. The two men became known for their ability to explain complex financial concepts in simple language, often through the annual shareholder letters and Berkshire’s annual meeting in Omaha.

Their partnership became one of the most influential relationships in modern investing.

The biggest bets
Over the decades, Berkshire built a portfolio of investments that became closely associated with Buffett’s name.

Among its notable holdings and acquisitions, there was Coca-Cola, a long-term investment that illustrated Buffett’s preference for durable brands and recurring consumer demand. Then came GEICO, the auto insurer that became one of Berkshire’s best-known operating businesses.

Furthermore, one must not forget about BNSF Railway. Acquired in 2009, the railway gave Berkshire exposure to the US transport and freight economy.

Berkshire Hathaway Energy, on the other hand, emerged as a major utility and energy business within the group. Dairy Queen, the celebrated consumer brand, became part of Berkshire’s portfolio in 1998.

Berkshire expanded its presence in aerospace manufacturing by acquiring Precision Castparts in 2016.

Berkshire also built major stock-market positions in companies such as Apple, whose shares became a significant investment in the group’s portfolio.

These investments illustrate how Buffett’s strategy evolved from buying undervalued securities to owning businesses with strong competitive advantages.

The common thread was not a particular industry. It was the ability to generate cash, retain earnings and produce attractive long-term returns.

The Oracle of Omaha
Buffett’s reputation was built not only on his investment returns but also on his ability to communicate.

He became known as the “Oracle of Omaha”, a nickname reflecting his investment record and his annual appearances before Berkshire shareholders.

The annual meeting in Omaha became a global event, attracting thousands of investors who travelled to hear Buffett and Munger discuss markets, businesses and the economy.

Unlike many financial executives, Buffett generally avoided complicated jargon. His shareholder letters often explained investment principles through everyday examples and memorable analogies.

His message was consistent: investors should understand the businesses they own, avoid unnecessary trading and maintain a long-term perspective.

He also frequently warned against excessive leverage, speculative behaviour and the belief that markets could be predicted with certainty.

That philosophy resonated with investors around the world, including those who did not own Berkshire shares.

Buffett’s personal lifestyle reinforced the message. Despite becoming one of the world’s wealthiest people, he remained associated with Omaha and a relatively modest way of living.

His public image combined financial success with frugality, plain speaking and a reluctance to chase status.

A fortune built on compounding
Buffett’s wealth grew alongside Berkshire Hathaway’s success.

The company’s shares became a long-term compounding machine, with investors benefiting from the reinvestment of earnings and the expansion of the group’s businesses.

Berkshire’s market capitalisation eventually reached approximately $1 trillion, placing it among the world’s largest companies. It became notable as a major non-technology company to reach that valuation.

The company’s structure also allowed Buffett to maintain substantial cash reserves and make large acquisitions when opportunities arose.

This approach was particularly important during periods of market stress, when asset prices fell and companies needed capital.

Buffett’s investment in Goldman Sachs during the 2008 financial crisis was one example of his willingness to provide capital to major businesses during difficult conditions.

Berkshire’s financial strength enabled it to act when other investors faced constraints.

Yet the company’s scale also created challenges. As Berkshire grew, finding investments large enough to make a meaningful difference to group earnings became increasingly difficult.

A strategy that worked exceptionally well with smaller sums became harder to replicate with hundreds of billions of dollars.

That reality shaped Buffett’s later career.

The succession question
Buffett’s succession planning became one of the most important issues facing Berkshire Hathaway.

The company’s identity had become closely linked to its chairman. Investors often treated Buffett’s judgement as a central part of Berkshire’s value.

The challenge was therefore not merely to appoint a new CEO. It was to preserve the decentralised management structure, financial discipline and corporate culture that had developed under Buffett.

Greg Abel emerged as the successor to the CEO role.

Abel had been a senior Berkshire executive and vice-chairman responsible for non-insurance operations. He became CEO in January 2026, taking responsibility for running the company’s businesses.

Howard Buffett’s role is different.

As chairman, he is expected to help protect the culture and values of the company. Buffett has previously described his son as someone who would guard Berkshire’s culture and values.

The distinction between the two roles is significant.

Abel is responsible for operations, capital allocation and the performance of Berkshire’s businesses. Howard Buffett’s chairmanship is primarily about governance and cultural continuity.

The arrangement reflects Berkshire’s long-standing preference for decentralised management, in which operating subsidiaries retain considerable autonomy.

What changes after Buffett?
The immediate change is the end of Buffett’s chairmanship, but the company’s investment philosophy is unlikely to disappear overnight.

Berkshire still owns its collection of businesses and investments. It retains its insurance operations, railway business, energy interests and consumer brands.

The group also retains a large investment portfolio and substantial financial resources.

The more difficult question concerns capital allocation.

Buffett’s ability to make major investment decisions was central to Berkshire’s identity. Investors will now watch how Abel approaches acquisitions, share purchases, cash reserves and the allocation of capital between Berkshire’s different businesses.

The transition may also affect investor expectations.

Berkshire’s shares have historically attracted shareholders who value financial conservatism and long-term ownership. The company’s future performance will depend on whether the new leadership can maintain those characteristics while adapting to changing market conditions.

The company’s size means that acquisitions must be substantial to materially influence earnings. The insurance business continues to face risks from claims, investment markets, and interest rates.

Berkshire’s future will depend on the quality of its businesses and the choices of its new leaders.

A legacy beyond the balance sheet
Buffett’s influence extends beyond Berkshire Hathaway.

His investment philosophy has shaped generations of investors, fund managers and business leaders. The principles of buying quality businesses, avoiding unnecessary debt and allowing capital to compound have become part of mainstream investment thinking.

His philanthropic commitments have also been significant.

Buffett has pledged to give away the vast majority of his wealth to charitable causes. He has been associated with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and co-founded the Giving Pledge in 2010 with Bill Gates and Melinda French Gates.

The initiative encouraged billionaires to commit to giving away at least half of their wealth during their lifetimes or through their wills.

Buffett’s philanthropy reflected his long-term investment strategy: he believed in using capital to generate enduring benefits.

The end of an era

Warren Buffett’s departure from the Berkshire Hathaway chairmanship is the closing chapter of one of the most remarkable careers in business.

He took control of a struggling textile company in 1965 and transformed it into a diversified conglomerate with a global shareholder base.

Along the way, he helped redefine value investing, built a powerful insurance operation and demonstrated the importance of disciplined capital allocation.

His partnership with Charlie Munger became a model for business collaboration. His annual letters became essential reading for investors. His public image made him one of the most recognisable figures in finance.

Now, Berkshire moves into a new phase.

Greg Abel will lead the business. Howard Buffett will oversee the board as chairman. Warren Buffett will remain a director and chairman emeritus, retaining a connection to the company he built.

The test for Berkshire will be whether its institutions can carry forward the principles that made it successful.

For investors, the Buffett era may be ending in name. But the businesses, capital and philosophy that he assembled will continue to shape Berkshire Hathaway for years to come.

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Wong told parliament that the government had deliberately chosen not to implement the new benchmark in a single step.

“Restraint cannot become neglect,” Wong said, arguing that political salaries had remained unchanged for 15 years while private-sector and civil-service salaries had risen.

He said the issue was ultimately about ensuring Singapore could continue to attract capable people into politics, particularly from the private sector.

Wong said he had personally approached several senior permanent secretaries and chief executives before the recent general election to persuade them to enter politics. None of those he approached agreed to make the move.

Senior executives in large listed companies can earn several million dollars a year, Wong said, meaning that joining politics can involve a substantial financial sacrifice even after the revised salary framework is taken into account.

“I have not given up,” Wong told Parliament, saying he hoped to persuade more senior professionals to enter politics before the next election.

Coordinating Minister for Public Services Chan Chun Sing also defended the changes, saying the review was aimed at giving Singapore a better chance of building a “first-rate team” of political leaders.

Chan said the revised framework should make it easier to recruit people at different stages of their careers, including younger Singaporeans in their 30s and 40s who may have significant financial commitments.

The government will also widen salary ranges to between 75% and 125% of the reference salary, giving the prime minister greater flexibility to determine pay based on an officeholder’s experience, performance, and responsibilities.

The existing four ministerial grades will be streamlined into three, with the MR2 and MR3 grades merged. Most ministers who remain at MR4 are expected to earn about SUSD 1.35 million by the end of the current term, rather than automatically moving towards the new SUSD 1.8 million benchmark.

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Singapore’s political salary system links the MR4 benchmark to the median annual income of the country’s top 1,000 earners, with a 40% discount intended to reflect the ethos of public service. The government says the system is designed to keep political salaries competitive while maintaining transparency and reducing incentives for corruption.

The remuneration package also contains a significant variable component. About 35% of a political officeholder’s reference remuneration is variable, including an individual performance bonus and a national bonus linked to national economic and social outcomes.

Under the revised system, the national bonus will be more tightly linked to unemployment and real income growth for Singaporeans at both the median and lower-income levels. The bonus can range from zero to six months.

Wong, meanwhile, said he would donate the entire increase in his salary for the next five years to suitable charitable causes, assuming he remains prime minister. He stressed that this was a personal decision and that he did not expect other political officeholders to follow suit.

Members of parliament will also receive higher allowances. Their monthly allowance will rise from SUSD 13,750 to SUSD 18,500, while allowances for nominated MPs and non-constituency MPs will also increase. These changes will take effect on October 15.

The changes are likely to remain politically sensitive. Singapore’s political salaries are already among the highest in the world, and the previous framework was introduced after a 36% reduction in 2012 following public criticism.

The government deferred a scheduled review in 2023 because of economic uncertainty. Wong said the latest review was necessary because prolonged restraint had caused political salaries to fall increasingly behind comparable remuneration in the private sector and parts of the public service.

The revised framework will be reviewed independently every five years, while the updated national bonus system will come into effect from January 2027.

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The challenge is broader than Siri. AI is changing how consumers search, create content, use software, and interact with devices. Apple faces significant challenges as its competitive edge has historically relied on its control over hardware, software, and services.

And it is also struggling with supply chain snags, especially on the chip front. To deal with the industry-wide chip shortages, the tech giant has already lifted prices across its Mac and iPad ‌line-ups. It has also braced up for dampening sales figures in the current quarter.

Ternus must determine how AI should reshape the iPhone and wider Apple ecosystem without undermining the privacy and security principles that distinguish the company.

The timing is demanding. Apple is preparing for a major product cycle, with its September 9 launch event expected to showcase new iPhones and potentially its first foldable iPhone. It will be Ternus’s first major public product moment as CEO.

Analysts see high-end devices like the upcoming foldable iPhone eventually becoming the main driver of Apple’s higher selling prices and margin growth.

Investors will also be watching whether he can revive a perception that Apple has become more evolutionary than revolutionary. Cook leaves behind an extraordinary financial record.

Apple’s market capitalisation rose from about USD 350 billion when he became CEO to roughly USD 4 trillion, while services grew into a business generating more than USD 100 billion a year.

The company also launched successful new categories such as Apple Watch and AirPods and developed its own chip technology.

Yet Apple’s recent AI missteps have created a strategic vulnerability. The company is competing with smartphone rivals and technology companies spending tens of billions on AI infrastructure, models, and talent globally.

That could push Ternus toward a more hardware-led answer to the AI race. His engineering background may prove useful as Apple seeks to build devices in which AI is embedded rather than simply offered as a cloud service.

Future products such as foldable phones, smarter wearables, augmented-reality devices, and more powerful Macs could become important parts of that strategy.

There is also a management challenge. Ternus must preserve the operational discipline that made Cook’s Apple extraordinarily profitable while encouraging greater risk-taking and faster decision-making.

He will also have to manage relationships with suppliers, regulators, and governments at a time when Apple faces scrutiny over its App Store practices and remains dependent on a complex global manufacturing network.

For now, Ternus has the advantage of continuity. He knows Apple’s culture, products, and senior leadership from the inside and has worked under both Steve Jobs and Cook. Apple’s board has described him as the right leader to take the company into its next phase.

But continuity may not be enough. Scale, efficiency, and financial expansion defined the Cook era. The Ternus era will be judged increasingly by whether Apple can turn AI from a weakness into a new source of product leadership.

His first job, in other words, is not simply to make Apple smarter. It is to make sure the company does not fall behind while the definition of “smart” is being rewritten.

Trying to break Samsung’s monopoly
Currently, Samsung Electronics dominates the niche called the “foldable smartphone market,” with the segment touted to be the next mainstream despite its premium price tags.

Foldable phones are anticipated to be a promising opportunity for consumer electronics companies that have encountered challenges due to a significant shortage of memory and storage chips, leading to price increases and a decline in overall consumer demand.

As per the research firm IDC, there will be a 12.6% jump in foldable phone shipments in 2026, whereas conventional smartphones will see a record ⁠16.7% export decline.

Analysts expect Apple to launch a foldable iPhone with a screen similar in size to an iPad mini. Earlier in 2026, Samsung unveiled a new ⁠passport-sized foldable phone as the South Korean tech giant seeks to consolidate its industry foothold.

Apple is expected to ship more than 17 million foldable iPhones by 2027, IDC predicted.

In 2025, Apple unveiled a slimmer iPhone Air and loaded its iPhone 17 base models with several better features. The iPhone 17 line-up helped drive a strong upgrade cycle among consumers.

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Yet market cap alone is a crude measure. What matters to shareholders, employees, and customers is what that valuation represents.

The creation of sustainable, recurring revenue streams. Here, Cook’s strategic choices become clearer. When he started, Apple was a company of peaks and troughs, dependent on product cycles. By the end, it had become a company of steady climbs.

The services revolution
In 2011, Apple’s services business – consisting primarily of the App Store, iTunes, and AppleCare – generated 6.3 billion pound annually.

This quarter, Apple reported 24.6 billion pound in services revenue alone. For fiscal year 2025, services reached £87 billion, making it Apple’s second-largest business after the iPhone, with a gross margin significantly higher than hardware.

This was deliberate strategy. Cook understood that the installed base of iPhone users represented not just a current revenue opportunity, but a platform for recurring income. Under his watch, Apple launched Apple Music, Apple TV+, Apple Fitness+, Apple News+, and Apple Arcade.

The workers haven’t received the news of the group paring back its model line-up and production capacity positively either.

When Blume visited Volkswagen’s headquarters in Wolfsburg to begin his outreach campaign among the workers, he stated, “Our plan for the future is the largest transformation programme in our company’s history. To make the transformation happen, everyone needs to pull together now.”

As per the reports, the crowd responded to the statement with boos. Banners bore slogans such as “Our jobs are not your balance sheet adjustments” and “Respect is not up for negotiation.”

Cavallo, seizing the momentum, said German factories were “an integral part” of the group.

“Our trust in this company’s executive board, and especially in its CEO Oliver Blume, has been damaged. Not yet beyond repair, but damaged nonetheless,” she said, according to excerpts of her speech shared by the works council.

“Cooperation ⁠is possible, but if VW management chooses only to pursue a path of layoffs and cutbacks, we will oppose it with all our might,” IG Metall union representative Thorsten Groeger remarked after the meeting.

Image Credit: Volkswagen

The trigger was a set of quarterly numbers that beat expectations, and, more importantly for the market, the first clear evidence that his successor Greg Abel is willing to spend.

Berkshire’s cash and short-term Treasury holdings fell to USD 364.7 billion on June 30, down from USD 380.2 billion three months earlier.

On the broader measure that Berkshire also discloses, the pile peaked at a record USD 397.4 billion at the end of March. Either way, the direction of travel has changed for the first time since early 2022.

During the quarter, Berkshire repurchased USD 4.5 billion of its own stock and bought USD 23.5 billion of other companies’ shares, including a USD 10 billion position in Google and YouTube parent Alphabet.

Set against the USD 235 million of buybacks in Abel’s first quarter in the chair, that is a striking acceleration. Berkshire was also a net buyer of equities to the tune of USD 19.8 billion, ending a streak of 14 consecutive quarters in which it sold more shares than it bought.

Shortly after the quarter closed, Abel completed the USD 6.8 billion purchase of homebuilder Taylor Morrison, valuing the business at roughly USD 8.5 billion including debt.

The operating numbers helped. Operating earnings rose 16% to USD 12.98 billion from USD 11.16 billion a year earlier. Net earnings, flattered by USD 12.7 billion of investment gains, more than doubled to USD 25.67 billion.

Manufacturing, service and retailing profits jumped 24% to USD 4.47 billion, Berkshire Hathaway Energy rose 27% to USD 891 million and railroad BNSF added 6% to USD 1.56 billion. Insurance was the weak spot, with underwriting earnings down 13% and GEICO’s underwriting profit falling 45%.

How Buffett ran the same balance sheet
For most of the past four years, Berkshire’s defining act was inaction. Buffett let the cash build because he could not find businesses he wanted at prices he was willing to pay.

He sold down a large slice of the Apple stake, took profits elsewhere, parked the proceeds in Treasury bills and waited. Cash climbed from USD 334 billion at the end of 2024 to USD 373 billion a year later, and kept climbing into 2026.

His reasoning was never mysterious. Buffett wanted a fortress balance sheet that could absorb a mega-catastrophe in the insurance business without forcing a single asset sale, and he wanted the firepower to act when other people could not.

That is exactly what happened in 2008, when Berkshire wrote cheques to Goldman Sachs and General Electric on terms nobody else could offer. The cash was not idle in his mind. It was an option on somebody else’s panic.

He was also being paid to wait. With short-term rates elevated, a USD 350 billion Treasury bill position threw off serious income at almost no risk. His last significant acquisition before stepping back was the USD 9.7 billion purchase of OxyChem in 2025.

The case for waiting
The strengths of the Buffett approach are easy to list. Nothing gets destroyed. A conglomerate that never overpays never has to write down goodwill, never has to explain a bad deal at the annual meeting and never loses the trust of its shareholders.

Optionality has real value in a market where an air pocket can appear without warning, and Berkshire’s insurance float only works if the parent can always pay claims.

The weaknesses are just as clear, and shareholders had begun to say so out loud. A cash position running near 29% of the company’s total size is a drag on returns.

Treasury bills beat losing money, but they do not compound the way a good operating business does, and the income is fully taxed. Berkshire pays no dividend, so investors who wanted their capital working had no way to reclaim it. The longer the pile grew, the more it looked less like patience and more like a shortage of ideas.

The case for spending
Abel’s version is not reckless, whatever the headlines suggest. Spending roughly USD 15 billion out of USD 380 billion is a change of tone rather than a change of religion. But the tone matters.

Buying back stock when the shares trade below what the businesses are worth mechanically lifts value per share for everyone who stays.

The Taylor Morrison deal fits Berkshire’s existing footprint, sitting alongside Clayton Homes, Shaw Industries, MiTek and HomeServices of America, which is the kind of synergy Buffett himself always favoured. Abel has signalled he will buy whole companies rather than only shares, which is the harder and more useful skill for a conglomerate of this size.

The Alphabet position, meanwhile, gives Berkshire exposure to artificial intelligence infrastructure through a business with the cash flows and moat that Berkshire has always liked.

Notably, Forbes reported that Buffett himself negotiated that investment at a discount, which suggests the old man’s fingerprints are still on the biggest single trade of the quarter.

The risks are real too. A homebuilder is a cyclical, rate-sensitive asset bought at a point in the cycle when American housing affordability is stretched. Buybacks executed at higher prices are simply a transfer from continuing shareholders to exiting ones.

Every dollar spent is a dollar not available when the next dislocation arrives, and Berkshire’s whole historic advantage was being the last buyer standing. There is also a subtler danger.

A new chief executive under pressure to prove he is not merely a caretaker can feel obliged to act, and deals made to answer critics tend to age badly.

What analysts are saying
Wall Street’s verdict so far is approving but conditional. Analysts have described the mood around Berkshire as a “show me” posture, with shareholders waiting for sustained proof that Abel can allocate capital as well as his predecessor did.

The consensus price target sits almost exactly at the current share price, which is about as neutral as coverage gets. Consensus forecasts also point to earnings drifting lower by roughly 2.4% a year over the next three years, which raises the bar for every deployment decision Abel makes.

The share price tells the same story. Berkshire entered August up about 3% for the year against a roughly 13% advance for the S&P 500, a gap of some ten percentage points that reflects lingering doubt about the transition rather than any weakness in the underlying businesses.

There is warmth in the commentary as well. Gabelli Funds’ Macrae Sykes noted that Berkshire continues to build shareholder net worth in Abel’s first year despite a tougher backdrop in the insurance industry, which is a fair reading of a quarter where the operating engines fired and only underwriting stumbled.

Analysts at Forbes cautioned that insurance headwinds will probably hold full-year operating earnings growth to the low to mid single digits, so the deployment story is doing a lot of the work in the share price at the moment.

Buffett, now chairman, offered his own endorsement at the annual meeting in May, telling shareholders that Greg is doing everything he did and then some. Coming from a man who spent six decades guarding this balance sheet, that is not a small thing to say.

The honest verdict
Neither approach is obviously right, because they are answers to different questions. Buffett was managing a company he had built and could afford to run at his own pace, and his caution was underwritten by 60 years of credibility.

Abel inherited a balance sheet that had drifted into an unusual shape and a shareholder base that wanted to see a plan. Sitting on the pile for another two years would have been the riskier choice for him, not the safer one.

The real test is not how fast the cash goes out but what it buys. Berkshire’s next 13F filing, along with the performance of Taylor Morrison and Alphabet through a full cycle, will say far more about Abel’s judgment than a single quarter of accelerated spending.

For now, the market has given him the benefit of the doubt, which is a good deal more than it was giving him in January.

He told the nominee directors of the Sir Dorabji Tata Trust on August 12 2026 that he would step away when his current term ends on February 20 2027.

Real estate investment trust Welltower awarded its chief executive, Shankh Mitra, USD 821 million intended to cover roughly a decade of pay; only 19% of shareholders backed it.

“Welltower’s board and compensation committee remain committed to engaging with shareholders to gather their feedback and understand their perspectives,” a spokesperson told Reuters, while adding that Mitra would receive the full amount only by hitting all performance targets.

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Compensation committees usually argue that these pay packages help align the interests of executives with those of shareholders, pointing out that support for “say on pay” votes among S&P 500 companies averaged 90.6% through late June, according to the consultancy Semler Brossy, which is an increase from 89.4% for all of 2025.

The report also highlighted United States President Donald Trump’s income, which rose almost 254% to USD 2.2 billion in 2025, driven largely by cryptocurrency holdings.

A White House spokesperson said all of the Republican’s assets were held in discretionary accounts managed by independent institutions, adding there was no conflict of interest.

The AFL-CIO noted that workers’ share of US national income has fallen to its lowest level since the Second World War, even as mean annual wages rose 3% to USD 69,770.

Rising CEO pay and inequality with the salaries and incentives received by the workers will again reignite the broader political debate on why the American workforce is having trouble affording housing, healthcare and other necessities.

Mean annual wages for all American workers were USD 69,770 as of May 2025, up 3% from a year earlier, according to the Labour Department statistics.

The board says it looked at internal and external candidates worldwide before settling unanimously on the 61-year-old Ethiopian, who spent more than 36 years at Ethiopian Airlines Group.

An internal Air India document reviewed by Reuters described him as a “change leader” with particular strength in crisis management. That phrasing matters. Air India is not asking him to grow an airline. It is asking him to steady one.

From the cargo desk to Africa’s largest carrier

Gebremariam joined Ethiopian Airlines in 1985 as a traffic officer in the cargo unit in Addis Ababa.

He worked through cargo, sales and commercial operations, and served as regional director for India and South Asia in the 1990s, which gave him early exposure to the market he is now walking into.

He took over marketing and sales in 2004, became chief operating officer in 2006, and was appointed group chief executive in January 2011.

The eleven years that followed produced one of the industry’s better growth stories. Revenue rose roughly fourfold, from about USD 1 billion to about USD 5 billion. The fleet grew from 33 aircraft to around 134.

The international network roughly doubled to 128 destinations and annual passenger numbers went from three million to twelve million.

He was named “African CEO of the Year” in 2012 and later collected the International Civil Aviation Organization’s “Award for Excellence” and CAPA’s “Airline Executive of the Year.”

The number that explains him best, though, is the roughly USD 1 billion he ploughed into the ground rather than the air. Addis Ababa acquired the continent’s largest cargo terminal, an aviation university, maintenance hangars, a catering centre and a 1,000-room hotel.

Ethiopian also took anchor stakes in ASKY Airlines in Togo, Malawi Airlines and Zambia Airways, extending its reach without flying every sector itself. He did not build an airline so much as a hub economy, one that pulled Africa to Asia and Africa to Europe traffic away from Gulf carriers.

Two crises, no bailout
His crisis record is the reason Tata has hired him. In March 2019, Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 went down six minutes after departing Addis Ababa, killing all 157 people on board and helping ground the Boeing 737 MAX worldwide.

Ethiopian sent the recorders to France rather than to the United States, defended its crew publicly and refused to hurry the aircraft back into service.

The MAX returned to its fleet only in February 2022, and Gebremariam framed the decision entirely around safety. The airline kept expanding and stayed profitable through it.

Then came the cOVID pandemic. Ethiopian took no government bailout, converted passenger aircraft into freighters and let cargo carry the group through the collapse in travel.

By its 2021/22 financial year the group was back at about USD 5 billion in revenue with profit sharply higher. He stepped down in March 2022 on health grounds, then ran his own consultancy, TGM Advisory Services, and advised Delta Air Lines.

The inheritance in Delhi
The parallel with Air India is uncomfortably close.

On 12 June 2025, flight AI171, a Boeing 787-8 bound for London Gatwick, came down about 32 seconds after leaving Ahmedabad and struck a medical college hostel.

Of the 242 people on board, 241 died, along with 19 people on the ground. The preliminary report found that both engine fuel control switches moved from RUN to CUTOFF within a second of each other.

In late July 2026 the government told Parliament that detailed testing had found no abnormality in the switch or its locking detents, and that the full thrust control module is still being examined at Boeing’s facility.

The final report is expected around October. Until it arrives, the airline lives with an unexplained accident, and the reputational cost of one.

The scrutiny has not let up in the meantime. In February this year a 787 was grounded in Bengaluru after a pilot reported that a fuel control switch would not lock into RUN, an episode that triggered a public disagreement with the UK regulator over the decision to operate the sector home.

The financial picture is worse. Air India and Air India Express posted a combined net loss of Rs 22,238 crore in FY26, more than double the previous year’s Rs 10,859 crore, on combined revenue of Rs 71,870 crore that fell almost 9%.

Chairman N Chandrasekaran has told shareholders that great airlines are built over decades rather than quarters, which is a fair statement of aviation economics and also an admission that the timetable has slipped.

Fleet renewal, the centrepiece of the Wilson era, is running behind the marketing.

Of 570 aircraft ordered, 524 are still to arrive. The narrowbody refit is largely done, but the widebody programme runs to mid-2027 for the 787s and to October 2028 for the legacy 777s, held up by a worldwide shortage of premium seats.

Seventeen ageing narrowbodies meant for retirement are being kept and refitted instead. Net capacity this year is close to flat.

Around all of this sits geopolitics. Pakistan has kept its airspace shut to Indian carriers since April 2025, renewing the notice month by month, most recently to August 24.

Air India has put the cost at around USD 455 million a year in forgone profit before tax, with fuel burn up as much as 29% on affected sectors and some journeys three hours longer.

Washington DC has already gone. Meanwhile IndiGo took a record 66.3% of the domestic market in June, with better punctuality and a quarter of Air India’s cancellation rate.

What he can actually change
Four levers look plausible.

The first is safety credibility, rebuilt slowly and visibly. Ethiopian’s response in 2019 was to be transparent, protect the internal reporting culture and let the evidence run its course. Air India needs the chief executive to be the public face of that, not the communications team.

The second is hub economics, which is his specialism. Delhi as a genuine transfer hub for India to Europe and India to North America traffic is the Addis Ababa idea transplanted, and it is the only structural answer to the Gulf carriers taking Indian passengers through their own hubs.

The third is revenue that does not depend on seats. Cargo, the greenfield maintenance base in Bengaluru and the training academy in Gurugram are already built or building. Ethiopian showed what happens when those units stop being cost centres.

The fourth is network honesty. Routes that cannot pay while the airspace is shut should stay parked, and the retrofitted aircraft should go where premium yields actually are.

The caution is that Ethiopian had a protected home market, state ownership and a low cost base. Air India has none of those, and faces a rival carrying two of every three domestic passengers. Gebremariam cannot reopen Pakistani airspace or speed up Airbus and Boeing. What he can do is decide what this airline is for, and stop it losing money while it works that out.